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Abstract
The Aims of this thesis are to understand the changes of the concept of sovereignty in
the international system considering the role of regional and functional arrangements
and the contribution of federalism as a political theory.
Federal theory is particularly important to the concept of sovereignty, particularly if
one considers the diversity of federal political systems and their different historical
experiences. Thus the thesis examines the federal experience of the United States
throughout history and the European tradition of federalism. The present research is
an attempt to emphasise the diversity of federalism as a legal and political concept
and to demonstrate that federal political systems can be applicable beyond the modern
state.
The EU is a paradigmatic case of a regional arrangement, ‘proto-federal’ that
challenges the notion of sovereignty as an exclusive statehood attribute. The thesis
examines the recent decision of the German Federal Constitutional Court concerning
the Treaty of Lisbon, which can be seen as an archetype of the challenges posed to
European integration. Moreover, the thesis analyses the concept of subsidiarity,
considered by some as a potential replacement of the concept of sovereignty.
A theory of institutions is required in order to understand the mechanisms of
international cooperation between states, this means that sovereignty should take into
account international institutions and their constitutive role on state behaviour.
Furthermore, the reconceptualization of sovereignty should consider at least three
different factors: the rise of regional and functional legal orders, the different
understandings of sovereignty offered by the federalist tradition and the processes of
‘deterritorialization’ and disaggregation of authority.
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Introduction to the Thesis
1. Research Objectives
The research objectives of this thesis are:
1. To develop theory on the changes of the concept of sovereignty in the
international order.
2. To explore the impact of international and supranational arrangements in
the redefinition of the concept of sovereignty.
3. To construct a new understanding of the contribution of federal
arrangements in the reconceptualization of sovereignty.
The thesis examines the concept of sovereignty in International Law considering that
it is the ordering principle of the current international system. The United Nations
Charter recognises the principle of sovereign equality of its members (Article 2/1).
The thesis identifies the principle of sovereignty as part of the constitutive or
‘constitutional’ rules of the international system. The constitutional rules of the
international system include rules of membership, rules of behaviour and meta-rules
(secondary rules). Furthermore, the thesis examines the challenges to sovereignty by
regional and functional arrangements. The role of the mechanisms of international
governance is also important, considering the growing institutionalisation of the
international system. Particularly important is the contribution of the federalist
tradition to the concept of sovereignty considering that federalism sees sovereignty as
a pluralistic concept as opposed to the understanding of the dominant tradition
associated with the modern territorial state.
The European Union is presented as an example of a regional arrangement where
sovereignty has evolved to accommodate the claims of member states and the Union.
As such, European integration presents opportunities to understand the impact of
global governance mechanisms in challenging state authority and reconceptualizing
sovereignty.
xv
The thesis is guided by the following research questions:
1. The extent to which competing concepts can accurately be substituted for
sovereignty, such as the principle of subsidiarity.
2. Whether sovereignty remains relevant to the notion of international order,
characterised by increasing institutionalisation, and if so, to what extent.
3. The nature of the role of international institutions in the redefinition of the
concept of sovereignty.
4. The contribution of federal arrangements to the study of sovereignty.
2. Methodology and Methods
The thesis follows a multidisciplinary approach and is informed by research in the
social sciences, particularly by International Relations and Institutional Economics.
International Relations theory is particularly relevant, considering the different
approaches to the study of international institutions, specifically Neo-Institutionalism
and Constructivism.
The thesis starts with the legal approach, which implies the use of international legal
sources defined by the Article 38(1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice
as: International Conventions, International Custom, and General Principles of Law,
Judicial Decisions and the Writings of International Publicists.
The limitations of the legal approach particularly in explaining the reasons for
international cooperation and the rise of mechanisms of global governance, has led the
thesis to use a multidisciplinary approach.1 Social science research is concerned with
social facts, the way the world is, not necessarily how the world ought to be, as
Monahan and Walker argue: ‘Law, in contrast, is normative. It does not describe how
1 On the limitations of the legal approach and the need for multidisciplinary approach, Reza
Banakar and Max Travers ‘Law, Sociology and Method,’ in Reza Banakar and Max Travers
(eds), Theory and Method in Socio-Legal Research, Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2005.
xvi
people do behave, but rather prescribes how they should behave’.2 This means that the
social sciences allow Law to escape from a ‘restricted methodological vision’.3
The European Union is chosen as a paradigmatic case (the most salient) of the
changes of the concept of sovereignty in the international system. European
integration is an example of the disaggregation of authority, and as such, offers
valuable lessons about the changes of sovereignty in a world composed of multiple
institutional arrangements (regional and functional) that challenge sovereignty as an
exclusive attribute of the modern state.
3. Structure of the Thesis
The thesis consists of five chapters. Chapter 1 examines the evolution of the concept
of sovereignty in history since the Peace of Westphalia of 1648. Additionally, it
outlines the dichotomy between two philosophical traditions in understanding the
concept of sovereignty: the tradition that begins with the works of Jean Bodin and
Thomas Hobbes, and the federalist tradition, inaugurated by Johannes Althusius.
Chapter 2 analyses the roles institutions and institutional theory play in the
understanding of the concept of sovereignty. The chapter discusses the need for an
interdisciplinary approach to studying international affairs. Furthermore, it provides
an explanation for the design and evolution of international institutions, and their
impact on sovereignty.
Chapter 3 examines the contribution of federalism as a legal and political theory to the
study of sovereignty, following the federalist tradition. In the chapter there is a
2 John Monahan and Laurens Walker, ‘Social Authority: Obtaining, Evaluating, and
Establishing Social Science in Law,’ University of Pennsylvania Law Review, vol. 134, No.3,
1986, p. 489. Law is essentially normative, and as such, is concerned primarily with rules and
the legal system.
3 Geoffrey Samuel, ‘Epistemology and Comparative Law: Contributions from the Sciences
and the Social Sciences,’ in Hoecke, Mark van, Epistemology and Methodology of
Comparative Law, Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2004, p. 73.
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discussion of the different historical experiences of the United States, Germany and
Switzerland, and the possibilities of federalism beyond the state.
Chapter 4 analyses the European Union as a salient case of a federal political system,
in which the concept of sovereignty is reframed into a new paradigm. The chapter
provides a discussion of some of the innovations introduced by the Treaty of Lisbon,
and discusses the recent decision of the German Federal Constitutional Court as an
archetype of the challenges to European integration, posed by the different national
Supreme and Constitutional Courts of the member states.
Chapter 5 concludes the thesis by discussing the concept of sovereignty in a post-
Westphalian world where authority is challenged by multiple institutional
arrangements. Moreover, the chapter discusses the phenomenon of
‘deterritorialization’ of authority. It looks at the notion of global legal pluralism as an
alternative to either monism or dualism in International Law, as a theory of the
articulation of legal systems, with multiple claims to ultimate authority or sovereignty.
The chapter concludes with the adoption of the Althusian framework of sovereignty.
1Chapter 1
Evolution of the Concept of Sovereignty in International Law
1. Introduction
The concept of sovereignty has been the cornerstone of International Law and of the
international system since at least the Peace of Westphalia (1648), and the history of
its origins and evolution is relevant to its reconceptualization, particularly if one sees
sovereignty in the context of the rise, and perhaps the wane, of the modern territorial
state at the beginning of the twenty-first century.
There are two historical traditions in the concept of sovereignty: one that sees
sovereignty as an absolute concept of the modern territorial state, beginning with the
works of Jean Bodin, hereinafter the ‘Bodinian tradition’, and the other that sees
sovereignty as an attribute of different polities sharing a federal arrangement, the
‘Althusian tradition’, by reference to its earlier exponent Johannes Althusius. This
chapter examines the origins and evolution of the concept of sovereignty by reference
to these two traditions, since the Peace of Westphalia, to the current international
system.
Concepts of social science arise to further explain and describe certain aspects of the
reality, offering simplified descriptions or explanations of a larger phenomenon. This
applies also to the concepts within the social sciences, ‘Indeed concept formation lies
at the heart of all social science endeavour’.1
Thus, concepts are not just words that define and explain reality, but in many ways
they denote simplifications of reality itself, a fact explained by the need of parsimony,
a necessary condition for the explanatory power of a concept.2 This explains why
1 John Gerring, ‘What Makes a Concept Good? A Criterial Framework for Understanding
Concept Formation in the Social Sciences,’ Polity, vol. 31, 1999, p. 359.
2 John Gerring, Social Science Methodology: A Criterial Framework, New York: Cambridge
University Press, 2001.
2concepts are bound by their historical specificity;3 why a history of concepts must first
address the formulation of a concept at a particular historical period against its
institutional and cultural background, and why ‘Conceptual changes need to be
understood in terms of the people who create and change their representations of
nature and the practices they use to do so’.4
Consequently, the study of sovereignty has been bound by the formulations and the
concepts of different authors, at different historical periods, since the emergence of
modern territorial state, and for this reason, it is a concept that has been in constant
mutation in the legal-political narrative.5 The concept of sovereignty is a political and
legal concept used to describe and explain the legal attributes of a political territorial
entity, called the State,6 as Hinsley argues: ‘To understand the origin of this concept it
3 The term, ‘historical specificity’, is borrowed from Geoffrey Hodgson. It means that
concepts are bound and defined in their historical and cultural milieu and, therefore, a
reconstitution of the history of a particular concept needs to account for concepts in the way
they were understood in their historical and cultural pedigree. As Hodgson reminds us, ‘The
problem of historical specificity addresses the limits of explanatory unification in social
science’. Geoffrey Hodgson, How Economics Forgot History: The Problem of Historical
Specificity in Social Science (Economics as Social Theory), London: Routledge, 2001, p. 23.
4 Nancy Nersessian, Creating Scientific Concepts, Cambridge, MA: Massachusetts Institute of
Technology, 2008, p. 5.
5 Sovereignty is also an essentially contestable concept, meaning that sovereignty is a
normative concept that expresses a certain state of affairs; that of the modern territorial state.
However, it is also a concept, which is disputable by different users. See Samantha Besson,
‘Sovereignty in Conflict,’ European Integration Online Papers (EIoP) vol. 8(15),
2004:http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2004-015a.htm [Accessed 21.12.2010]. Similarly, Dan
Sarooshi, International Organizations and Their Exercise of Sovereign Powers, Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2005, pp. 3–5. On the essential contestability of normative concepts
see Samantha Besson, The Morality of Conflict: Reasonable Disagreement and the Law,
Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2005, p. 72.
6 The etymology of the word State first appears in relation to Italian city-states to describe a
‘state of affairs’, which in Italy, was known as Stato, from the Latin root Status, and which
later came to describe the legal entity of the polity we have come to understand as the State.
See Johan Kaspar Blunstschli, The Theory of the State (First published in German, Lehrevom
Modernen Stat,1875), Ontario: Batoche Books, 2000; Philip Bobbitt, The Shield of Achilles,
3is necessary to distinguish between the emergence of the state as a distinctive
institution and, on the other hand, the extent to which the state is recognised and
extent to which its rule is effective’.7
Sovereignty as a concept continuously changes according to the different foundational
periods of a given ‘international system’.8 As Fowler and Bunck argue, ‘Sovereignty
thus brought to mind somewhat different notions for people in different centuries’.9
As a concept, sovereignty has been used to describe an attribute of statehood as an
issue of ultimate political authority, but as a concept, sovereignty does not retain a
fixed meaning;10 it is not an irreducible concept, although some aspects of it are
irreducible. What is understood by this is that sovereignty as a legal concept can be
defined and attributed with having the supreme power and authority within a territory,
the summa potestas. This supreme authority is given to the State, and as such,
sovereignty can be seen as an absolute category in that a state cannot be more or less
sovereign. Sovereignty, as will become clear in the subsequent sections, is an attribute
derived from statehood, although this does not mean that as an attribute of statehood11
sovereignty is a static concept, rather, as will be explored below, it is a flexible
concept that has been stretched to apply to different foundational moments of a
particular international system.
War, Peace and the Course of History, London: Penguin Books, 2002, p. 87; Kenneth Dyson,
The State Tradition in Western Europe, Oxford: Martin Robertson, 1980.
7 F. H. Hinsley, Sovereignty, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986, p. 21.
8 For this definition of an international system, see Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A
Study of Order in World Politics, London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002, p. 9.
9 Michael Ross Fowler and Julie Marie Bunck, Law, Power, and the Sovereign State,
Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995, p. 6.
10 As Krasner recalls, the concept of sovereignty as it is used has at least four different
meanings: domestic sovereignty, interdependence sovereignty, international-legal sovereignty
and Westphalian sovereignty. See Stephen Krasner, Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy,
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999, p. 9.
11 The attribute, Statehood, is an inherent concept of the modern territorial state, which
claimed ultimate political authority in all affairs, religious and secular, in a demarcated
political territory.
41. Origins of the Concept of Sovereignty
The first author to describe sovereignty in the modern sense12 was the French writer
Jean Bodin, who described it as the ‘absolute and perpetual power of a
commonwealth’.13 In order to understand the concept of sovereignty, however, it is
necessary to understand the institutional background of the international system in the
sixteenth century.
The European continent contained a multiplicity of political authorities that were not
modelled on the territorial State system. Authority was not completely territorialised
in the hands of a ‘Leviathan’,14 but was divided into a vast range of overlapping
claims by different polities. For this reason, a theory of sovereignty was not possible
without a paradigmatic change of the medieval worldview. Medieval political theory
was still populated with the persistence of the ideal political community of the
Respublica Christiana,15 with the secular authority of the Holy Roman Empire and the
religious authority of the papacy.16 In this sense, all political authority, although based
12 As Hinsley argues: ‘Although the word “sovereignty” had gained currency by the beginning
of that century Bodin in his Les Six Livres de La République of 1576 was perhaps the first
man to state the theory behind the word’. Supra note 6, Hinsley, op. cit., p. 71.
13 Jean Bodin, Six Books of the Commonwealth (Les Six Livres de la République), first
published in 1576 (trans and edited by Julian H. Franklin), Book I, Chapter 8, On
Sovereignty: Four Chapters from The Six Books of the Commonwealth, Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1992, p. 1.
14 Thomas Hobbes, on the role of the state: Leviathan, first published in 1651 (edited by R.
Tuck), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.
15 Christian Commonwealth.
16 As the historian, James Bryce, argued ‘Thus, the Holy Roman Church and the Holy Roman
Empire are one and the same thing, in two aspects: and Catholicism, the principle of the
universal Christian society, is also Romanism; that is, rests upon Rome, as the origin and type
of its universality; manifesting itself in a mystic dualism which corresponds to the two natures
of its Founder. As a divine and eternal, its head is the Pope, to whom souls have been
entrusted; as human and temporal, the Emperor, commissioned to rule men’s bodies and acts’.
James Bryce, The Holy Roman Empire, fourth edition, New York: Lovel, Coryell &
5on feudal lines, was ultimately subjected to the Empire, albeit with nominal authority.
This clashed with the claims to authority of all the other different political
authorities17 in temporal affairs, and in their claims of jure independence attesting to
their de facto autonomy; and was further exacerbated by the breakdown of religious
unity with the Protestant Reformation. As one author points out: ‘The Protestant and
especially the Calvinist interpretation of the Bible confirmed their commitment to a
disintegrated Europe of wholly independent states, in some of which at least they
would be free to enforce their religion and institute their form of society’.18
The pre-Westphalian system was not based on a notion of territorial states alone: it
was grounded in a pluralistic political order composed of different political
authorities, which usually overlapped, such as a league of cities (the Hanseatic league
is a prime example), city-states, principalities, duchies, bishoprics and other
autonomous polities, against the background of the persistence of the Holy Roman
Empire, and its nominal claim to universal authority. As Spruyt argues:
Systems of rule in the early Middle Ages had vastly different
characteristics. They were non-territorial, and sovereignty was, at best
disputed. Yet it would be wrong to think that these systems of rule did
not control a particular geographical space. As Robert Dodgshon argues,
all forms of organization – hunter-gatherer tribes, nomadic kinship
structures, empire, and states – occupy a certain space. The question is
whether the system of rule is predicated on and defined by fixed
territorial parameters. The medieval period lacked not only exclusivity
but also territoriality. Even in the feudal system of rule, where lords
Company, 1886, pp. 100–101; on the Holy Roman Empire, Peter H. Wilson, The Holy Roman
Empire 1495–1806, Basingstoke: Macmillan Press, 1999.
17 Especially the claims of the French Monarchy that claimed complete independence from
the Holy Roman Empire, and which provided the background for Bodin’s normative theory.
18Adam Watson, The Evolution of International Society: A Comparative Historical Analysis,
London: Routledge, 1992, p. 170.
6might have jurisdiction over manors and lands granted to them,
territoriality was not the defining trait of that logic of organization.19
Thus, all those modes of political organisation were, in a way, an antithesis of the
‘ideal-type’20 of modern territorial state. Authority was diffused and overlapping, and
no single centre or particular political community was able to claim ultimate supreme
authority, as the sovereign state had done after the Peace of Westphalia.
Consequently, Bodin’s work on sovereignty had a normative character, for he was not
describing the state of affairs of an empirical reality he witnessed, but was making the
case for the concentration of the ultimate legal authority of the sovereign territorial
state.21 Nevertheless, this perspective was decisive in changing the modern accepted
view of the concept of sovereignty as Beaulac stresses:
19 Hendrik Spruyt, The Sovereign State and its Competitors, Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1994, p. 35.Tilly identifies three types of polities: tribute-taking empires and systems of
fragmented sovereignty, in which he includes city-states and national states. See Charles
Tilly, Coercion, Capital and European States, AD 990–1992, Oxford: Blackwell, 1992, p. 21;
See also Charles Tilly, ‘Entanglements of European Cities and States,’ in Charles Tilly and
Wim P. Blockmans (eds), Cities and the Rise of States in Europe AD 1000 to 1800, Oxford:
Westview Press, 1994.
20 Here the ‘ideal type,’ is used in the Weberian tradition, meaning not a ‘real type’, but an
idealised type of what a certain category is supposed to be. As Max Weber reminds us: ‘An
ideal type is formed by one-sided accentuation of one or more points of view and by synthesis
of a great many diffuse, discreet, more or less present and occasionally absent concrete
individual phenomena, which are arranged according to those one-sidedly emphasised
viewpoints into a unified analytical construct. In this conceptual purity, this mental construct
cannot be found empirically anywhere in reality. It is a utopia. Historical research faces the
task of determining in each individual case, the extent to which this ideal construct
approximates to or diverges from reality.’ Max Weber, Edward Shills and Henry Finch (ed.
and trans.),Methodology of the Social Sciences, Illinois: Free Press, 1949, p. 90.
21 The concept of the ‘Nation-State’ is rejected, primarily because it is a concept associated
with an idealised territorial community that represents a particular nation based on an ethnic
or religious homogeneity, and secondly, because it is a concept that appears only after the
French Revolution. See Philipp Bobbitt, The Shield of Achilles, 2002, op. cit., pp. 178–204
and Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of
Nationalism, London: Verso 2006.
7The enlarged hermeneutic context of Six Livres in which its discourse
existed and has since been existing, supports the proposition that the
word ‘sovereignty’ was used by Bodin for a particular purpose; namely
to place the ruler at the apex of a pyramid of authority. Accordingly,
the sovereign prince should enjoy the most supreme power in the
hierarchical organisational structure of society, that is, the highest
unified power, free from any temporal authority. Internally, the
Parlament of Paris, the Estates-General, officials, magistrates and
commissioners would fall under the overarching authority of the
monarch. Externally (that is, internationally), the French King would
be fully independent of any other political entity, be it the Holy Roman
Empire, the papacy, or a foreign country.22
Bodin did not invent the concept, but he certainly gave it a precise meaning in his
theory; a normative theory of how power and authority should be assigned, rather than
a description of how authority worked in sixteenth-century France. His work was
seminal in the sense that: ‘Reflecting the spirit of his party and the political conditions
of his time, Bodin, in his masterly work, became the framer of the theory of
sovereignty upon which the French monarchy was to rest, upon which, in fact,
modern political science was to build’.23
Let us not forget that in Bodin’s work, sovereign power was also limited by what he
saw as the limits of Natural Law and Divine Law, following the medieval
understanding of it: ‘Hence just as a sovereign prince is not bound to the Laws of the
Greeks or any other foreigner whatever, so also with the Roman laws, to which he is
22 Stephane Beaulac, ‘The Social Power of Bodin’s Sovereignty and International Law,’
Melbourne Journal of International Law, 2003, vol. 4, No. 1; see also, Stephen Krasner,
Sovereignty: An Organized Hypocrisy, 1999, op. cit., p. 22.
23 C. E. Merrian Jr., History of the Theory of Sovereignty since Rousseau, New York:
Kessinger Publishing, 1900, pp. 13–14.
8bound even less than his own, except in so far as they conform to natural law, to
which law, says, Pindar, all Kings and princes are subject’.24
Thomas Hobbes was also influential in the history of political ideas, in the sense that
he laid out a political theory that justified the emergence of the modern territorial
state, by proposing a theory in which people subjected themselves to the authority of
the state25 in order to overcome the problems of security. However, it is important to
point out that Hobbes is mainly concerned with the dimension of internal sovereignty
and authority within the state, and not with the problems of international legal
sovereignty.26 Hobbes is also part of the Bodinian tradition, in that he also ascribes
ultimate authority, or sovereignty, to the monarch as a representative of the state,
arguing ‘From this Institution of a Commonwealth are derived all the Rights, and
Faculties of him, or them, on whom the Sovereign Power is conferred’.27 For Hobbes,
sovereignty assumes a unitary and indivisible aspect, as with Bodin, in that he only
recognises the authority of the state in which the citizenry gives its consent or
acquiescence.
It is not the purpose of this research to develop an exhaustive historiography of the
concept of sovereignty, but it is important to identify in history the different changes
in the concept of sovereignty, in both the legal and political scholarship. In order to
understand the transformations and changed meanings of sovereignty, it is also
necessary to understand the emergence of the territorial state as the most important
political entity in the international system. This was a process that occurred slowly,
and although scholars point out foundational moments of the current international
24Bodin, op. cit. Book I, Chapter 8, (396), p. 38. For a detailed analysis of the philosophical
implications of Bodin’s thought see Quentin Skinner, The Foundations of Modern Political
Thought: The Age of Reformation, vol. II, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978, pp.
284–301.
25 Hobbes preferred the term Commonwealth: ‘This done, the Multitude so united in one
Person, is called a Commonwealth, in Latin “Civitas”. This is the Generation of the great
Leviathan, or rather of that Mortall God, to which we owe under the Immortal God, our peace
and defence.’ Part II, Chapter XVII, op. cit., p. 120.
26Raia Prokhovnik, Sovereignty, History and Theory, Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2008, p. 56.
27Ibid., Part 2, Chapter XVIII, p. 121.
9system, such as the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, the fact is that modern territorial
states evolved gradually before and after the settlement achieved in Westphalia, as
Strayer argues: ‘But the change is usually so gradual that the process is hard to
document; it is impossible to say that at a certain point on the time scale loyalty to the
state becomes the dominant loyalty’.28
2. The Peace of Westphalia
Much has been written about the settlement achieved at Westphalia, which ended the
Thirty Years’ War,29 and is considered the foundational moment of the modern
territorial system. The traditional account considers Westphalia as the moment that
inaugurates the modern state system by defining the rights and duties of states as
having the supreme authority in their own territorial jurisdictions, as Philpott points
out: ‘In the wake of Westphalia, states were the chief form of constitutional authority
in Europe, and their authority faced no serious rival in the Holy Roman Empire’.30
The claim is that Westphalia is not just a ‘moment’, but the settlement that in itself is
28 Joseph R. Strayer, On the Medieval Origins of the Modern State, Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1970, (2005, Forward by C. Tilly and W. J. Jordan), pp. 9–10. Similarly,
Gunn: ‘State growth, however was not as linear a process as it may have appeared, whether to
its proponents or its enemies.’ Steven Gunn, ‘War, Religion and the State,’ in Euan Cameron
(ed.), Early Modern Europe: An Oxford History, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001, p.
123.
29 A conflict that lasted from 1618 to 1648, it determined the fate of Germany, included all
major European powers, and settled the wars of religion in Europe. It included the Peace
Treaty of Münster between the Holy Roman Empire and France, and the Peace Treaty of
Osnabruck between the Holy Roman Empire and Sweden. The Peace settlement included
most of the European countries involved in the conflict, and considering the nature of the war,
it was truly Pan-European. Randall Lessafer, ‘Peace Treaties from Lodi to Westphalia,’ in
Randall Lessafer (ed.), Peace Treaties and International Law in European History,
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004, p.10; Randall Lessafer, ‘The Westphalia
Peace Treaties and the Development of the Tradition of Great European Peace Settlements
Prior to 1648,’ Grotian, vol. 18, 1997.
30 Daniel Philpott, Revolutions in Sovereignty: How Ideas Shaped Modern International
Relations, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001, p. 84.
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constitutive of a new international system, based on the modern territorial state that
excludes other international actors such as city-states, League of cities and the Holy
Roman Empire.
For this reason, ‘Westphalia refashioned each of the three faces of sovereignty; its
legacy is the persistence of this refashioning over the following three centuries. At
Westphalia the state became the legitimate polity within Europe, while the Holy
Roman Empire virtually lost its sovereign prerogatives’.31 Sovereign statehood,32 in
this sense, is intrinsically related to the emergence and evolution of the state system at
Westphalia, and is seen by many as a ‘constitutional’ proto-charter of the international
community.
This, however, has been contentious, mainly because although Westphalia still
remains as a symbolic marker of the new world inaugurated by the modern territorial
sovereign state which consecrated the principle of ‘Cuius regio, eius religio’33 it was a
Treaty that disciplined the internal constitution of the Holy Roman Empire and
contained different polities to the modern territorial sovereign state.34
31 Ibid., p. 90.
32 To use the modern terminology.
33 The principle consecrated the rule that the ruler can choose and define the religion in its
domain or territory following the Peace of Augsburg in 1555. The Peace of Westphalia
recognises the power of the rulers in the multiple political authorities, especially in Germany,
to define the religion in its domain, settling the wars of religion in the European continent.
See Leo Gross, ‘The Peace of Westphalia 1648–1948,’American Journal of International
Law, vol. 42, No. 1, pp. 20–41.
34 The settlement achieved is not one that excludes different political actors, other than the
sovereign state such as the Holy Roman Empire, but one that works as a symbolic
representation of a new age. ‘Westphalia is not a literal moment of political transformation,
but, rather, the symbol of that change. After Westphalia the language of international
justification gradually shifted, away, from Christian unity and towards international diversity
based on a secular society of sovereign states’. Robert Jackson, Introduction, Sovereignty at
the New Millennium, Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 1999, p. 17. On the importance of
Westphalia as a symbolic, defining moment, see also Antonio Cassesse, International Law in
a Divided World, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986, pp. 34–53.
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Historically, Westphalia should not be seen as a meta-historical moment that
encompasses the notion that all polities before the Peace were not sovereign states,
and after the settlement, suddenly became sovereign states. It is a settlement that
marks a dramatic change, not in the way the sovereign state actually emerges, but in
the way this emergence is perceived in the legal and political literature. The shift was
symbolic, and should be seen from this perspective – not as a real shift – although
there is agreement with those that say: ‘The Peace of Westphalia, for better or worse,
marks the end of an epoch and the opening of another. It represents the majestic portal
which leads from the old to the new world’.35
This new international system was to be based on the principle of exclusive territorial
authority of the state, as clarified by Kratochwil: ‘Sovereignty became a distinct
institution when the claim to supreme authority was coupled with a specific rule of
allocation for exercising this authority’.36 It appears that, suddenly, it is the beginning
of the end for pluralism in legal and political authority in the European State system,
while at the same time, a gradual empirical centralisation of authority towards the
sovereign state and its rulers ensues. Sovereignty becomes the legal expression to
denote the loci of centralised and exclusive political power in the state externally in
international affairs, and internally, within the state;37 as Jouvenel – writing about the
centralisation of power in the hands of the monarch – puts it: ‘The plenitude potestatis
became the goal towards which the kings moved consciously. To reach it, a long road
stretched before them, for it was necessary to destroy all authorities other than their
35 Gross, op. cit., p. 28.
36 Friedrich Kratochwil, ‘Sovereignty as Dominium,’ in Gene M. Lyons and Michael
Mastanduno (eds), Beyond Westphalia? Sovereignty and International Intervention,
Baltimore and London: John Hopkins University Press, 1995, p. 25. On the exclusive
authority over territory of the modern state Pierson, The Modern State, London: Routledge,
1996, p. 12.
37 Internal sovereignty means that states have the monopoly on legitimate use of force within
a given territory, to use Max Weber’s expression, thus enjoying the exclusivity of authority in
a given territory.
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own. And that pre-supposed the complete subversion of the existing social order. This
slow revolution established what we call sovereignty’.38
2.1. Constitutional Rules of the International System
If one sees Westphalia as a foundational moment of the international community
composed of sovereign territorial states, it is necessary to identify the foundational
principles, norms and rules that created this particular system. The foundational or
‘constitutional’ rules39 should identify at least three types: rules of membership, rules
of behaviour and secondary rules.40 The rules of membership determine the types of
polities that are legitimate in the international system. In the international system
inaugurated after the Peace of Westphalia, the sovereign territorial state is only one of
the many types of polities accepted, although after Westphalia, it becomes
increasingly the only acceptable political form; the waning of the Hanseatic League is
a good example of how Westphalia contained a strong bias against polities other than
the modern territorial state, as Duchhardt argues:
The restriction of the active part in international law to the sovereignty
holders is also mirrored in the fact that (for a long time ‘international’)
alliances of cities such as the Hanseatic League in the middle of the
seventeenth century gradually disappeared from the international
scene. This first of all had to do with the fact that the League itself did
no longer function and that in 1629 it handed over the authorisation to
act on behalf of the whole association to the three northern German
38 Bertrand de Jouvenel, An Inquiry into the Political Good, Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1997,
p. 208.
39‘Constitutional rules,’ are meant as ‘constitutional’ in the material sense, as a set of rules
that discipline a particular society or community; in this case, the international society. See
Christian Reus Smit, ‘The Constitutional Structure of the International Society,’ International
Organization, vol. 51, No. 4, 1997, p. 566.
40 Primary rules are those that regulate behaviour and conduct, secondary rules are those from
which primary rules are created, extinguished or altered. See Herbert Hart, The Concept of
Law, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997, p.94.
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‘Hanseatic’ towns. But it had primarily to do with fact that the Hansa
simply no longer fitted into a system of sovereign states and could no
longer justify its existence as a league with a specific purpose, aiming
at nothing else than optimising and securing its trade, within a system
of sovereign states.41
The rules of behaviour determine what is or is not acceptable behaviour; they also
establish the rights and duties of the different polities. It is in this framework that
sovereignty must be understood, as a concept within the constitutive rules of each
international system; in Westphalia, sovereignty starts to emerge from those
foundational rules, as a concept attributed to the modern territorial state.
After the settlement of Westphalia, a new understanding of the Law of Nations slowly
emerges – a ‘secular’ political42 order – where states have no authority above them
and in which political power emanates solely from states’ consent. This new
international system is increasingly secular, focused on the idea of equality between
states, and freed from the previous paradigm and its imperial and religious
connotations. The medieval dreams of the Respublica Christiana are dashed to the
ruins of history; ‘The Imperium Mundi, which rose above the Sovereign States, had
evaporated into an unsubstantial shadow, and at any rate, was stripped of the character
of a State, even when its bare existence was not denied’.43
The chief exponent of this new order, disciplined by the new Law of Nations is Hugo
Grotius,44 who saw sovereignty as the power ‘whose actions are not subject to the
41Heinz Duchhardt, ‘Peace treaties from Westphalia to the Revolutionary Era,’ in Randall
Lessafer, (ed.) Peace Treaties and International Law in European History, Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2004, p. 48.
42 As Bluntschli, states on the nature of the State: ‘The modern idea of the State is not
religious,’ op. cit., p. 60.
43Otto Gierke, Political Theories of the Middle Age (first edition 1900, trans. F. W. Maitland),
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968, p. 97.
44 Hugo Grotius (1583–1645), was a Dutch lawyer and is considered the founder of Modern
Public International Law. See his work, Jure Belli ac Pacis (On the Law of War and Peace,
1625), Montana: Kessinger Publishing, (2010). See also, Amos Hershey, ‘History of
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control of any other power’.45 Sovereignty is an attribute of the states in a political
order in which all were equal sovereigns, independent of any other political authority,
and supreme in their own jurisdictions. The Bodinian46 paradigm returns as the idea of
a supreme authority only answerable to itself, although in Grotius’s understanding of
the Law of Nations, states are bound by Natural Law, in fact, in Grotius’s philosophy
of Law, he emphasised the limited character of the sovereign, saying: ‘Now the Law
of Nature is so unalterable, that it cannot be changed even by God Himself’.47 For
Grotius, contrary to the modern view, International Law is not purely consensual, but
depends on the limits posed by Natural Law.48 This view, however, did not lead to a
return of the old paradigm of multiple political authorities under the overarching order
of the Holy Roman Empire and the Catholic Church, but to a model of states as the
supreme agents in the new international order, albeit limited by Natural Law as
perceived by the early authors.49
In many ways, the development of a theory of International Law accompanies the rise
of the territorial state, which came about as a result of the political and technological
transformations that preceded and followed Westphalia.50 The development was
International Law Since the Peace of Westphalia,’ American Journal of International Law,
vol. 6, No. 1, 1912, pp. 30–69; Hersch Lauterpacht, ‘The Grotian Tradition in International
Law,’ in The British Yearbook of International Law, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1946,
pp. 1–54.
45 Grotius, op. cit., Book I, Chapter 3, VII, p. 40.
46 By reference to Jean Bodin.
47 Grotius, op. cit. Chapter I, X, p. 7.
48 In Grotius’s case, the doctrine on War and Peace had its origins in his understanding of the
theory of a just and unjust war, which is a theme recurrent in western thought at least since
Thomas Aquinas. What is new, however, is his insistence on the nature of the relations
between States based also on consensus.
49 Martti Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2005, p. 99. They included Christian Wolff and Emmerich Vattel; on their contributions see
Chris Brown, Sovereignty, Rights and Justice: International Political Theory Today,
Cambridge: Polity Press, 2002.
50 The rise of the modern territorial state, as a result of transformations in warfare and the
consequent expansion of the bureaucratic structures of the state –especially by means of a
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gradual, but as the old world order was effectively closed, political thought reflected
this shift:
After Westphalia Western Europe came to understand itself as a world
of sovereign states which, although they were unequal in terms of
population, territory, military power, and economic wealth, were all
equal in terms of international law and diplomacy.51
The factual change, from an international system based on multiple political
authorities to a system based on the modern territorial states, took some centuries to
be fully established after the settlement of Westphalia:
The Treaties ending the Thirty Years’ wars did not sweep aside the old
political-territorial order; they did not abolish the Holy Roman Empire,
nor did they eliminate all sorts of quasi-sovereign polities. But they did
embody an early formalization of the idea that sovereignty was not
simply a characteristic of individual states, but was also a principle that
should govern relations between states.52
fiscal administration created to support the means of war –was among one of the main reasons
for the success of the territorial state vis-à-vis other polities. As Tilly argues: ‘War wove the
European network of national states, and preparation for war created the internal structures of
the states within it,’ Charles Tilly, op. cit., p. 76. For other accounts of the rise of the
territorial state based on institutional factors, see Spruyt, op. cit. 1994, and Thomas Ertman,
Birth of the Leviathan: Building States and Regimes in Medieval and Early Modern Europe,
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997, pp. 10–19.
51 Robert Jackson, Sovereignty: Evolution of an Idea, Cambridge: Polity Press, 2007, p. 66.
52 A. B. Murphy, ‘The Sovereign State as a Political-Territorial Ideal: Historical and
Contemporary Considerations,’ in State Sovereignty as a Social Construct, Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1996, p. 92. Westphalia represents a symbolic change only
because it disciplined the internal constitution of the Holy Roman Empire, Randall Lessafer,
‘Peace Treaties from Lodi to Westphalia’ in Lessafer, Randall (ed.), Peace Treaties and
International Law in European History, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004, pp.
9–10.
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Nevertheless, this philosophical change – the ‘Copernican revolution’ – transformed
the way international society was seen, although this change should not be equated
with a dramatic change in 1648, because in reality, historically, the rise of the modern
territorial state was a gradual process.
International Law began to reflect this change, first to resemble an order that applies
to the modern territorial state, excluding other types of polities, which until then had
been prevalent in the international system, and secondly, in the source of authority,
excluding references to the divine. This meant that International Law was valid,
because the sovereign territorial state decided to abide by the rules set, freely
accepting them, and thus it was a voluntary conception, as opposed to a naturalistic
conception.
This was not entirely clear after the Peace of Westphalia, but became increasingly the
accepted view of International Law over a period of time. The concept of sovereignty
also follows this understanding of International Law, which affirms peremptorily that
Law is a product of the conscious creation of states. The concept of sovereignty is
thereby completely modelled on this paradigm of an international system based on
anarchy53 where states consciously create the foundational rules of the international
system, and no rule is valid unless assented by the states. Therefore, ‘Here,
sovereignty and anarchy are tied together ontologically, at the level of definition, the
former term being logically privileged, since it signifies that which is foundational to
international politics’.54
The element of ‘international community’55 bound by strong rules slowly disappears,
and what emerges is a conception based solely on anarchy and the idea that because
the rules of the international system are freely chosen by states, hence, states can opt-
53 Anarchy does not mean chaos, but is a feature of an international system based on the
existence of sovereign territorial states that recognise no superior, op. cit., Bull, 2002.
54 Jens Bartelson, A Genealogy of Sovereignty, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1995, p. 24.
55 Which presupposes a community of states bound by common principles.
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out of the rules that once bound the international community. The international system
is, thus, seen as a system of ‘self-help’ only, and states as pursuing their national
interests alone.56
3. The Limits of the Bodinian Tradition: Johannes Althusius
Sovereignty, in the sense of this novel philosophical understanding, was a concept
that was at the basis of the International Law. Following the Bodinian tradition, it is a
concept defined by its indivisibility and unity, and in many respects, can be seen as a-
historical, in that it fails to account for the problems of historical specificity, while
also failing to address the actual changes the concept has undergone through attending
to the practice of states and empirical reality.
The Bodinian paradigm of sovereignty that came to dominate the legal-political
discourse on the concept is just one part of the tradition that eclipsed the Althusian57
contribution to the debate on sovereignty. In contrast to Bodin, Johannes Althusius
wrote his work in the context of the Holy Roman Empire and proposed a ‘compound’
theory of sovereignty. He argued that sovereignty was an attribute in which different
political communities could share, and in this respect, he was arguing for a view of
sovereignty in which different political communities participated, whilst forming part
of a larger political community. Hence, the Althusian tradition is an early exposition
of a proto-federalist tradition,58 and his major work, the Politica, is therefore equal in
its dignity to Bodin’s work in the history of political and legal scholarship. It is
important to point out, however, that the exclusive territorial authority of the state was
not something Althusius witnessed in the international system of his period, lest one
56 This is the widely accepted view in International Relations theory, particularly with Neo-
Realism, see David Baldwin (ed.), Neorealism, and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary
Debate, New York: Columbia University Press, 1993.
57 By Reference to Johannes Althusius (1557–1638), the ‘father’ of federalism, hereinafter,
Politica first published in 1603. See also references to Althusius in Chapter 3 when the
federalist tradition is discussed.
58 The relevance of federalism and federalist theory to the study of sovereignty will be the
subject of scrutiny in Chapter 3.
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forget, that the rise of modern State authority was a gradual process. What it is
important to retain is that the Althusian tradition emphasises a pluralistic system of
governance based on consent59 which requires him to overcome the concept of
sovereignty as it was presented in Bodin’s work. In Althusius’s work, political
communities are not based on the centralised and hierarchical understanding that
emerged from Bodin’s work. Althusius is a proto-federalist theorist who emphasises
the role of voluntary association, seeing sovereignty as a power belonging to political
communities, not an absolute and perpetual power as Bodin’s theory proposed.
Therefore he directs his critique to Bodin by arguing that:
Bodin disagrees with our judgement by which supreme power is
attributed to the real or universal association. He says that the right of
sovereignty, which we have called the right of the realm, is a supreme
and perpetual power limited neither by law (lex) nor by time. I
recognise neither of these two attributes of the right of sovereignty, in
the sense Bodin intends them as genuine. For this right of sovereignty
is not the supreme power; neither is it perpetual or above law…
Indeed, an absolute and supreme power standing above all laws is
called tyrannical.60
Althusius clearly rejects a political theory that sees sovereignty as an absolute power
of the king, as Bodin’s theory proposed. For him, the nature of political life is based
on the idea of ‘symbiosis’,61 which for Althusius, means a communion of different
political communities sharing and participating in the exercise of the political
59Thomas O. Hueglin, ‘Johannes Althusius: Medieval Constitutionalist or Modern Federalist?’
Publius: Federalism as a Grand Design, vol. 9, No. 4, 1979, pp. 9–41; Thomas O. Hueglin,
Early Modern Concepts for a Late Modern World: Althusius on Community and Federalism,
Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 1999.
60 Johannes Althusius, Politica Methodice Digesta Illustratis, Sacris, Profanis, 1603 (Politics
Methodically Set Forth and Illustrated with Sacred and Profane Examples, (trans. F.
Carney)), Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1995, Chapter X, 20–21, p. 71.
61‘Politics is the art of associating (consociandi) men for the purpose of establishing,
cultivating, and conserving social life among them. Whence it is called “symbiotics” …’.
Althusius, ibid., Chapter I, 1, p. 17.
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power.62 Hence, this understanding of different political communities sharing power,
leads him to ascertain that sovereignty is an attribute of the realm, by which he means,
the different political communities. Althusius was not writing in the context of the
modern territorial state, but about the pluralistic legal order that was slowly emerging
in Europe between the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, and in light of that, it is
important to keep in mind his claim that: ‘Moreover, I have attributed the rights of
sovereignty, as they are called, not to the supreme magistrate, but to the
commonwealth or universal association’.63 This is in opposition to Bodin’s claim
attributing sovereignty to the French king – in which regard, Althusius is anti-
Bodinian in the tradition he inaugurated – which is opposed to that which prevailed in
western political thought on sovereignty64 as Hueglin makes clear:
First of all, Althusius’ political theory obviously constitutes a rather
important, if still largely neglected, contribution to the history of
political thought.65
The Althusian tradition did conclude with its author, but was followed up by authors
such as Ludolph Hugo,66 who writing in the federalist tradition, understood the
62 Sovereignty thus resides in the ‘People’ as a corporate body, see George H. Sabine, A
History of Political Theory, Hinsdale: Dryden Press, fourth edition, 1973, p. 388; similarly,
William Archibald Dunning, A History of Political Theories, From Luther to Montesquieu,
London: Macmillan & Co., 1928, p. 63.
63Ibid., Althusius, Preface to the third edition (1614), p. 13.
64 As Daniel Elazar states: ‘In the struggle over the direction of European State building in the
seventeenth century, the Althusian view, which called for the building of states on federal
principles – as a compound political associations – lost out to the view of Jean Bodin and the
statists who called for the establishment of reified centralized states where all powers were
lodged in a divinely ordained king at the top the power pyramid or in a sovereign center’;
‘Althusius’s Grand Design for a Federal Commonwealth’ in Johannes Althusius, Politica
Methodice, op. cit., Chapters X, 20–21, pp. 71, p. xxxviii.
65 Hueglin, op. cit., p. 5.
66 Ludolph Hugo (1630–1704), dealt with the constitution of the Holy Roman Empire in his
work, Dissertatio de statu regionum Germaniae et regimini principum summae imperii
reipublicae aemulo 1661, (On the Status of Regions of Germany); see H. H. F. Eulau,
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relationship between the Holy Roman Empire and the territorial states in federal
terms, and thus, the concept of sovereignty.67 Hugo saw the possibilities of different
polities other than the territorial state,68 particularly in the context of the Imperial
Constitution accepting the territorial division of the Empire. This position was
anathema to authors writing under the framework of the Bodinian tradition, such as
Puffendorf,69 who saw the territorial division of the Empire as ‘monstrous’ and
‘irregular’ because, in his view, sovereignty as the reserve of territorial states and a
federal system was just an alliance of the states, ‘which reserved all final authority to
themselves’.70
Another author following in the Althusian tradition was Leibniz.71 He removed the
idea of supremacy from the concept of sovereignty, and offered a minimalist
definition of the concept of sovereignty based on the idea of territorial superiority, by
affirming: ‘Sovereign is who he is a master of a territory’.72 This led him to conclude
and admit the territorial authority of different political communities other than the
state,73 which, as Riley states: ‘Leibniz’ weakening of Sovereignty had the great merit
‘Theories of Federalism under the Holy Roman Empire,’ The American Political Science
Review, vol. 35, No. 4, 1941, p. 650.
67 Ibid., Eulau, p. 653.
68 He identified three types of polities, the confederal league, decentralised unitary
governments and what is now called federal government. For a more detailed and refined
argument of his theory see P. Riley, ‘Three 17th-Century German Theorists of Federalism:
Althusius, Hugo and Leibniz,’ Publius, vol. 6, No. 3, pp. 7–41.
69Samuel Puffendorf (1632–1694), German Lawyer and political theorist. His relevant work
for the purposes of the discussion is De Jure Naturae et Gentium Libri Octo (Of the Law of
Nature and Nations), 1672.
70 Riley, pp. 19–20.
71 Gottfied Wilheem Leibniz (1646–1712), a German philosopher and scientist, the work
relevant to the discussion is De Suprematu Principum Germaniae, 1677, G.W.L., Political
Writings, (ed.) P. Riley, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998.
72 In Riley, ‘Three 17th-Century German’, op. cit. p. 26; Leibniz equated territorial hegemony
with sovereignty, Chapter X, op. cit., Leibniz, pp. 115–116.
73 Riley, pp. 28–29.
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of allowing him to see federal government as something more than an alliance, even
though this cost him a realistic appraisal of the modern states-system’.74
The Althusian tradition, albeit forgotten, is still of importance, if one wants to grasp
the complexities of sovereignty and the rise of the territorial state.
The Peace of Westphalia inaugurated a new period for the international system in
which territorial states assumed the primacy as actors in the international sphere. A
new theory was, therefore, required to embody these changes: the Bodinian tradition
assumed pre-eminence by excluding the Althusian tradition, which was relegated to
the annals of history, until its rediscovery by German scholarship in the nineteenth
century, especially by Otto Van Gierke.75 Notwithstanding this, the prevailing
understanding of the theory of sovereignty in the Bodinian tradition was found in
authors such as Vattel76 who identified the legal category77 of sovereignty as
belonging to different states, regardless of their power or size, and it is here that
equality in International Law is linked to the rights of sovereignty:
A dwarf is as much a man as a giant is; a small republic is no less
sovereign than the most powerful Kingdom. By a necessary
consequence of that equality, whatever is lawful for one nation, is
74 Ibid., p. 29. As one author demonstrates: ‘He not only admitted the possibility of the
theoretical limitation of sovereignty, but he also found, in the examples of the Empire, the
Helvetic Confederation and the United Provinces, that several territories may be united into
one body politic without detriment to the territorial supremacy (superioritas territorialis) of
any single of them’, see Eulau, op. cit. p. 655.
75 Elazar, p. xxxxix.
76 Emmerich de Vattel (1714–67), was a Swiss Lawyer. Referring to his magisterial work,
Droit des Gens ou principles de la Loi Naturalle apliques a la conduite et affairs des Nations
et des Souverains, 1758 (The Law of Nations, or Principles of the Law of Nations Applied to
the Conduct and Affairs of Nations and Sovereigns, trans. Joseph Chitty, 1853), Philadelphia:
T. J. W. Johnson, Law Booksellers.
77 Sovereignty appears increasingly, in the legal scholarship as a legal category.
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equally lawful for any other; and whatever is unjustifiable in the one is
equally so in the other.78
Political thought on the legal attributes of the state becomes more and more
sophisticated to reflect the political reality, and the early exponents of International
Law following the Bodinian tradition, begin to develop the doctrine of sovereign
equality to reflect these changes, as Simpson states:
To summarise, then, sovereign equality arose over a long period of
time in European history. The primary political roots of the principle
can be found in the slow dissolution of the Holy Roman Empire and its
replacement by a system of territorial separatism and the state.79
Regardless of the importance one attributes to Westphalia the fact is that the
transformation of political thought begins to reflect the rise of the modern territorial
state, in the centuries that followed the Settlement up until the great cataclysm of the
modern period; the French Revolution and its aftermath, the Congress of Vienna.
The death of the Holy Roman Empire came about in 1806 as a result of the success
and transformations of the territorial state and the innovations borne out of the French
Revolution, as Blanning points out: ‘In this brave new world of power-politics there
was no room for such a soft polity as the Holy Roman Empire’.80 Notwithstanding the
dissolution of the Holy Roman Empire, it is important to stress what is interesting –
not the dissolution – but its pervasiveness in an international system composed of
sovereign states and the settlement that had been achieved in Westphalia.
78 Vattel, ibid. Preliminaries 18, also mentioned in Gerry Simpson, Great Powers and Outlaw
States: Unequal Sovereigns in the International Legal Order, Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2004, pp. 31–2.
79 Simpson, op. cit., 2004, p. 34. The principle of sovereignty allied with the principle of
equality found its expression in the Hague Peace Conference of 1907. See Frederick Charles
Hicks, ‘The Equality of States and the Hague Conferences,’ American Journal of
International Law, vol. 2, No. 3, 1908.
80 Tim Blanning, The Pursuit of Glory, Europe 1648–1815, London: Penguin Books, 2008, p.
285.
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The successors of the Imperial crown of Charlemagne could no longer hold on to the
title, ‘Kings of the Romans’, or aspire to universal supremacy in Europe in the system
of sovereign states, which was now much more efficient and effective in waging war
and building up an alliance between society and rulers.
4. The Congress of Vienna
There is good reason for studying the Peace Conferences that created the rules for
each international system since Westphalia: ‘when we are concerned with
understanding the European system as a whole, and the politics of its component
autonomous actors, peace conferences are evidently among the best sources of the
relevant kind of political discourse, especially peace conferences where the fate of the
system as a whole was at stake, or at least the fate of important parts of the system’.81
The importance of the Congress of Vienna82 to the history of International Law cannot
be overstated. It was convened by the Great Powers of the time, and as with
Westphalia, included the most important states of Europe, all of which had agreed to
map and set out the ‘constitutional rules’ that would govern the international order for
the next century. After Napoleon’s failure to forge a European Empire based on
French hegemony, the Congress of Vienna was truly pan-European, settling issues in
relation to dynastic successions and those concerned with the rise or fall of new states,
from the shores of Portugal’s Atlantic Coast to the Baltic Sea. It was in Vienna that
the ‘balance of power’83 was consecrated as an organising principle of the
international system that was to be maintained by the Concert of Europe, a coalition
81 Andreas Osiander, ‘Talking Peace: Social Science, Peace Negotiations and the Structure of
Politics,’ in Randall Lessafer (ed.), Peace Treaties and International Law in European
History, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004, p. 314.
82 In 1815 following the defeat of Napoleon Bonaparte.
83 Although the origins of the balance of power as a concept can be traced back to the Italian
city-states of the sixteenth century, see Bobbitt, op. cit.
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of the Great Powers, which included the victors of the Napoleonic wars.84 The legal
status attributed to the Great Powers at Vienna and the subsequent Treaties that were
concluded throughout the nineteenth century was at odds with the Bodinian tradition
of sovereignty because of the ‘legalised hegemony’.85
This caused many authors to dismiss the concept of sovereignty as irrelevant, it was
seen to be at odds with the practice of the Great Powers, and was viewed as an
‘Organised Hypocrisy’.86 The Congress of Vienna was significant, because it was the
first time that the international system of territorial states – based on the principle of
sovereign equality – accepted in its constitutional rules the primacy of Great Powers
and recognised that asymmetries of power are not irrelevant in the international legal
order. It was clearly a departure from the strong anti-hegemonic principle established
at Westphalia,87 although it was driven by concerns for security, aware of the need to
avoid another Pan-European war.
The concept of sovereignty under the constitutional rules agreed at Vienna must be
understood not as an immutable concept, but as a flexible one, which assumes a new
face in the context of the constitutional rules agreed in Vienna by the Great Powers,
and legalised hegemony as part of those constitutional rules. The claim is that in
foundational moments of a new international order, such as those agreed at
Westphalia and at Vienna, the concept of sovereignty is flexible enough to
84 The Quadruple Holy Alliance: Russia, Austria, Prussia and England. France joined in 1818;
the Concert of Europe.
85 Simpson’s definition of the legal status of privileges attributed to the Great Powers, creators
of the constitutional rules and principles that establish a system of equal sovereign states, but
reserving for themselves a legal position of authority, Simpson (2004), p. 68, for a definition
of legalised hegemony. The Congress of Vienna started a ‘moral pentarchy’ between the five
Great European Powers. As British Lawyer Westlake, commenting on the Congress of Vienna
argued, ‘Such was the commencement of what during a long succeeding period was described
as the moral pentarchy of Europe, pentarchy because France was readmitted to it at the
Congress of Aix-La-Chapelle in 1818’. John Westlake, Chapters on the Principles of
International Law, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1894, p. 96.
86 Stephen Krasner, Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy, 1999, op. cit.
87 Adam Watson, op. cit., 1992, p. 182.
25
accommodate changes in the constitutional rules of the system, and in Vienna, this
implies the accommodation of the legal status attributed to the Great Powers as a kind
of a Primus inter Pares88 in the community of the sovereign territorial states. The
concept of sovereignty, therefore, does not provide a universal category that is
applicable at all moments of history since Westphalia, but it is in fact a time-bound
category.
5. The Settlement of Versailles
The Peace of Versailles89 can be considered as one of the most important foundational
moments of the international community; the Treaty of Versailles completely changed
the borders of Europe. The settlement led to the creation of new European states, on
the ashes of three Empires,90 inspired in part by the nationalist ideals and the
reorganisation of the European continent along the lines proposed by the American
President Woodrow Wilson in the Fourteen Points.91 The Treaty of Versailles itself
partially laid out the constitutional rules of the international system until World War
II. It contained provisions relating to the creation of the League of Nations, which was
88 First among Equals.
89 The Peace of Versailles was achieved as a result of the Paris Peace Conference of 1919.
The Conference included the Versailles Treaty, which dealt with peace in Europe after the
end of World War I; the dismemberment of the former enemy states and the Covenant of the
League of Nations, essentially a ‘constitutional’ of the international system. Available at:
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/subject_menus/versailles_menu.asp [Accessed 16.12.2010].
90 The dissolution of the German, Russian, Ottoman and Austrian-Hungarian Empires was a
consequence of World War I. In the aftermath of the war, new states were formed based on
nationalism and the principle of self-determination.
91 The Fourteen Points, presented as a Presidential Address by Woodrow Wilson on 8 January
1918 included a proposal for Peace in Europe, at the core of which was the League of
Nations. See Thomas J. Knock, ‘Wilsonian Concepts and International Realities at the End of
the War,’ in Manfred F. Boemecke, Gerald D. Feldman and Elizabeth Glaser, The Treaty of
Versailles, A Reassessment after 75 Years, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998, p.
115; and Sir Frederick Pollock, The League of Nations, London: Stevens and Sons Limited,
1920. Wilson’s Fourteen Points: http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/wilson14.asp
[Accessed 21.12.2010].
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the international organisation composed by most states in that international system,92
and which was responsible for the maintenance of Global Peace.93
A manifestation of the principle of collective security in the League of Nations is
Article 11 which states: ‘Any war or threat of war, whether immediately affecting any
of the Members of the League or not, is hereby declared a matter of concern to the
whole League, and the League shall take any action that may be deemed wise and
effectual to safeguard the peace of nations’. This was clearly an attempt to restrict the
sovereignty of states, which for centuries were allowed to wage war, although
respecting the rules of Ius in Bello.94 It is true that during the nineteenth century and
in the early twentieth there was an increase in the codification of rules governing the
use of force in armed conflicts, but none of them attempted to restrain war itself as the
League of Nations did, in restricting significantly the right to wage war, as Article 16
states:
Should any Member of the League resort to war in disregard of its
covenants under Articles 12, 13 or 15, it shall ipso facto be deemed to
have committed an act of war against all other Members of the League,
which hereby undertake immediately to subject it to the severance of
all trade or financial relations, the prohibition of all intercourse
between their nationals and the nationals of the covenant-breaking
State, and the prevention of all financial, commercial or personal
intercourse between the nationals of the covenant-breaking State and
92 The United States and the Soviet Union were not part of the League of Nations.
93 The League of Nations contained a rudimentary notion of collective security that was
embodied in Article 10 of the Covenant, which stipulated obligations to respect the principle
of territorial integrity and political independence of all members, although collective security
was still in its ‘infancy’. See Antoine Fleury, ‘The League of Nations: Toward a New
Appreciation’ in Manfred F. Boemecke, Gerald D. Feldman and Elisabeth Glaser, The Treaty
of Versailles: A Reassessment after 75 Years, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998,
p. 509.
94 It is important to retain the two distinctions: Ius in Bello (Laws in War) and Ius ad Bellum
(The Right to Wage War).
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the nationals of any other State, whether a Member of the League or
not.
Note that membership, or not, of the League was irrelevant for the purposes of the
severe restrictions on war.95 For that reason, the Covenant of the League of Nations
contained constitutional rules for the international system inaugurated in Versailles,
but the system was not flawless, as Cassesse points out: ‘Recourse to force was
prohibited except for a limited number of cases’.96 This meant that war was not
prohibited outright in the Covenant, only subjected to time restrictions pending a
judicial decision. The provisions of the Covenant contained rules of membership
embracing the modern territorial State, and its ideal, the ‘Nation-State’;97 rules of
conduct that considered matters of war and peace as the Leagues’ responsibility, and
secondary rules, which remained, in part, customary and, in part, written, a good
example of which is Article 20 that explicitly states:
The Members of the League severally agree that this Covenant is
accepted as abrogating all obligations or understandings inter se, which
are inconsistent with the terms thereof, and solemnly undertake that
they will not hereafter enter into any engagements inconsistent with the
terms thereof.
95 See Cassesse, op. cit. pp. 60–64, aggressive war was forbidden only in 1928 with the
Briand-Kellog Pact during the Versailles system, formally known as ‘General Treaty for the
Renunciation of War’, it is still in force and ‘prefigures the legal regime of the Charter’ of the
United Nations. See Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law, Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2008, pp. 729–30.
96 Op. cit., pp. 60–61. Similarly, Hersch Lauterpacht, International Law, Vol. 2, ‘The Law of
Peace,’ Part I, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975, p. 150.
97 The mythical Romantic idea of one nation – with one language, ethnic group and common
history within a territorial state – considering that only a few states are actually nation-states
and that most states are composed of different nationalities and languages. See Sylvia Walby,
‘The Myth of the Nation-State: Theorizing Society and Polities in a Global Era,’ Sociology,
vol. 37, No. 3, 2003, pp. 529–530; Benedict Anderson, 20006, op. cit.
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The Covenant of the League was, therefore, establishing a form of hierarchy by
explicitly accepting that the obligations of its provisions imposed certain norms on
states. These obligations were ‘constitutional’ in the sense that they were foundational
of the international system inaugurated by the Versailles settlement.
For all of the above, it is important to emphasise that the Versailles system was a
break from the settlement of Vienna, in the sense that the Treaty of Versailles
inaugurated an era where conflicts were supposed to be settled peacefully, and, if not,
all the members of the League were supposed to police the international order by
adhering to the rules laid out in the Treaty and to defend global peace in common. For
the peaceful resolution of conflicts and disputes, the League provided an International
Court which was to be the supreme arbiter in judicial disputes, the Permanent Court of
International Justice.98 In this new world order, some voices expressed a healthy
optimism for the new system to be governed by International Law, as Oppenheim
stated:
The universal demand for a new League of Nations accepting the
principles that every judicial dispute amongst nations must be settled
by International Courts and that every political dispute must, before
the parties resort to arms, be brought before a Council of Conciliation,
demonstrates clearly that the Community of States must, now
deliberately give itself some kind of organisation, because without it
the principles just mentioned cannot be realised.99
The concept of sovereignty in the new international system was transformed by these
new constitutional rules, which restricted warfare among states – old and new – even
98 Hereinafter also called the PCIJ.
99 Lassa Oppenheim, The League of Nations and its Problems: Three Lectures, London:
Longmans, Green and Co., 1919, p. 35. However, the Versailles system had very weak
enforcement mechanism as Chadwick argues: ‘the league “peace programme” rested in large
part on arguably non-binding recognition of the need to reduce armaments, and on
unenforceable security obligations’, Elizabeth Chadwick, Traditional Neutrality Revisited:
Law, Theory and Case Studies, The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2002, p. 112.
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though armed conflicts would eventually test the power of the League, and lead to its
irrelevance, and eventual dissolution. Restrictions of sovereignty were also enshrined
in the Treaty of Versailles, limiting the sphere of action of states by the rules of
protection of minorities in former enemy states or states emerging from the
dissolution of empires, and by imposing other obligations on states such as gradual
disarmament.100
The PCIJ101 in interpreting the rules and principles of the system of Versailles, had a
very ‘constitutional’ view of the new rules of Treaty, in the sense that often in its
decisions it deemed Versailles’ rules as hierarchically superior to other rules, which
were also part of the general principles of International Law, although not always
explicitly. A good example of this is seen in the Wimbledon case.102 Thus the concept
of sovereignty in the Versailles system should be seen in the framework of the
foundational rules of the system; consequently, an absolute definition of sovereignty
was untenable. Concerning the concept of sovereignty, in the case of Island Las
Palmas,103 the sole arbitrator Max Huber argued that:
Sovereignty in the relations between States signifies independence.
Independence in regard to a portion of the globe is the right to exercise
therein to the exclusion of any other State, the functions of a State. The
development of the national organisation of States during the last few
centuries and, as a corollary, the development of International Law,
have established this principle of exclusive competence of the State in
regard to its own territory in such a way as to make it the point of
100 Ian Brownlie, op. cit., p. 554.
101 Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) established by the League of Nations in
1922, Ian Brownlie, op. cit., pp. 707–8.
102 See infra, section about the Wimbledon case.
103 Arbitration award judged by the Permanent Court of Arbitration between the Netherlands
and the United States regarding their claims to the Island Las Palmas (Miangas), Island Las
Palmas, Perm. Ct. 4rb. 1928. See also, Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia, op. cit., p. 241.
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departure in settling most questions that concern international
relations.104
Nevertheless, in this description of the concept of sovereignty of states in its dual
dimensions – independence and supremacy – it did not follow that states had an
unlimited freedom of action in the international system or even in their own domestic
jurisdictions, as the PCIJ declared in the Nationality Decrees case:105
The question whether a certain matter is or is not solely within the
jurisdiction of a State is an essentially relative question; it depends
upon the development of international relations.106
For many commentators, the concept of sovereignty as an attribute of statehood
begins to assume a non-absolutist tone during the Versailles system; and some even
propose the abandonment of the concept, such as the French lawyer Georges Scelle107
because of its absolutist connotations, which he argued:
It is a vain task to want to build law and international law, in particular,
on the notion of sovereignty. In practice this concept only leads to the
104 Available at: http://untreaty.un.org/cod/riaa/cases/vol_II/829-871.pdf [Accessed
16.12.2010].
105 Nationality Decrees Issued in Tunis and Morocco on Nov. 8th, 1921, Advisory Opinion,
1923 P.C.I.J, Advisory Opinion by the PCIJ about a dispute between France and the United
Kingdom regarding decrees about nationality.
106 See Para. 40, available at
http://www.worldcourts.com/pcij/eng/decisions/1923/1923.02.07_morocco.htm [Accessed
16.12.2010].
107 Georges Scelle (1878–1961), was a French lawyer and the author of a book that is relevant
here, Precis du Droit de Gens: Principe et Systematique. He was also one of the main
contributors to the theory of federalism. See Tierry Hubert, ‘The Thought of Georges Scelle,’
European Journal of International Law, vol. 1, No. 1, 1990; Antonio Cassese, ‘Remarks on
Scelle’s Theory of “Role Splitting” (dedoublement fonctionnel) in International Law,’
European Journal of International Law, vol. 1, No. 1, 1990.
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release of governments’ will from the grip of law, to destroy the notion
of competence, and with it the notion of legality.108
Scelle understood the concept of sovereignty as Kompetenz-Kompetenz109 in that
because states have the power to determine their own powers they are limited only by
the rules they accept for themselves, but for him, this was unrealistic because he
believed that the environment always constrains states, and in his view, sovereignty
was ‘anti-legal’.110 It is for all of these reasons that Scelle is seen as part of the
Althusian tradition.111
5.1. TheWimbledon Case Revisited
The Wimbledon case112 is paradigmatic of the misunderstanding into which traditional
legal scholarship entered when analysing International Law in the Versailles system
and the relationship between different international obligations in International Law.
The case illustrates the tensions between different interpretations of International Law
and shows the interactions between Law and International Politics. The case was
adjudicated before the PCIJ. The facts were these: the British steamship Wimbledon,
chartered by a French company, was a boat full of military supplies heading to Poland
and was denied passage in the Kiel Canal by the German Government. The Germans
108 Scelle, in Tierry, op. cit., p. 201.
109 Competences of Competences, the power to determine its own powers: see Chapter 4 of
this thesis for a discussion of the concept in the context of European Union Law.
110 Tierry, op cit., p. 201.
111 On Scelle, see also Martti Koskenniemi, The Gentle Civiliser of Nations: The Rise and
Fall of International Law 1870–1960, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001, pp.
327–348.
112 S.S.Wimbledon (United Kingdom, France, Italy and Japan v. Germany), 1923, P.C.I.J,
(ser. A) No. 1 (June 28). Available at:
http://www.worldcourts.com/pcij/eng/decisions/1923/1923.08.17_wimbledon.htm [Accessed
16.12.2010].
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refused passage on the grounds of neutrality under the terms of neutrality orders
issued by the German Government. The United Kingdom, Italy, France and Japan
brought the dispute before the Court and accused Germany of unlawfully refusing
passage to the steamship and demanded compensation.
The Court considered all the arguments of the involved parties and the provisions of
the Versailles Treaty applicable, from Articles 380 to 386, particularly Article 380,
which established that the Kiel Canal should be maintained open and free to all
vessels, merchant or war, of all nations at peace with Germany. The Court decided
then to accept Germany’s arguments and the rights of Germany to deny passage to
enemy vessels, but since the vessel was British, and because Britain was a country at
peace with Germany, it followed that Germany was in violation of the Treaty of
Versailles and the argument of neutrality did not hold. The Court argued that ‘the
provisions relating to the Kiel Canal in the Treaty of Versailles are therefore self-
contained’. This meant that as a special regime of International Law its rules applied
instead, and the Court rejected the argument that these rules amount to ‘servitude’ in
International Law.113 Moreover, it stated that these rules did not amount to limitations
on sovereignty on the part of Germany, and stated that:
The Court declines to see in the conclusion of any Treaty by which a
State undertakes to perform or refrain from performing a particular act
an abandonment of its sovereignty. No doubt any convention creating
an obligation of this kind places a restriction upon the exercise of
sovereign rights of the State, in the sense that it requires them to be
exercised in a certain way. But the right of entering into international
engagements is an attribute of state sovereignty.114
113 On international servitudes as restrictions in sovereignty under International Law, see
Fowler and Bunck, op. cit., p. 99.
114 Wimbledon decision, Para. 35. The Court adhered to the doctrine of auto-limitation of
sovereignty, and as Steiner makes clear: ‘In the Wimbledon case this was made clear with
respect to the German neutrality order: no matter what rights Germany may have had to
protect her neutrality under normal conditions, she could not assert this right if her
international obligations prescribed a different course’. See H. Arthur Steiner, ‘Fundamental
Conceptions of International Law in the Jurisprudence of the Permanent Court of
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Similarly, the rules of the Suez and the Panama Canals also contain rules that impose
restrictions upon the exercise of sovereignty.115 The Court presumed the willingness
of Germany, in ‘freely’ accepting the provisions of the Kiel Canal in the Versailles
Treaty in order to reach the conclusion that those rules should apply instead of the
rules of neutrality, invoked by Germany. Hence the Court declared German actions as
violations of the Treaty by stating that ‘From the foregoing, therefore, it appears
clearly established that Germany not only did not in consequence of her neutrality,
incur the obligation to prohibit the passage of the Wimbledon though the Kiel Canal,
but on contrary, was required to permit it’.116
The Court’s decision in this case might seem straightforward, a simple case of the
application of the rules of Versailles ostensibly agreed by Germany. Nonetheless, a
more careful examination of the Court’s arguments might lead to a different
conclusion. The dissenting opinions of Judges Anzilotti and Huber in the case also
will help in understanding better the decision and its importance for the scrutiny of the
concept of sovereignty in the international system.117
International Justice,’ The American Journal of International Law, vol. 30, No. 3, 1936, p.
433.
115 Suffice to say that the willingness to enter into international Agreements regarding Panama
had to do with US promotion of Panama’s independence against Colombia. In the Hay-Varilla
Treaty and in the case of the Suez Canal, the British influence in Egypt gave Britain control of
the Canal. In both cases, Power politics imposed on a weaker state a set of rules, that states
‘formally’ accepted, but in practice, had no freedom to choose something different. Issues of
bargaining power, information and transaction costs and asymmetries between states in the
conclusion of international agreements cannot be overlooked when analysing how
International Agreements and International Treaties are created. Jack Goldsmith and Eric
Posner, The Limits of International Law, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005. On the legal
aspects and the history of the Kiel Canal, the Panama Canal and the Suez Canal, regarding
Great Power Politics and the limitations of sovereignty partly derived from constraints on the
states involved, see, R. Jennings and A. Watts, Oppenheim, International Law, ninth edition,
vol. 1, Parts 2–4, Harlow: Longman, 1992, pp. 591–599.
116 Wimbledon Decision, Para. 48.
117 Paras 65–85.
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The Court, as previously indicated, assumed a positivist stance of international
obligations based on the ‘mythical’ idea of freedom to enter into international legal
obligations.118 Positivist, because it assumed that Germany’s obligations were valid
because Germany signed the Versailles Treaty without coercion, therefore, in a purely
syllogistic argumentative conclusion, it must follow that those obligations were
binding, as an emanation of the legal principle of pacta sunt servanda.119
The Court, for unknown reasons, because there is only the case report to refer to,
analysed the nature of the legal obligations arising out of the Versailles Treaty by
reference to the idea that those rules are self-contained.120 Thus, special Law (lex
specialis) applies instead of general law, following the principle that Lex specialis
derogate legi generali.
This understanding would not, however, explain the Court’s outright rejection of the
laws of neutrality invoked by Germany, and the possibility of the inconsistency of the
Versailles Treaty with the traditional laws of neutrality.121 In that case, simply
invoking the rule of self-containment would not be enough; the Court would need to
justify the reasons by appealing to other arguments. On the other hand, the Court,
besides dismissing the arguments laid out by Germany, easily signalled its willingness
to restrict the exercise of sovereign powers in the Canal by assuming Germany’s
118 Koskenniemi calls the Court’s decision ‘pure psychologism,’ Martti Koskenniemi, From
Apology to Utopia, op. cit., (2005), p. 425.
119 The general principle of Law that states that all obligations voluntarily accepted are
binding.
120 On self-contained regimes, International Law Commission (ILC), ‘Fragmentation of
International Law: Difficulties Arising From the Diversification and Expansion of
International Law, Report of the Study Group of the International Law Commission,’
finalised by Martti Koskenniemi, A/CN.4/L682, 2006, available at: http://daccess-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/LTD/G06/610/77/PDF/G0661077.pdf?OpenElement [Accessed
22.12.2010].
121 On the Laws of neutrality, see Elizabeth Chadwick, Traditional Neutrality Revisited, op.
cit.
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‘freedom to choose’122 the dispositions of the Versailles Treaty, and particularly the
rules concerning the Kiel Canal.
In the discussion on the nature of the rules invoked, the Court overlooked the
provisions of the Treaty. This meant that the Court strictly adhered to a positivist
understanding of International Law without referring to the precedence of the rules of
the Versailles Treaty over the rules of neutrality.
The account offered here assumes a ‘constitutional’ interpretation of the rules of the
Treaty. This means that the rules laid out in the Versailles Treaty are applicable to the
case, not because Germany willingly accepted the rules of the Treaty, but because
these rules are part of the foundational rules of the Versailles system in the sense that
they are ‘constitutional’ and are, therefore, applicable to the international community
of states as a whole.123 The Treaty had a ‘constitutional character’, because it laid out
some of the foundational rules of the future system, and the provisions of the Kiel
Canal are part of those foundational rules.
The Court also failed to demonstrate the ‘freedom’ of Germany to choose and
negotiate the Treaty of Versailles, as now historiography shows that the Treaty was a
Diktat on Germany and its allies; as Tomuschat argues: ‘As has already been hinted,
the making of the Versailles Treaty followed a different course. Germany had no say
whatsoever in the elaboration of the texts’.124 This constitutional interpretation of the
122 This is related with the notion of asymmetries of power and bargaining power. Let us not
forget that Germany was defeated, thus forced to accept, the Versailles settlement.
123 See the infra section on what is meant by the ‘Constitutional Rules’ of the international
system.
124 Christian Tomuschat, ‘The 1871 Peace Treaty between France and Germany and the 1919
Treaty of Versailles’ in Randall Lessafer, (ed.), Peace Treaties and International Law in
European History, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004, p.388;Alma Luckau,
‘Unconditional Acceptance of the Treaty of Versailles by the German Government, June 22–
28, 1919,‘The Journal of Modern History, vol.17, no.3, 1945.
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decision of the Court is, in the view of the current thesis, far more consistent with a
coherent interpretation of Law at the time, than the account chosen by the Court.125
The consequences of this case for the study of the concept of sovereignty are
significant. This is because this case demonstrates that, contrary to the Court’s
arguments, sovereignty was not restricted freely by Germany’s acceptance of the
Treaty of Versailles, because the Treaty was the constitutional Charter of the post-
World War I international system. Its dispositions were, therefore, foundational of the
system and thus were applicable before any other rules, generally speaking, because
also it might be assumed that certain dispositions of Versailles could be contrary to
International Law, particularly in the rules regarding neutrality.126 This appears to be
the opinion of the dissenting Judges Anzilotti and Huber. However, as Clabber
contends: ‘Instead of being plagued by the sovereignty dilemma, the Wimbledon
Court had managed to make a virtue out of a vice’.127
The Versailles system further legitimates the notion of the Sovereign territorial State.
The Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States128 defines a State
under International Law as a legal person that ‘should possess the following
qualifications: (a) a permanent population; (b) a defined territory; (c) a government;
and (d) the capacity to enter into relations with the other states’.129
125 Germany was in effect ‘neutralised’ by the Versailles settlement. S. W. Armstrong argues
that ‘At the Peace Conference the position of Germany was comparable to that of a
condemned criminal sentence’, see S. W. Armstrong, ‘The Doctrine of Equality of Nations in
International Law and the Relation of the Doctrine to the Treaty of Versailles,’ The American
Journal of International Law, vol. 14, No. 4, 1920, p. 553; ‘The doctrine of equality of states
gives way to the primacy of Great Powers,’ S. W. Armstrong, op. cit., p. 556.
126 See Jan Klabers, ‘Clinching the Concept of Sovereignty: Wimbledon Redux,’ Austrian
Review of International Law and European Law, vol. 3, No. 3, 1999, see also, O. Spiermann,
‘Judge Max Huber at the Permanent Court of International Justice,’ European Journal of
International Law, vol. 18, No. 1, 2007.
127 Jan Klabbers, op. cit., p. 30.
128 Signed on Montevideo on 26 of December of 1933 by the American States.
129 Article 1.
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This legal instrument demonstrates that under international legal scholarship the
territorial state contrary to the Westphalian system is the legitimate and, increasingly,
the sole acceptable political polity under International Law excluding other polities.
Considering that since Versailles, most multinational empires were dissolved and that
no other polities such as a league of cities, confederations or other polities are
considered to have attributes of sovereignty – and thus enjoy the privileges of the
modern territorial state – in effect, thereby, the state assumes a monopoly in the
international system as it never did before.
The Montevideo Convention also manifests the concept of sovereignty by stating that
‘States are juridically equal, enjoy the same rights, and have equal capacity in their
exercise. The rights of each one do not depend upon the power which it possesses to
assure its exercise, but upon the simple fact of its existence as a person under
international law’.130 The concept of the legal equality of states, as a corollary of
sovereignty regardless of the asymmetries of power or capabilities of states, is
enshrined in International Law. The norm of non-interference in domestic affairs is
also enshrined by stating that ‘No state has the right to intervene in the internal or
external affairs of another’.131 The Convention is interesting, because it incorporates a
strong norm of sovereignty in the Bodinian tradition, in which States enjoy political
independence and political supremacy in their jurisdictions, and contains a strong
norm of non-interference.
The optimism of the interwar period did not lead to the promises of a new
international Utopia. Kissinger points to the failures of collective security in
Versailles: ‘The concept of collective security was so general as to prove inapplicable
to circumstances most likely to disturb the peace; the informal Franco–English
cooperation which replaced it was far too tenuous’.132 The collapse of the system was
already apparent in the late 1920s, and the terms of the punitive peace133 imposed on
130 Article 4.
131 Article 8.
132 Kissinger, op. cit., p. 246.
133 This is manifest in the harsh norms of the Versailles Treaty imposed on Germany
regarding territorial adjustment, financial obligations and so on. This new spirit d’époque, the
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Germany, and the isolationism of the United States and the Soviet Union, allied to the
economic problems prolonged by the Great Depression, eventually led to the
shattering of the Versailles system.
6. The United Nations System
The international system in place today is governed by foundational rules that created
the United Nations134 and its Charter. The United Nations system created an
international organisation which was created as a result of the San Francisco
Conference in 1945.135
The UN was modelled partly on the League of Nations, its founders attempting to
overcome the deficiencies of the League of Nations. The founders of the UN called
for an international organisation responsible for peace and security in which the Great
Powers (the US, Russia, the United Kingdom, France and China) would enjoy a
degree of hegemony,136 but at its core, the system was based on the idea of sovereign
equality of states enshrined in Article 2(1) of the UN Charter.
The Charter incorporated the notion of ‘legalised hegemony’ by assigning the victors,
as Great Powers, permanent seats in the Security Council (Article 23, 1).137 The
attribution of culpability to Germany and the utopian desire for peace maintained by a League
of Nations, are manifest in much of the post-war literature, for example, ‘We were in bondage
of international anarchy, to the superstition of the state, and the fraud of the balance of power.
Only a League of Nations will free us from our fears, give us liberty from our bonds’. See A.
F. Pollard, The League of Nations: An Historical Argument, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1918,
p. 22.
134 Hereinafter the UN.
135 For further analysis of the San Francisco Conference, see Leland M. Goodrich, Edvard
Hambro and Anne Patricia Simmons, Charter of the United Nations, Commentary and
Documents, New York: Columbia University Press, 1969, pp. 1–17. The Dumberton Oaks
Conference in 1944 set the stage for the UN Conference in San Francisco.
136 Simpson, op. cit., p. 169.
137 As Shineda argues: ‘It is fair to say that the structure of the United Nations remained open
to these two aspects: the constitutional sovereignty of great and small states and the national
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Security Council138 was the body primarily responsible for maintenance of peace and
security (Article 24, 1). The Charter also forbade the Jus ad bellum139in which
constitutes a severe limitation of the traditional view of sovereignty.140
The Great Powers were to be responsible for the balance of the system, among
themselves, and between themselves and the lesser powers, considering their
privileged position as states with superior material capabilities and, of course, as
Victors. The reason for this was to design a system with its basis in empirical reality,
hence the need for legal equality to coexist with legalised hegemony, considering the
role that Great Powers traditionally enjoy in international politics. As Simpson recalls,
‘This combination of parity and hegemony became a mark of the new international
legal order’.141
The UN system also contains an International Court of Justice142 (Article 92) designed
to settle disputes peacefully as in the previous system, and although it does not enjoy
compulsory jurisdiction, it has been one of the main contributors to the development
of International Law and the interpretation on what sovereignty means under the
constitutional rules of the present international system.
sovereignty of absolutely equal states,’ Hideaki Shinoda, Re-examining Sovereignty: From
Classical Theory to the Global Age, Basingstoke: Macmillan Press, 2000.
138 On the role of the Security Council in the maintenance of peace and security, and its
implications to the concept of sovereign equality, Dan Sarooshi, The United Nations and the
Development of Collective Security, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000; David M.
Malone, ‘The Security Council,’ in Thomas G. Weiss and Sam Daws, The Oxford Handbook
on the United Nations, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007.
139 The right to wage war as an attribute of sovereignty.
140 Rama Mani, ‘Peaceful Settlement of Disputes and Conflict Prevention,’ in Thomas G.
Weiss and Sam Daws, The Oxford Handbook on the United Nations, Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2007, p. 302.
141 Simpson, op. cit., p. 175.
142 Hereinafter called the ICJ. The jurisdiction of the ICJ is not compulsory unless accepted by
states (Article 34 of the Statute of the ICJ), James Crawford and Tom Grant, ‘International
Court of Justice,’ in Thomas G. Weiss and Sam Daws, The Oxford Handbook, 2007, op. cit.,
p. 195.
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6.1. Sovereign Equality
Sovereign Equality was the wording chosen by the founders of the UN. This principle
enshrines the norm that all states are equal and enjoy the attributes of sovereignty and
are, therefore, not subjected to the jurisdiction of other states. As Kelsen recalls, ‘The
term sovereign equality used in the Four Power Declaration probably means
sovereignty and equality, two generally recognized characteristics of the States as
subjects of international law’.143 The concept of sovereignty has also been codified in
the important Friendly Relations Declaration, a resolution of the United Nations
Assembly General,144 which defined the elements of sovereign equality by stating
that:
In particular, sovereign equality includes the following elements:
(a) States are juridically equal;
(b) Each State enjoys the rights inherent in full sovereignty;
(c) Each State has the duty to respect the personality of other States;
(d) The territorial integrity and political independence of the State are
inviolable;
(e) Each State has the right freely to choose and develop its political,
social, economic and cultural systems;
(f) Each State has the duty to comply fully and in good faith with its
international obligations and to live in peace with other States.
Considering this, the concept of sovereign equality had to live alongside the notion of
legalised hegemony, and in this sense, is ‘an inherently unstable concept, always torn
143Hans Kelsen, ‘The Principle of Sovereign Equality of States as basis for International
Organization,’ The Yale Law Journal, vol. 53, No. 2, p. 207.
144 Declaration on Principles of International Friendly Relations and Co-Operation Among
States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, United Nations General
Assembly Resolution 2625 (XXV), 24 October 1970.
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between idealist aspirations and realist concessions’.145 The expression of the
principle of sovereign equality is manifest in the development of cases before the ICJ.
In the Corfu Channel case, the Court maintained that between territorial states respect
for territorial sovereignty is an essential foundation of international relations.146While
the Court adhered to the strict interpretation of the Charter regarding the norm of non-
interference in the Bodinian tradition, present developments of International Law have
not put the Court in the same position of strength in this respect, and the Court has
come to be a weak representative of the Bodinian tradition. What this means is that
the increasing multiplicity of legal regimes and international dispute-settlement
mechanisms beyond the UN Charter – for instance in international humanitarian law
(in the ICTY, ICTR and the ICC) or in the global trade system (WTO) – have put the
Court in a position of having to interpret the Charter and consider the diversity of
other provisions contained in a multiplicity of legal systems (regional and functional)
with their own dispute resolution mechanisms, which are increasingly judicial in
nature, and for these reasons the ICJ is put in a difficult position.
6.2. Constitutional Rules in the Present System
In the present system, the concept of sovereignty as an attribute of statehood has been
modified by the constitutional norms set out by the United Nations Charter as
Fassbender argues: ‘Sovereign equality is the legal authority and autonomy of a State
as defined and guaranteed by the constitution of the international community’.147
The Charter also contains a provision as in the Covenant of the League of Nations,
stating in Article 103: ‘In the event of a conflict between the obligations of the
145 Nico Krisch, ‘More Equal than the Rest? Hierarchy, Equality and US Predominance in
International Law,’ in M. Byers and G. Nolte, United States, Hegemony and the Foundations
of International Law, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005, p. 141.
146 Corfu Channel Case (United Kingdom v. Albania); Merits, International Court of Justice
(ICJ), 9 April 1949. See also, R. Jennings, A. Watts, (eds), Oppenheim’s International Law,
ninth edition, vol.1, Part 1, Harlow: Longman, 1992, p. 385.
147 Bardo Fassbender, ‘Sovereignty and Constitutionalism in International Law,’ in N.
Walker, Sovereignty in Transition, Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2003, p. 131.
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Members of the United Nations under the present Charter and their obligations under
any other international agreement, their obligations under the present Charter shall
prevail.’ This gives the Charter a privilege not enjoyed by other sources of law and
hence its constitutional character.148 The constitutional character of the Charter is
attested by Verdross: ‘Hence the international law of the Charter tends to be not only
the law of the United Nations, but a world law, binding States within the whole
international community so far as the maintenance of international peace and security
is concerned’.149
The obligations of the Charter are applicable to all states regardless of their
membership, because this is a characteristic of a Charter – that it is applicable to the
international community as a whole – and a ‘constitutional charter’ in terms of the
issues of peace and security (Article 6, paragraph 2 of the Charter). It is not, therefore,
simply a Treaty in which obligations derive from the adherence of states.150 The ICJ,
in the Reparation for Injuries case, also sees the UN Charter as a type of Constitution,
and employs a functionalist method in its interpretation.151
The United Nations System is not static, but flexible, and its institutional development
has been led by different types of institutions, such as the progressive changes led by
the ICJ in the adjudicative process, but of equal importance is the political process,
148 Defined by Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice.
149 Alfred Verdross, ‘General International Law and the United Nations Charter,’
International Affairs, vol. 30, No. 3, 1964, p. 347. This means that the Security Council
resolutions ‘trump’ other norms when referring to Chapter VII purposes, which does not mean
that the Security Council has a general power ‘to govern’, but is related to the possibility of
ultra vires acts of the Security Council. On the nature of Security Council Resolutions see
Advisory Opinion in Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of
Independence In Respect of Kosovo, (ICJ) 22 July 2010. This point is explored in Chapter 5.
150Hans Kelsen, The Law of the United Nations: A Critical Analysis of its Fundamental
Problems, London: Stevens & Sons Limited, 1951.
151 Bruno Simma (ed.), The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary, vol. 1, Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2002, p. 15; on Sovereign Equality, pp. 67–91. Reparation for
Injuries suffered in the service of the United Nations Advisory Opinion of April 11th, 1949,
ICJ.
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particularly the role of Security Council resolutions in developing International Law,
which is mandatory for the international community as a whole.152 In this sense, it is
important to stress that interpretation of the rules of the UN system and its Charter as
part of the constitutional provision of the international community as a whole, needs
to be seen from a perspective of institutional evolution and considered together with
the different institutions, both judicial and political.
The Charter does not, according to this view, exhaust the constitutional provisions of
the system, however, because there are other constitutional norms and rules that do
not form part of the system of the United Nations’ rules, such as rules relating to
global trade or international humanitarian law. This differs from Fassbender’s
interpretation, in the sense that the current international system is regulated by
constitutional provisions in many areas other than peace and security, and these are
not found in the Charter or related Treaties. The centrality of the United Nations
Charter is not being questioned, however, but the idea that its constitutional rules are
all contained therein is under scrutiny. The Charter does not deal with issues related to
trade or economic integration, for example, which nowadays are being
institutionalised153 in legal orders other than those of the United Nations, at the
regional, as well as at the functional or specialised level: the EU and the WTO are two
known examples. The Charter does not incorporate all customary International Law of
which many of the foundational rules of the system are part. The same can be said
about ius cogens154 norms, which have arisen within the constitutional legal order
152 Here the Comparative Institutional Analysis approach is followed, looking at the different
institutional processes, the political process led by the Security Council and the judicial
process led by the ICJ as proposed by Neil Komesar, Imperfect Alternatives: Choosing
Institutions in Law, Economics and Public Policy, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press,
1994.
153 Institutionalisation, as the process in which rules and norms begin to govern certain
behaviour and conduct, see J. Goldstein, M. Kahler, R. O. Keohane and A. M. Slaughter,
‘Introduction: Legalization and World Politics,’ International Organization, vol. 54, No. 3,
2000, p. 385. This will be further explored in the Chapter 2 with regard to institutions.
154 Ius cogens are norms considered peremptory under International Law, norms accepted and
recognised by the International community of States as a whole, independently of the will or
acceptance of States, e.g. the prohibition of aggression, genocide and slavery are examples of
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inaugurated at San Francisco. In essence, the constitutional rules in this new
international legal system155 begin with the United Nations Charter, but go far beyond
it, particularly because of the development and fragmentation in multiple legal orders.
As Wet argues, ‘In the increasingly integrated legal order there is a coexistence of
regional, and sectoral (functional) constitutional orders that complement one another
in order to constitute an embryonic constitutional legal order’;156 for global purposes,
one might add.
International Law is increasingly fragmented in regional and in functional legal
orders, and this fragmentation accommodates an understanding of sovereignty that is
variable depending on whether the modern territorial state is part of a regional and
functional legal order. This means that states that are part of supranational legal
arrangements (or federal arrangements) reframe their identities in a legal framework
that differs from other states, and effectively see sovereignty not only from a state-
centric view, but also from the perspective of their supranational political
community.157 For this reason, it is important to mention the fragmentation of
those types of rules, Article 53 of the Vienna Convention of Law of Treaties (VCLT). On the
controversy surrounding those norms, see, A. Orakhelashvili, Peremptory Norms in
International Law, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006; P. Malanczuck Akehurst, Modern
Introduction to International Law, seventh edition, Abingdon: Routledge, 2006, pp. 57–58; C.
L. Rozakis, The Concept of Jus Cogens in the Law of Treaties, New York: North-Holland
Publishing Company, 1976; Alfred Verdross, ‘Jus Dispositivium and Jus Cogens in
International Law,’ American Journal of International Law, vol. 60, No. 1, 1966, pp. 55–63.
In the ICJ Case Right of Passage, in Judge Alvarez’ Opinion on peremptory norms and ius
cogens where he accepts this type of norm. Case Concerning Right of Passage Over Indian
Territory (Portugal v. India), [1960] ICJ.
155 If it can be called a system, because International Law is not codified in a single legal
instrument and is a decentralised law-making process, in an anarchical system. States can
therefore adhere to different legal orders (regional and functional) that fragment the unity of
International Law.
156 Erika Wet, ‘The International Constitutional Order,’ International Comparative Law
Quarterly, vol. 55, No. 1, 2006, p. 75.
157 This will be further explored in Chapter 4 about the European Union.
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International Law as a phenomenon with direct implications for the concept of
sovereignty.
6.3. Fragmentation of International Law
In the present international system, the concept of sovereignty has been challenged by
a plethora of multiple regimes. This is because the limitations, and sometimes
expansions of the concept have been carried out during the creation or via the
evolution of these different legal orders. It is for this reason that the concept of
sovereignty should be seen first in the context of the constitutional rules of the
international system, and second, in terms of the fragmentation of International Law
in multiple regional and functional legal orders, and also in the specific challenge
such orders pose to the concept of sovereignty.
In the following chapters it is necessary to explore how processes of voluntary
interstate cooperation are actually redefining the way constitutional norms of the
international community affect the framework of sovereignty. The evolution of these
other processes may lead to ‘constitutionalization’158 of legal orders, bringing about a
transformation in ‘jurisdictional spaces’, which in turn will challenge the territorial
state authority and hence sovereignty. Sometimes, in the case of regional legal orders,
the creation of new jurisdictions may lead to the formation of a new political and legal
authority in a new territorial jurisdiction (regional, comprising several states), which
goes beyond the national state, and in other cases, may lead to the creation of a new
jurisdictional space that goes beyond territory and is functional, based on the nature of
the ‘issue-area’.159
The European legal framework is an example of regionalism and is illustrative of how
regional legal orders have a transformational effect on the analysis of the concept of
158 On Constitutionalization, Deborah Cass, Constitutionalization of the World Trade
Organization, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005.
159 A term from International Relations used to designate certain areas or domains with a
distinct legal and political framework as a result of the process of institutionalisation. This
point will be further developed in Chapter 2 regarding institutions.
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sovereignty.160 The global trade rules defined by GATT Agreements and related
Treaties of the WTO are also elucidative of how specialised legal orders are claiming
a constitutional character.
6.4. Manifestations of Sovereignty161
The concept of sovereignty has multiple manifestations in legal and political theory:
Legal/Political
Sovereignty has been understood in different forms. Some, such as Austin,162 see
sovereignty as an exclusive legal concept because the sovereign is s/he who has the
authority to command. This is a purely positivist understanding. Others, such as
Schmitt,163 see sovereignty in the context of political facts, stating that the sovereign
is s/he who decides on the rule of exception.
Absolute/Relative
The division of absolute and relative sovereignty varies according to whether the
concept is viewed as absolute, indivisible and unitary.
Internal/External
This binary division is not arbitrary, because it is part of the concept. International
sovereignty means supremacy of the state in internal affairs and external sovereignty
means independence in international affairs.
Positive/Negative
Here, the classification depends on how one sees the ability of states to pursue a
sphere of freedom in international politics, it presupposes capabilities (positive
160 This will be the subject of analysis in Chapter 4 on the European Union.
161 Here, we follow Georg Schwarzenberger, International Law and Order, London: Stevens
& Sons, 1971, pp. 57–83.
162 John Austin, The Province of Jurisprudence Determined and the Uses of the Study of
Jurisprudence (first published 1832), New York: Prometheus Books, 2000, pp. 215, 277–282.
163 Carl Schmitt, Political Theology, Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2005, p. 5.
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sovereignty) or to enjoy the rights of sovereignty from non-interference from other
authorities (negative).164
The classification presented here may help in understanding the philosophical
problem in the concept of sovereignty in its multiple dimensions. Here the dichotomy
between Bodinian sovereignty and Althusian sovereignty is presented, because both
represent traditions in the history of political thought, and view sovereignty in
different terms. The Bodinian tradition sees sovereignty as an absolute concept that is
unitary, indivisible and supreme, which belongs only to the modern territorial state,
and excludes other polities. The Althusian tradition sees the concept of sovereignty as
a relative concept, divisible and potentially applicable to polities and political
communities other than the territorial state that emerges slowly after the settlement of
Westphalia.
6.5. Deterritorialization165 and Territoriality
It is also necessary to explore issues of deterritorialization of authority in the context
of changes seen in the constitutive or constitutional rules of the international system
and the emergence of regional and functional legal orders in order to analyse the
context in which sovereignty – defined as authority or ultimate authority within the
state territorial jurisdiction – is challenged by the disaggregation as a result of their
specific claims to authority. As Sassen argues:
State sovereignty is usually conceived of as monopoly of authority
within a particular territory. Today, it is becoming evident that state
164 Robert H. Jackson, Quasi-States: Sovereignty, International Relations, and the Third
World, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990, pp. 26–31.
165 By Deterritorialization of authority, the detachment of authority from the state and its
territory is meant. The term is borrowed from Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, Anti-
Oedipus, London: Continuuum, 2004. Deterritorialization also means Reterritorialization, see
Gearoid Tuathail and Timothy Luke, ‘Present at (Dis)Integration: Deterritorialization and
Reterritorialization in the New Wor(l)d Order,’ Annals of the Association of American
Geographers, vol. 84, No. 3, 1994, pp. 381–398.
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sovereignty articulates both its own external conditions and norms.
Sovereignty remains a systemic property but its institutional insertion
and its capacity to legitimate and absorb all legitimating power, to be
the source of law, have become unstable. The politics of contemporary
sovereignties are far more complex than notions of mutually exclusive
territorialities can capture.166
Sovereignty, then, shifts, from a state-bound concept subject to territoriality, to a
concept that is not exclusively tied to a territory:
a) Sovereignty–Supreme authority–Territory–Jurisdiction;
b) Sovereignty–shared authority–deterritorialized–functional jurisdiction or
regional jurisdiction.
This is why it is necessary to explore issues relating to conflicts, overlaps of different
normative orders, and the challenges the new world poses to the territoriality of
authority – all of which slowly emerged after Westphalia –following the narrative of
the Bodinian Tradition and the counter-narrative of the Althusian tradition.
6.6. Conclusion
This chapter has examined the origins of the concept of sovereignty and its evolution,
according to different international systems since the Peace of Westphalia, and has
considered sovereignty as an attribute of statehood that derives from the structure of
the international system.
In the discussion on the historical origins of the concept of sovereignty, the chapter
analysed two philosophical traditions that offered two distinct frameworks for the
concept of sovereignty; one that derived from Bodin and Hobbes – which is dominant
in the literature –and the other, based on the work of pluralist authors writing within
the federalist tradition, such as Althusius.
166 Saskia Sassen, Territory, Authority, Rights: From Medieval to Global Assemblages,
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008, p. 415.
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This chapter has also explored the different ‘constitutional rules’ in international
systems that define rules of membership, rules of behaviour and meta-rules, and
which are different for each international system. The most important international
systems were identified, specifically the Peace of Westphalia, The Congress of
Vienna, The Treaty of Versailles and the United Nations System.
Finally, the chapter concluded that the multiplicity of regional and functional
arrangements in the current international system would necessarily transform the
current concept of sovereignty. Furthermore, it pointed to the processes of
‘deterritorialization’ of authority, and briefly considered the challenges posed to the
international system.
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Chapter 2
Institutions and the Concept of Sovereignty
‘Human societies are structured; they resemble buildings rather than
piles of rock. Institutions, in the strict sense of the word, determine the
architecture of these buildings’.1
1. Introduction
This chapter examines the ways in which institutions and institutional theory have
contributed to an understanding of the concept of sovereignty in the current
international system. In addition, the chapter explores legal theory and looks at the
limited explanation it offers to explain the mechanisms of cooperation between states.
Thus, the chapter proceeds by analysing some of the various approaches to the study
of institutions in the social sciences.
The chapter emphasises the need for an interdisciplinary approach in order to
understand the role of states in the international system, especially the relevance of
International Relations to the study of International Law, and argues that institutions
at the international level need to be understood against the background of the different
approaches in the social sciences, particularly in the context of neo-institutionalism,
as it is presented in International Relations.
In order to understand international institutions the reasoning behind their design, and
the mechanisms that have driven their evolution, needs to be understood. This in turn
implies that an analysis of some of the factors that affect international institutions as
presented in the literature is necessary.
1 Maurice Duverger, The Study of Politics, London: Nelson and Sons, 1971, pp. 67–68.
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The chapter also examines the dichotomy between agency and structure in the social
sciences, particularly when analysing the international system. It attempts to explain
the concept of sovereignty in the context of the multiplicity of actors in the
international system, looking at how the structure of the international system has
shaped the behaviour of states. In addition, this section explores the trend towards
regionalisation and the rise of functional legal arrangements, which restrict the
freedom of states’ actions and thus their legal sovereignty. It also highlights the
increasing complexity woven into the constitutional rules of the international system
seen clearly in the processes of ‘judicialisation’. The chapter concludes with an
analysis of the mechanisms of Global Governance in the context of international
institutions.
1.1. Institutions and the Contribution of Institutional Theory
In legal theory, it is common to equate international institutions with international
organisations. This is because legal theory does not usually focus on the essential
question of why states decide to cooperate in an anarchical world,2 as Klabbers
emphasises:
Legal theorists ordinarily have little business in trying to explain
why states co-operate: such belongs to the social sciences properly.
Moreover, the legal theorist is generally ill equipped to perform
such a task: whenever lawyers engage in political analysis, more
often than not the results fail to persuade professional political
scientists.3
The limitations of legal theory to explain the mechanisms of cooperation between
states is an important factor leading to an exploration of the institutional approach,
considering that the legal theory focuses on the rules and judicial cases only, without
2 Here the term, anarchy, refers to its use in International Relations, as the absence of superior
polities in the modern territorial state, and not to an absence of order.
3Jan Klabbers, An Introduction to International Institutional Law, Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2002, p. 34.
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consideration of the facts behind the mechanisms of international cooperation. This,
in turn, relates to the question of why states decide to cooperate in the first place, and
calls for a closer look at the contours of that cooperation: an institutional approach as
March and Olsen argue is ‘one that emphasises the role of institutions and
institutionalisation in the understanding of human actions within an organization,
social order, or society’.4
The institutional approach helps to explain the mechanisms of cooperation between
states, and illuminates the reconceptualisation of the concept of sovereignty. This is
because of the role that international institutions play in regulating state behaviour and
to determine states’ preferences (their regulative and constitutive role), particularly in
regional arrangements with the creation of international organisations, such as the
European Union.
It is for these reasons that it is important to understand international institutions, the
purposes behind their creation, and how they constrain state behaviour and reallocate
authority to the global level in order to constrain states’ sovereignty.
Institutions are not synonymous with organisations, it is argued.5 A distinction that it
is important to stress because in some cases – and this is the case in international
affairs – there is a tendency to equate the two terms, as Hodgson points out:
4 James G. March and Johan P. Olsen, ‘The Institutional Dynamics of International Political
Orders,’ International Organization, vol. 42, No. 4, 1998, p. 948. On the focus of the
institutional approach in social science, see Vivien Lowndes, ‘The Institutional Approach,’ in
David Marsh and Gerry Stoker, (eds) Theory and Methods in Political Science, Basingstoke:
Palgrave Macmillan, 2010, p. 66.
5 Geoffrey Hodgson, ‘What are Institutions?’ Journal of Economic Issues, vol. XL (1), 2006,
p. 18. In International Law, it is common to refer to international organisations as
international institutions and reduce institutional theory to the study of international
organisations, e. g. ‘It seems useful, therefore to make a systematic study of the institutional
problems which arise in all or most international organisations. The branch of law
concentrating on such problems may be called ‘international institutional law,’ see Henry G.
Schermers, International Institutional Law, Leiden: A. W. Sijthoff, 1972, p. 2. Similarly, ‘Our
purpose is to provide an introductory overview of the law of international organisations,
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Organisations are special institutions that involve a) criteria to
establish their boundaries and to distinguish member from non-
members, b) principles of sovereignty concerning who is charge, c)
chains of command delineating responsibilities within the
organisation.6
Organisations constitute special types of institutions and should also be seen as
actors,7 which means that in analysing the role of organisations in social life, they
should be seen as purposive agents.
Institutions ‘are systems of established and embedded social rules that structure social
interactions,’8 which suggests that a proper understanding of the term ‘agency’9 must
be understood in order to consider the role of institutions in constraining, shaping and
constituting the behaviour of agents. A theory of institutions, in addition, should
provide an understanding of the design and the mechanisms of change10 within
including international courts and tribunals as a whole’. Phillipe Sands and Pierre Klein,
Bowett’s Law of International Institutions, London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2009, p. 14. See also
Jose E. Alvarez, International Organizations as Law-makers, Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2005. All these approaches are properly ‘the Law of International Organisations,’ but
the approach taken in this chapter will be different and follow the various institutional
approaches in the social sciences, which define institutions broadly as, for example, in
Krasner (Chapter 2 about Institutions), Stephen Krasner, Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy,
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999, pp. 43–72.
6 Idem., p. 18.
7 Douglass North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance, Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1990, pp. 4–5.
8 Geoffrey Hodgson, ‘What are Institutions?’ op. cit., p. 18. For further definitions see
Douglass North, op. cit., 1990, p. 4; W. Richard Scott, Institutions and Organizations,
London: Sage Publications, 1995, p. 33; the latter emphasises that there are three ‘Pillars’ of
institutions: regulative, normative and cognitive.
9 Agency refers to how an individual actor acts in a social structure. This is related to the
relationship between agency and structure, see Geoffrey Hodgson, ‘Institutions and
Individuals: Interaction and Evolution,’ Organization Studies, vol. 28, 2007.
10 On the mechanisms of change, see John L. Campbell, Institutional Change and
Globalization, Princeton: Princeton University Press, pp. 63–89.
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institutions, in order to provide an accurate description of their role in the social
process under scrutiny. The level of analysis11 is also important, relating as it does to
the dimension of the social process one intends to study, whether local, national,
regional or global.
Institutionalisation ‘implies that institutional rules govern more of the behaviour of
important actors’.12 It is a process in which institutions are created for certain
purposes and shape and determine actors’ preferences.
It is also important to distinguish between individual institutions within the ‘matrix of
institutions’.13 This observation is relevant because, in understanding the role of
institutions in the social structure, it is important to observe the overall framework
(‘matrix’) structure and shape of individual institutions and individual agencies, and
also, to look at how individual institutions interact with each other.
The contribution of economics to the study of institutions is particularly relevant to
the current argument in that it relates both to ‘Old Institutional Economics’ (OIE)14
11 On the level of analysis into the study of institutions, see Campbell, op. cit., p. 38.
12 Judith Goldstein et. al., ‘Introduction: Legalization and World Politics,’ International
Organization, vol. 54, No. 3, p. 387. For another definition and a more detailed analysis, see
Ronald L. Jepperson, Institutions, Institutional Effects, and Institutionalism, Walter W.
Powell and Paul J. DiMaggio (eds), Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1991, p. 149.
13 Proposed by Robert Ackrill and Adrian Kay in ‘Historical-Institutionalist Perspectives on
the Development of the EU Budget System,’ Journal of European Public Policy, vol. 13, No.
1, p. 114, 2006.
14 On the history of the OIE, see Geoffrey Hodgson, How Economics Forgot History: The
Problem of Historical Specificity in Social Science, London: Routledge, 2001; Malcolm
Rutherford, Institutions in Economics: The Old and the New Institutionalism, Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1994; Geoffrey Hodgson, Economics and Institutions,
Cambridge: Polity Press, 1988; Geoffrey Hodgson, ‘Institutional Economics into the Twenty-
First Century,’ Studi e Note di Economia, Anno XIV, No. 1, 2009, Geoffrey Hodgson, ‘What
is the Essence of Institutional Economics?’ Journal of Economic Issues, vol. XXXIV, No. 2,
2000.
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and ‘New Institutional Economics (NIE).15 OIE is characterised by its emphasis on
the roles of habit and routine in determining individual agency, as Geoffrey Hodgson
an exponent of the synthesis between OIE and NIE points out, the concept of
‘Reconstitutive downward causation’ is defined as a process in which ‘institutions as
a special type of social structure with the potential to change agents, including
changes to their purposes and preferences’16 operate. This suggests that institutions
have the potential to ‘mould the dispositions and behaviours of agents in fundamental
ways: that they have the capacity to change aspirations, instead of merely enabling or
constraining them’.17 Hodgson then points to the role of institutions in shaping the
preferences of agents (constitutive role), viewing agents not simply as those that
design and shape institutions.
Conversely in the NIE literature, individual preferences are considered as a given, and
institutions are explained by way of the rational choice of agents with reference to
transaction costs and cost-benefit analysis carried out through Pareto efficiency
criteria.18 The role of habit is explicitly rejected by NIE with the focus on rationality
15 With the emphasis on transaction costs, particularly contributions by Oliver E. Williamson,
The Economic Institutions of Capitalism, New York: The Free Press, 1985; North, op. cit.;
Anil Hira and Ron Hira, ‘The New Institutionalism, Contradictory Notions of Change,’
American Journal of Economics and Sociology, vol. 59, No. 2, 2000.
16 Geoffrey Hodgson, The Evolution of Institutional Economics: Agency, Structure and
Darwinism in American Institutionalism, London: Routledge, 2004, p. 14; Milan Zafirovski,
‘Orthodoxy and Heterodoxy in Analyzing Institutions: Original and New Institutional
Economics,’ International Journal of Social Economics, vol. 30, No. 7, 2003, p. 816.
‘Individuals shape institutions and institutions shape individuals,’ see A. Allan Schmid,
Conflict and Cooperation, Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2004, p. 8.
17 Geoffrey Hodgson, ‘Institutions and Individuals: Interaction and Evolution,’ Organization
Studies, vol. 28, 2007, p. 107. On the same notion that institutions define preferences, see
James G. March and Johan P. Olsen, ‘The New Institutionalism: Organizational Factors in
Political Life,’ The American Political Science Review, vol. 78, No. 3, 1984, p. 739.
18 Transaction costs include information costs and the costs associated with reaching an
optimal solution and the criteria for efficiency. This is the Kaldor-Hicks criterion, a
modification of the Pareto criterion, which states that a solution is efficient if there is net gain
from the state of affairs ‘A’ to the state ‘B’, as long as there is compensation for the losers in
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of choices that are motivated by a cost-benefit analysis made by agents. According to
NIE, the rationality of agents is presumed, although in recent scholarship, the concept
of rationality is modified by the idea of bounded rationality.19
The contributions made by the different approaches to institutional economics are
particularly relevant towards understanding and explaining the establishment and
evolution of international institutions, to which aim both OIE and NIE offer valuable
insights. This chapter will focus on international institutions from among the many
forms of institutions about which analysis is obtainable. Understanding the
mechanisms that drive the change in institutions is also important to the study of how
institutions evolve. Especially relevant to the current discussion is the concept of
‘path-dependence’;20 the notion that the past determines the way institutions evolve in
the future, which as North argues:
Path dependence means that history matters. We cannot understand
today’s choices (and define them in the modelling of economic
the movement from state ‘A’ to ‘B’. This logic could also be applicable to institutions, as
Knight argues, ‘Pareto-optimal institutions have the following feature: Any change in the
allocations produced by the institution benefits one actor only, at the expense of another.
Institutions that are socially efficient are Pareto optimal, but the reverse does not hold,’ Jack
Knight, Institutions and Social Conflict, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992, p. 34.
For a critical analysis of cost-benefit analysis and the efficiency criteria, see Matthew D.
Adler and Eric Posner, Cost-Benefit Analysis: Legal, Economic, and Philosophical
Perspectives, Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2001. This approach is favoured by
proponents of Economic Analysis of Law. For its application to International Law, see Joel P.
Trachtman, The Economic Structure of International Law, Harvard: Harvard University Press,
2008.
19 On Bounded rationality see Christine Jolls, Cass R Sunstein and Richard H. Thaler, ‘A
Behavioural Approach to Law and Economics’ in Sunstein, Cass R. (ed.), Behavioural Law
and Economics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000, pp. 14–15.
20 One of the best known examples is the QWERTY keyboard, which became the norm as
soon it was introduced but which was not established on the basis that it was the most
efficient. See Paul A. David, ‘Clio and the Economics of QWERTY,’ American Economic
Review, vol. 75, No. 2, 1985.
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performance) without tracing the incremental evolution of
institutions.21
The mechanisms of change in institutions are incremental and based on the logic of
increased returns; meaning that as institutions evolve, there are strong incentives for
the evolutionary process to be based on the initial set of constraints.22 Once
institutions are set on an initial evolutionary path, therefore, the costs of reversal
become high, thus creating incentives for the stability and durability of a given
institution, which explains why increasing return-processes tend to be self-
reinforcing.23 Institutions do not always evolve by ‘formal’ procedures as set out in
their constituent charters; often their evolution is ‘informal’.24 Thus, it is important to
understand the mechanisms of their evolution and also the ‘modes’ of institutional
change in order to grasp the complexities, particularly with regard to international
institutions. Mahoney and Thelen identify four modes of institutional change:
1. Displacement: the removal of existing rules and the
introduction of new ones.
2. Layering: The introduction of new rules on top of or
alongside existing ones.
3. Drift: the changed impact of existing rules due to shifts in
the environment.
21 Douglas North, ‘Institutions,’ op. cit., 1990, p. 100.
22 For extended discussions on path dependence and/or increasing returns, see Paul Pierson,
‘Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics,’ The American Political
Science Review, vol. 94, No. 2, 2000, pp. 251–267; Stan J. Liebowitz and Stephen E.
Margolis, ‘Path Dependence, Lock-in, and History,’ Journal of Law, Economics and
Organization, No. 1, 1995, pp. 205–226; B. Guy Peters et. al., ‘The Politics of Path-
Dependency: Political Conflict in Historical Institutionalism,’ The Journal of Politics, vol. 67,
No. 4, 2005, pp. 1287–88; Robert Ackrill and Adrian Kay, op. cit.
23 Idem., p. 252.
24 Informal changes are particularly relevant, for example, in the context of the EU see Jane
Jenson and Frederic Merand, ‘Sociology, Institutionalism and the European Union,’
Comparative European Politics, vol. 8, No. 1, 2010.
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4. Conversion: the changed enactment of existing rules due to
strategic redeployment.25
These modes of change often take place in international institutions, in particular
when certain patterns inside their internal framework tend towards being more or less
permanent when set beside the intentions of individual states.26
Following Scott, it is possible to identify three main roles or dimensions in
institutions:27
a) Regulative, the extent to which institutions constrain behaviour.
b) Normative, the prescriptive roles institutions have in establishing
values and norms.28
c) Cognitive, institutions shaping actors and the way they perceive
reality.29
Generally, there are four main approaches to the study of institutions in the Social
Sciences:30
25 James Mahoney and Kathleen Thelen, ‘A theory of Gradual Institutional Change,’ in James
Mahoney and Kathleen Thelen (eds), Explaining Institutional Change, Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2010, pp. 15–16; Kathleen Thelen, ‘How Institutions Evolve,’ in
James Mahoney, and Dietrich Rueschemeyer, Comparative Historical Analysis in the Social
Sciences, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003.
26 An example of institutional change presented by Mahoney and Thelen is the British House
of Lords and its survivability beyond its feudal origins and functions in a democratic age, op.
cit., pp. 1–2.  NATO offers a good example of layering and conversion: an organisation
created to face the Soviet Union in the European continent it was transformed into an
organisation with a new strategic focus outside Europe. See John S. Duffield, ‘International
Security Institutions,’ in R. A. W. Rhodes (ed.), with Sarah A. Binder and Bert A. Rockman,
The Oxford Handbook of Political Institutions, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006, p.
642.
27 W. Richard Scott, Institutions and Organizations, London: Sage Publications, 1995, p. 35.
28 This dimension is emphasised by North, op. cit.
29 Constructivism in IR emphasises the cognitive role of institutions by stating that institutions
often shape the interests and preferences of states.
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a) Organizational Institutionalism
b) Rational Choice Institutionalism
c) Historical Institutionalism31
d) Sociological Institutionalism32
2. International Institutions: Relevance to International Relations and
International Law
International Relations (IR) or International Politics is a social science that studies the
international arena from different perspectives. Many approaches in IR are relevant to
International Law (IL), because IR complements the study of Law with the study of
social facts in the international sphere, while also illuminating the legal dimension by
analysing the factors that give rise to legal rules and changes to them. The
interdisciplinary approach of linking International Law and International Relations is
a framework commonly employed by those devoted to the study and analysis of
international affairs, as Abbot argues:
The appeal of the interdisciplinary approach for lawyers and legal
scholars is clear. Although IR is not well suited to resolving
doctrinal questions, it remains of value even for the international
lawyer qua lawyer. As Anne Marie Slaughter argues, integrating IR
and IL ‘can make international lawyers better lawyers’: the diverse
theoretical perspectives of IR help them to recognize the (often
unspoken) assumptions that underlie their own and others’ legal
arguments, readings of texts and doctrines, and prescriptions, and
30 Campbell, op. cit., p. 11; for different strains of institutional approaches, see Lowndes, op.
cit., p. 6.
31 On historical institutionalism see Sven Steinmo and Kathleen Thelen, ‘Historical
Institutionalism in Comparative Politics,’ in Sven Steinmo, Kathleen Thelen and Frank
Longstreth, Structuring Politics: Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Analysis,
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992.
32 Didem Buhari-Gulmez, ‘Stanford School of Sociological Institutionalism: A Global
Cultural Approach,’ International Political Sociology, Vol. 4, 2010.
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to use distinct theoretical visions to generate responses and
alternatives.33
The institutional framework was applied to the study of IR34 theory by Neo-
institutionalism,35 while the dominant school in IR is Neo-realism,36 which claims that
33 Kenneth W. Abbott, ‘Toward a Richer Institutionalism for International Law and Policy,’
Journal of International Law and International Relations, vol. 1, No. 1, 2005, p. 10; on the
interdisciplinary approach see Kal Raustiala and Anne-Marie Slaughter, ‘International Law,
International Relations and Compliance,’ in Walter Carlnaes, Thomas Risse and Beth
Simmons (eds), The Handbook of International Relations, Thousand Oaks, CA–London: Sage
Publications, Ltd., 2002.
34 On the relationship between IR and IL, the former with its instrumentalist optic and the
latter with its normative optic, see Robert Keohane, ‘International Relations and International
Law: Two Optics,’ in Robert Keohane, Power and Governance in a Partially Globalized
World, London: Routledge, 2002, pp. 117–129; Anne-Marie Slaughter, ‘International Law
and International Relations Theory: A Dual Agenda,’ American Journal of International Law,
vol. 87, No. 2, 1993.
35 Or Neo-liberalism, the terms are used interchangeably in International Relations theory,
Chris Brown, Understanding International Relations, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004,
pp. 45–48.
36 This is the dominant school of International Relations based on the Realist approach, for a
critical analysis of E. H. Carr’s Realism, see John Mearsheimer, ‘E. H. Carr vs. Idealism: The
Battle Rages On,’ International Relations, vol. 19, No. 2, 2005. On Neo-realism, Kenneth N.
Waltz, Theory of International Politics (published in 1979), particularly his ‘three image’
approach, the man, the state and the structure of the international system: Kenneth N. Waltz,
Man, the State and the War, New York: Columbia University Press, 1959. Neo-realists are
sceptical of the role of international institutions, for the discussion see John J. Mearsheimer
‘The False Promise of International Institutions,’ International Security, vol. 19, No. 3, 1994.
Moreover, the Neo-realists emphasise the notion that states are more interested in relative
gains than in absolute gains, meaning that international institutions may provide incentives
where all states stand to gain, but because states are interested primarily in maximising their
own security, they will be focused on relative gains. See Michael Mastanduno, ‘Do Relative
Gains Matter? America’s Response to Japanese Industrial Policy,’ in David A. Baldwin (ed.),
Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate, New York: Columbia University
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states are rational, unitary, and are basically concerned with their own survival.37
According to this school of thought, states are the most important actors (units) in the
international system, whose primary concern is to maximise their security and/or
power. Both Neo-realism and Neo-institutionalism share the view that the
international system is anarchic.38 Other important theoretical approaches for IR are
Liberal theory39 and Constructivism.40 The thesis will not focus in detail on Liberal
Theory or Constructivism, however, because according to these two approaches, the
primary focus is not on international institutions; the former deals with the role of
domestic politics and the various interest groups that define and shape foreign policy
and participation in different international arrangements, while the latter, as part of
Critical Theory emphasises the extent to which the international system is socially
constructed, including the modern territorial state, to which, Constructivism is
particularly relevant because it points out the mutually constitutive role of the state as
an agent and the international system as a structure.
It is important to distinguish between the different approaches, not only because they
reveal a variance of assumptions about the inner functioning of the international
system, but also because they provide alternative approaches to the relevance and
operation of institutions in the international system.
Press, 1993. Against this view, see John Gerard Ruggie, ‘The False Promise of Realism,’
International Security, vol. 20, No.1, 1995.
37 On the key assumptions of Neo-realism, anarchy, self-help and balance of power, see
Kenneth N. Waltz, ‘Structural Realism after the Cold War,’ in Michael E. Brown, Owen R.
Cote Jr., Sean M. Lynn-Jones and Steven E. Miller (eds), Primacy and its Discontents:
American Political Power and International Stability, Cambridge, Ma: MIT Press, 2009, p.
137.
38 On anarchy see Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics,
Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002.
39 On the Liberal theory for IR, see Andrew Moravcsik, ‘Taking Preferences Seriously: A
Liberal Theory of International Politics,’ International Organisation, vol. 51, No. 4, 1997.
40 On Constructivism see Alexander Wendt, ‘Constructing International Politics,’
International Security, vol. 20, No. 1, 1995, p. 71.
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The concern of this thesis is to explore the role of international institutions, not to
offer a detailed analysis of competing theoretical standpoints and their underlying
paradigms. For this reason, the chapter discusses neo-institutionalism in the context of
IR theory, and discusses some of the underlying assumptions regarding the role of
international institutions. When relevant, other approaches of IR will be discussed,
although the main focus will remain on the contribution of neo-institutionalism.
To understand the concept of sovereignty in relation to the role of international
institutions in constraining states and other actors in international politics, a concept
of the conditions of cooperation should be forthcoming or implied, according to
Keohane, who argues: ‘Institutions that facilitate cooperation do not mandate what
governments must do; rather, they help governments pursue their own interests
through cooperation’.41
2.1. Neo-Institutionalism and other Institutional Approaches in International
Affairs
The study of neo-institutionalism relates to the desire to understand the international
system, particularly the growing interdependence42 between states in the international
system. The theory was born to explain the dynamics of cooperation between states,
and in particular the pervasiveness of international institutions in an international
anarchic system,43 and thus it was influenced by a rational choice approach.44 Writing
41 Robert Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political
Economy, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984, (Reprinted 2005), p. 246; Robert
Keohane and Robert Axelrod, ‘Achieving Cooperation under Anarchy: Strategies and
Institutions,’ World Politics, vol. 38, No.1, 1985, p. 234.
42 On ‘interdependence’ and its relationship with international institutions in the international
system see Robert Keohane, ‘International Institutions: Can Interdependence Work?’ in
Robert Keohane (ed.), Power and Governance, op. cit., pp. 27–38.
43 Hedley Bull, op. cit., n. 10.
44 On the role of rational choice in neo-institutionalism, see Robert Keohane, After Hegemony,
op. cit., pp. 65–84; see also Robert Keohane and Lisa Martin, ‘The Promise of Institutionalist
Theory,’ International Security, vol. 20, No. 1, 1995. On the rational-choice approach in the
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from that approach, Keohane defines institutions as a ‘persistent and connected set of
rules that prescribe behavioural roles, constrain activity, and shape expectations’.45
The emphasis on cooperation should be understood in terms of the potential for
discord as well harmony.46 For neo-institutionalism, cooperation between states
reduces uncertainty and limits the problems derived from negative
externalities47which can affect two or more countries.
This means that states decide to cooperate in order to deal with transnational problems
that cannot be settled solely by one state. In these instances, cooperation between
states will ensue, with the establishment of international institutions, particularly
considering the inadequacies of the modern territorial state – their limited, small-scale
capacity – when dealing with global issues, as Ohmae argues:
There is a growing sentiment that the system itself – the much
patched and mended apparatus of the modern nation state – is an
inadequate mechanism for dealing with the threats and
opportunities of a global economy.48
social sciences in general, see Michael Root, Philosophy of Social Science: The Methods,
Ideals, and Politics of Social Inquiry, Oxford: Blackwell, 1993, pp. 100–123.
45 Robert Keohane, ‘International Institutions: Two Approaches,’ International Studies
Quarterly, vol. 32, No. 4, 1988, p. 386.
46 Robert Keohane, After Hegemony, op. cit.
47 Externalities can be positive or negative and are ‘benefits conferred or costs imposed on
others without compensation,’ Inge Kaul and Ronald U. Mendoza, ‘Advancing the Concept of
Public Goods,’ in Inge Kaul, et. al, Providing Global Public Goods: Managing Globalization,
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003, p. 107, Richard Cornes, and Todd Sandler, The
Theory of Externalities: Public Goods, and Club Goods, Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1986.
48 Kenichi Ohmae, The End of the Nation State: The Rise of Regional Economies, London:
Harper Collins, 1995, pp. 59–60. Ohmae offers the functionalist argument that states do not
have adequate scale or the correct structures to deal with negative externalities, and in his
view, this should be done at the level of the ‘Region State’ which would replace the national
state, Ohmae, op. cit, p. 136.
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International institutions serve the interest of states in order to prevent a particular
result (common aversions such as the ‘tragedy of the commons’49) or to achieve
certain ends (common interests) by joint action. The former is a classic example of
coordination, the latter being a type of collaboration.50 It is through international
institutions that states deal with international externalities, such as international
pollution or transnational criminality, which cannot be managed appropriately within
the context of the modern territorial state, considering its scale and territorial bias, as
Held and Mcgrew argue:
In this context, many of the traditional domains of state activity and
responsibility (defence, economic management, health, and law and
order) can no longer be served without institutionalizing
multilateral forms of collaboration.51
What the modern territorial states stand to gain from cooperation in the creation of
international institutions should be seen as a Pareto-improving outcome, because
without some form of cooperation, states will necessarily be worse off, as Hooge and
Marks state:
The coordination dilemma confronting multi-level governance can
be simply stated: To the extent that policies of one jurisdiction have
spill-over (i.e. negative or positive externalities) for other
jurisdictions, so coordination is necessary to avoid socially perverse
outcomes.52
49 On the ‘Tragedy of the Commons’ see, Elinor Ostrom, Governing the Commons: The
Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990.
50 On the dilemmas of common aversion and common interests see Arthur Stein,
‘Coordination and Collaboration: Regimes in an Anarchic World,’ in David Baldwin (ed.),
Neorealism and Neoliberalism, New York: Columbia University Press, 1993, p. 41.
51 David Held and Anthony McGrew, Globalization and Anti-Globalization, Cambridge:
Polity Press, 2008, pp. 25–26.
52 Liesbet Hooge, and Gary Marks, ‘Unravelling the Central State, but How? Types of Multi-
level Governance,’ The American Political Science Review, vol. 97, No. 2, 2003, p. 239. This
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However, considering the anarchic nature of the international system, cooperation is
not easy to achieve, although international institutions can reduce uncertainty and the
transaction costs of repeated interactions between states and allow states to take
advantage of economies of scale to increase the returns of an additional issue,53 which
point underlies rational choice institutionalism, as Ikenberry states:
Rationalist theory sees as agreements or contracts between actors
that function to reduce uncertainty, lower transaction costs, and
solve collective action problems. Institutions provide information,
enforcement mechanisms, and other devices that allow states to
realize joint gains. Institutions are explained in terms of the
problems they solve – they are constructs that can be traced to the
actions of self-interested individuals or groups.54
Although international institutions can significantly decrease transaction costs and
facilitate exchange between states, the end result of an international institution will
not always reflect the most efficient result desired by states, particularly because
‘institutional development frequently depends on prior outcomes (path-dependence)
and evolutionary forces’.55
point is also expressed by Robert Keohane and the prisoners’ dilemma analogy to
international affairs, Keohane, After Hegemony, op. cit.
53 The reason states decide to create international institutions relates to their need to decrease
the transaction costs of future interactions, and also to ensure a stable framework in order to
achieve the desired results by joint action, as Keohane states: ‘International regimes reduce
transaction costs of legitimate bargains and increase them for illegitimate ones’, Keohane,
After Hegemony op. cit., p. 90.
54 G. John Ikenberry, ‘Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Persistence of American Post-
war Order,’ in Michael E. Brown, Owen R. Cote Jr., Owen R, Sean M. Lynn-Jones and
Steven E. Miller, Primacy and its Discontents: American Political Power and International
Stability, Cambridge, Ma: MIT Press, 2009, pp. 182–83.
55 Barbara Koremenos, Charles Lipson and Duncan Snidal, The Rational Design of
International Institutions, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001, p. 7.
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2.2. Logic of Appropriateness and Logic of Consequences
In order to understand the effect institutions have on agents in social life, the two
‘logics for actions’ should be considered: the logic of appropriateness and the logic of
consequences.
The logic of appropriateness sees action determined by the rules of what is
appropriate behaviour; where actors match their actions to their identities, and
behaviour is conditioned by what actors believe is the correct course of action. This
logic contains cognitive and normative elements56 and represents the logic used in
Constructivist arguments. The logic of consequences, on the other hand, sees action as
determined by a rational assessment of the interests of social actors.57
The relevance of these two logics in relation to international institutions is that they
also represent two different approaches to the study of international institutions,
Constructivism v. Rational Choice; the former emphasising that international
institutions are not just instrumental agents of states but that they can exercise a
significant influence in constraining state behaviour and in determining states’
preferences even when considering power asymmetries in international affairs; the
latter, emphasising that international institutions are a mere by-product of states’
designs and that, at most, they constrain and shape states’ behaviour, but even so,
states preferences are considered exogenous, as a given.58 Rothstein expresses this
problem when he argues that:
The advantage with the economic approach is that it provides us
with clearly defined and universal micro-foundations of how
individuals will act in different institutional settings (viz., they will
maximize their expected utility). The problem is that, because it has
56 James, G. March and Johan P. Olsen, Rediscovering Institutions: The Organizational Basis
of Politics, New York: The Free Press, 1989, pp. 160–62.
57 Kjell Goldmann, ‘Appropriateness and Consequences: The Logic of Neo-Institutionalism,’
Governance: An International Journal of Policy and Administration, vol. 18, No. 1, 2005.
58 A recent example of rational choice applied to International Law is seen in the Economic
Analysis of Law by Joel P., Trachtman, The Economic Structure of International Law,
Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2008.
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no theory of where preferences come from (of what is “expected
utility” for different actors), it must generally deduce preferences
from behaviour: the dependent variable is thus used to explain the
independent, which in turn is re-used to explain the same dependent
variable.59
In any case, looking at the contribution of institutionalism, ‘the best theory would tell
us when institutions necessarily matter to states, and why’,60 although what is
considered the ‘best’ theory can be elusive. This means that a ‘good’ theory about
international institutions should explain the origins of international institutions and
take into consideration that states design institutions for certain purposes, and thus,
look at the reasons behind their creation. Hence, a ‘good’ theory will also address the
mechanisms of the evolution of institutions.
2.3. The Problem of Choice
Cooperation is needed in a world where states expect to gain from a coordinated
international institutional framework. However, this does not mean that states have an
unlimited set of choices, particularly because states cannot choose the constitutional
rules of the international system without incurring the huge transaction costs of
renegotiating the three types of rules that are the foundations of an international
system.61 Moreover, states cannot overcome the limits of their geographical position
in international affairs.
For instance, the institutional development of the EU and its evolution has seen states
that are eligible to access the EU more likely to apply for membership because the
59 Bo Rothstein, ‘Political Institutions: An Overview’ in Robert E. Goodin and Hans-Dieter
Kinglemann, A New Handbook of Political Science, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998,
p. 148.
60 Nicholas Onuf, ‘Institutions, Intentions and International Relations,’ Review of
International Studies, vol. 28, 2002, p. 211.
61 Rules of membership, rules of behaviour and secondary rules (meta-rules) as discussed in
Chapter 1.
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cost of accession is lower than the transaction costs of establishing a new, similar
institutional arrangement.62
In regions where nothing similar exists (as the EU integration process), states are less
likely to create and establish similar institutional arrangements. This is because of
associated high transaction costs, considering the difficulties of establishing a new
regional arrangement, which might require the identification of common problems to
solve, whether it is, for example, to liberalise trade, provide for common security or to
avoid environmental degradation.
The same logic applies to functional institutions such as the WTO, where the gains to
be obtained from membership are immense, taking into account that it is one of the
largest global organisations within which trade liberalisation takes place. That said
accession rules are negotiated case by case63 which maintains high entry costs and
which, thus, constrains the choice of states. A theory of international institutions
should address these limitations of states in the establishment or their entry into
international arrangements, and not only consider the differences in material
capabilities and legal status between states (asymmetries of power and legalised
hegemony), but also the outcomes of institutional arrangements (intended and
unintended consequences). This implies that a theory of international affairs should
explain why states decide to cooperate in certain areas (per capita stakes and regime
theory). As a consequence, it is important to discuss, briefly, some of the factors that
might affect the design and evolution of institutions in international affairs, namely:
Regime Theory, Asymmetries of Power, Per Capita Stakes, Unintended
Consequences and Public Goods.
2.4. Regime Theory
62 The cost of establishing a new institutional arrangement should be compared with the cost
of entry into an already established institutional arrangement.
63 Peter John Williams, A Handbook on Accession to the WTO, Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2008, p. 2.
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The study of regimes from a rational-choice perspective has been part of International
Relations scholarship for a long time. Regimes ‘can be defined as sets of implicit or
explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which
actors’ expectations converge in a given area of international relations’.64 Regimes are
also international institutions, the basic function of which is to govern a particular
issue area of international politics in order to achieve better coordination between
states in that issue-area, whether it is in relation to trade, the environment or
otherwise.65
2.5. Asymmetries of Power
It is important to remember that the design of international institutions is affected by
asymmetries of power between states (power structures) in which states, legally equal
but materially more powerful, might enjoy a privileged position in designing
international institutions because they have greater bargaining power. This was the
case, in particular, of the Post-World War II international system where the concept of
the Great Powers was legally introduced by the United Nations Charter with the
creation of the Security Council.66 Institutional theory recognises the role that
asymmetries of power have, not only in terms of establishing international
institutions, but also in their evolution, as Keohane argues: ‘More generally, the rules
of any institution will reflect the relative power positions of its actual and potential
64 Stephen Krasner, ‘Overview’ in Stephen Krasner (ed.), International Regimes, Ithaca:
Cornell University Press, 1983, p. 2.
65 Ibid., p. 7; Oram R. Young, ‘Regime Dynamics: the Rise and Fall of International
Regimes,’ in Stephen Krasner, International Regimes, op. cit., p. 93; Friedrich Kratochwil
and John Gerard Ruggie, ‘International Organization: A State of the Art or an Art of the
State?’ International Organization, vol. 40, No. 4, 1986, p. 759; Oran R. Young,
‘International Regimes: Towards a New Theory of Institutions,’ World Politics, vol. 39, No.
1, 1986.
66 Simpson calls it ‘legalised hegemony,’ see Gerry Simpson, Great Powers and Outlaw
States, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004. This point was explored in Chapter 1.
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members which constrain the feasible bargaining space and affect transaction costs’.67
The influence of the Great Powers in the design and evolution of institutional
arrangements often imposes costs on weaker states, forcing them to accept outcomes
which they would not otherwise willingly accept, as seen in the Wimbledon case
discussed in Chapter 1.
2.6. Per Capita Stakes
Furthermore, ‘per capita stakes’ of the various actors in the international system also
have an effect on institutional establishment and evolution, depending on the stake of
states in certain issues. This means that depending on the issue, different states and
actors will be more heavily involved in certain areas or regions of international
politics, which will, therefore, give these states a greater role in the design and
evolution of these institutions.68 For example, European states have a greater stake in
the development of the EU because it directly affects them; similarly, maritime states
have greater incentives to participate in the political or legal developments that impact
on the regime of the seas because they have economic interests in their maritime
zones and Economic Exclusive Zones (EEZ).69 As Komesar indicates in explaining
the role of per capita stakes in the political process, ‘Interest groups with small
numbers but high per capita stakes have significant advantages in political action over
interest groups with larger numbers and smaller per capita stakes’.70 This notion
67 Robert Keohane, ‘International Institutions: Two Approaches,’ op. cit., p. 387, similarly
Jack Knight, op. cit., p. 127.
68 On per capita stakes, see Neil Komesar, ‘Imperfect Alternatives: Choosing Institutions,’ in
Law, Economics and Public Policy, Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1994, p. 68.
69 A sea zone of 200 miles where states have special sovereign rights of exploration of natural
and marine resources, Part V (Article 56, rights of states and Article 57, the 200-miles
extension) of the United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea, 1982, see Malcom D.
Evans, ‘The Law of the Sea,’ in Malcom D. Evans, (ed.), International Law Documents,
Oxford: Oxford University Press, eighth edition, 2007, pp. 644–45.
70 Komesar applied his Interest Group Theory of politics (IGT) to the individual level, but it
can also be applied at the international level if the state is considered as an individual actor, as
IR theory posits, see Neil Komesar, op. cit., p. 68.
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corresponds to that of ‘Voice’ and ‘Exit’ proposed by Hirschman,71 the former
relating to the political participation of an agent in an institutional framework and the
latter to the possibility of exit from an institutional arrangement. ‘Voice’ relates to Per
Capita Stakes because it defines the level and depth of participation of an agent within
an institutional framework. However, ‘Voice’ cannot be seen as separate from ‘Exit’,
because if an agent cannot participate fully in an institutional arrangement, the ‘Exit’
option may need to be exercised.72 This is significant in international affairs because
states have a variable degree of participation in institutional arrangements depending
on their position of power and the initial set of constraints defined by the rules of the
arrangement. This means that in many instances of state participation, ‘Voice’ might
be affected, and for that reason, ‘Exit’ may function as a last-resort mechanism to
protect state sovereignty, particularly if sovereignty is shared, as it is in the EU.73
2.7. Unintended Consequences
The study of international institutions should also address the problem of unintended
consequences, in the sense that international institutions are designed for certain
purposes, but that the outcomes of their actions often produce results very different
from those envisioned by their designers at the outset.74 This is especially relevant to
the concept of sovereignty because, if in designing and establishing institutions states
do not fully anticipate the outcomes of their actions, the result might be that the power
of institutions is enhanced, thus restricting state sovereignty. This point is of particular
71 Albert O. Hirschman, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press,
1970.
72 Hirschman, op. cit., pp. 125–26.
73 This is why the new Treaty of Lisbon explicitly asserts the right of withdrawal from the
EU, ending years of doctrinal debate. See analysis in Chapter 4 on the EU.
74 Pierson also links the unintended consequences with the limitations of rational choice in
institutionalism, see Paul Pierson, Politics in Time: History, Institutions, and Social Analysis,
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004, p. 108. On a rational-choice perspective in
relation to unintended consequences, see Russell Hardin, Liberalism, Constitutionalism and
Democracy, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999, pp. 23–24.
72
poignancy when considering the different mechanisms of evolution of institutions,
such as Pierson argues in relation to the EU:
Specific Institutional Arrangements have multiple effects.
Expanded judicial review in the European Union simultaneously
empowered judges, shifted agenda-setting powers away from the
member states towards the European Commission, altered the
character of discourse over policy reform, transformed the kinds of
policy instruments that decision makers prefer to use, and
dramatically changed the value of political resources traditionally
employed by interest groups, to name just a few of the most
obvious consequences.75
Public Goods
Public goods ‘are usually defined as goods with non-excludable benefits and non-rival
consumption. Non-excludability means that it is technically, politically, or
economically infeasible to exclude someone from consuming the public good. Non-
rivalry means that one person’s consumption of the good does not detract from the
availability to others’.76
At the international level, public goods provide a useful analytical framework to
understand the nature of international cooperation in relation to the insufficiencies of
states, within their own territorial jurisdictions, in tackling transnational problems.
There are different types of Global Public Goods, with Peace and Security, the
75 Paul Pierson, op. cit., p. 109. On the application of institutional theory to the EU, especially
the role of informal institutional change, see Jeffrey Stacey and Berthold Rittberger,
‘Dynamics of formal and informal institutional change in the EU,’ Journal of European
Public Policy, vol. 10, No. 6, 2003.
76 Inge Kaul, et. al., Providing Global Public Goods: Managing Globalization, Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2003, pp. 21–22.
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Environment and Global Financial Stability77 constituting some of the most
important.78 At the international level, the definition of Public Goods requires some
adjustment when it is considered that some Global Public Goods do not conform fully
to the definition; when for example, many so-called ‘Public Goods’ are excludable
and can be rivals as in, for instance, the trade regime at the WTO, which although
large, excludes non-member states, and the rivalry that exists among regional trading
systems such as NAFTA or MERCOSUR.79
The ‘Area’80 is another example of a Global Public Goods or a ‘global commons’
considered part of the ‘common heritage of mankind’ (Article 136 of the United
Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea)81 which is managed by the International
Seabed Authority. In the legal regime of the global commons, no states’ claims of
sovereignty are recognised by International Law.82 This is significant, because in the
regime of the global commons, states’ sovereignty – defined by ultimate exclusive
territorial authority – is not present, although global commons are considered the
property of mankind as a whole.83
77 Global financial stability is an example of a Global Public Good, as recognised by the IMF,
see Fariborz Moshirian, ‘Globalisation and the Role of International effective Institutions,’
Journal of Banking and Finance, vol. 31, No. 6, 2007. p. 1584.
78 Pedro Conceicao, ‘Assessing the Provision Status of Global Public Goods,’ in Inge Kaul,
et. al., Providing Global Public Goods, op. cit., p. 156.
79 On ‘impure public goods’ see Severine Deneulin and Nicholas Townsend, Public Goods,
global Public Goods and the Common Good, WED Working Paper 18, 2006:
http://www.welldev.org.uk/research/workingpaperpdf/wed18.pdf [Accessed 22.12.2010].
80 The ‘Area’ is defined in the UN Convention of the Law of the Sea as the ‘seabed and ocean
floor and subsoil thereof, beyond the limits of national jurisdiction’ (Article 1 of UNCLOS).
81 Hereinafter, UNCLOS.
82 Similarly, the Outer Space, the Moon and the Celestial bodies cannot be appropriated by
claims of sovereignty by states (Article 2 of the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities
of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial
Bodies, 1967).
83 Susan J. Buck, The Global Commons: An Introduction, London: Earthscan Publications,
1998, pp. 27–29.
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The provision of Global Public Goods in international affairs requires the protection
of a regime or an institutional framework, as Held and McGrew assert, ‘Effective and
accountable institutions of governance are central to the effective provision of global
public goods’.84 As a result, Global Public Goods require rules to regulate their
protection and enforcement, particularly considering the need for states to enjoy their
benefits, as Moshirian points out:
It is clear that global public goods require global institutions to
ensure that they are produced and at the same time, they require the
support and coordination of regional and national institutions to
ensure that they will reach all nations.85
3. Agency v. Structure in International Relations
The dichotomy between agency and structure is pervasive in the social sciences.86 As
such, it also is relevant to IR theory87 especially when analysing the structure of the
84 David Held and Anthony McGrew, ‘Political Globalization: Trends and Choices’ in Inge
Kaul, et. al., Providing Global Public Goods: Managing Globalization, Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2003, p. 196.
85 Moshirian, op. cit., p. 1585.
86 ‘Action and structure normally appear in both sociological and philosophical literature as
antinomies,’ see Anthony Giddens, Central Problems in Social Theory: Action, Structure and
Contradiction in Social Analysis, London: Macmillan press, 1979, p. 49; see also Derek
Layder, Understanding Social Theory, London: Sage Publications, 2006, pp. 193–212.
According to Hodgson, structure ‘includes all sets of social relations, including the episodic,
and those without rules, as well social institutions’, see Geoffrey Hodgson, ‘Institutions and
Individuals: Interaction and Evolution,’ Organization Studies, vol. 28, 2007, p. 96. On
discussions about the impact of rational choice, particularly its emphasis on methodological
individualism, see Geoffrey Hodgson, ‘Meanings of Methodological Individualism,’ Journal
of Economic Methodology, vol. 14, No. 2, 2007.
87 Andreas Bieller and Adam David Morton, ‘The Gordian Knot of Agency-Structure in
International Relations: A Neo-Gramscian Perspective,’ European Journal of International
Relations, vol. 7, No. 1, 2001, pp. 10–13; Alexander Wendt, ‘The Agent-Structure Problem in
international Relations,’ International Organization, Vol. 41, No. 3, 1987.
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international system,88 and its interaction with state agency. The relationship between
agency and structure should be seen as mutually constitutive, as Giddens argues:
The constitution of agents and structures are not two independently
given sets of phenomena, a dualism, but represent a duality.
According to the notion of the duality of structure, the structural
properties of social systems are both medium and outcome of the
practices they recursively organize.89
Bearing in mind that this thesis is concerned with analysis of the international system,
in looking at agency, therefore, our primary focus is the state, seen as the most
important actor since Westphalia. This implies an analysis of the multiple dimensions
of the state; its constituent components, 90 and the different interest groups with
multifarious interests and preferences within the state trying to advance their
88 Structure in IR theory is determined in part by Kenneth Waltz’s Neo-realism and his ‘three
images’ understanding of International Politics: structure is differentiated from the unit-level
analysis, which includes analysis of the state, however, Waltz’s theory reduces Structure or
System to the unit-level analysis (the state), following his rational-choice approach. For a
critical view, see John Gerard Ruggie, ‘Continuity and Transformation in the World Polity:
Toward a Neorealist Synthesis,’ World Politics, Vol. 35, No. 2, 1983; Alexander Wendt,
Social Theory of International Politics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999, pp.
139–189.
89 Anthony Giddens, The Constitution of Society, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1984, p. 25; Beth
V. Yarbrough and Robert M. Yarbrough, International Institutions and the New Economics of
Organization, International Organization, vol. 44, No. 2, 1990.
90 This is particularly relevant for federal states or decentralised states where the state is not
‘operationally’ a unitary actor but constitutes the many, considering that those states are
vertically and horizontally divided into many centres. They are vertically divided into many
centres because federal and decentralised states are composed of different units (states,
regions or provinces) which enjoy significant autonomy. They are horizontally divided
because in those states, power is usually divided in the executive, legislative or judicial
power, and this often has an effect on the ‘unity’ of states’ action, Slaughter calls it the
‘disaggregated state,’ see Anne Marie Slaughter, A New World Order, Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 2004, pp. 12–15.
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positions.91 Furthermore, seeing the state as a unitary actor without considering the
role of domestic politics in shaping state preferences and interests, could lead often to
incorrect conclusions. States represent a plethora of different interests, as Gruber
argues:
One source bias has been their predilection for seeing ‘states’ as the
fundamental building blocks of international relations theory. A
legacy of Waltzian Realism, the assumption that states are (in the
jargon) ‘unitary actors’ greatly simplifies the explanatory task,
allowing the analyst to trace changes in state behaviour to
corresponding changes in the larger international environment.
That said, if our goal is to understand why international cooperation
takes the form it does, abandoning the notion of states as internally
undifferentiated entities is an absolute necessity.92
Certain groups within the state might have different interests, as Liberal Theory
emphasises.93 This means that states’ interests will reflect the outcomes of domestic
politics, and that as a consequence, domestic politics will also be reflected in the
design of international institutions.
The structure of the international system94 is composed of the ‘constitutional’ rules of
the international system including rules of membership, rules of behaviour and meta-
91 This point is particularly emphasised by the liberal theory in IR, see Andrew Moravcsik,
‘Taking Preferences Seriously,’ op. cit.
92 Lloyd Gruber, Ruling the World: Power Politics and the Rise of Supranational Institutions,
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000, p. 259.
93 Andrew Moravcsik, ‘Taking Preferences Seriously,’ op. cit., and Anne-Marie Slaughter,
‘International Law in a World of Liberal States,’ European Journal of International Law, vol.
6, No. 4, 1995.
94 For neo-realism, the structure of the International system includes anarchy (absence of
authority in international politics), differentiation between units (states are the most important
units in the international system) and the distribution of capabilities between units
(asymmetry of power). According to this approach, the state is seen as a unitary actor – no
role for domestic politics is considered – and the structure of international politics compels
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rules. Constitutional rules mean the ‘foundational’ rules that allow for interaction
between states. Constitutional does not refer to a ‘Constitution’ for the international
system.95
The structure of the international system constrains and shapes the behaviour of the
different actors in the international system. However, care must be taken not to reduce
state’s agency to the structure of the international system, in that although the sphere
of action of individual states is constrained by constitutional rules of the international
system, states still retain some choice in the conduct of their own affairs. The
constitutional rules of the international system are composed, firstly by rules that
determine what the legitimate acceptable polities (units) in the international system
(rules of membership) are; secondly, by the rules which proscribe and prescribe how
these actors should behave (rules of behaviour) and thirdly, by rules about the creation
of other rules (meta-rules or secondary rules), as Smit points out:
Constitutional structures are coherent ensembles of intersubjective
beliefs, principles, and norms that perform two functions in
ordering international societies: they define what constitutes a
legitimate actor, entitled to all the rights and privileges of
statehood; and they define the basic parameters of rightful state
action.96
These rules are foundational and define the rules of the game of each international
system, as Philpott recalls,
states to maximise their power or security, with the potential for cooperation seen as minimal.
See Brian C. Schmidt, ‘Realist Conceptions of Power,’ in Felix Berenskoetter and M. J.
Williams, Power in World Politics, London: Routledge, 2007, p. 46.
95 Although some authors such as Fassbender see the UN Charter as the Constitution for the
International Community. See Bardo Fassbender, ‘Sovereignty and Constitutionalism in
International Law,’ in Neil Walker, Sovereignty in Transition, Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2003.
96 Christian Reus Smit, ‘The Constitutional Structure of the International Society,’
International Organization, vol. 51, No. 4, 1997, p. 566.
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These rules are not the laws or institutions of “international
society” that provide order or peace or justice among states; rather
more foundationally, they create the system in the first place. They
define the holders of basic authority and their most essential
prerogatives. In the modern international system constitutive rules
define sovereign states, not baronies, or tribes or churches or
empires, as the legitimate polities, and they set forth their essential
prerogatives, as non-intervention, pacta sunt servanda, and the
like.97
Hence, the discretionary sphere of action of individual states is largely explained by
the extent to which these rules operate in international politics, which suggests that in
order to understand the role of states in the international system, it is necessary to
consider not only the role of structure in constraining state behaviour, but also in
constituting state conduct in international affairs.98
Notwithstanding this, it is important to point out that states are created in the
Westphalian international system, the basic rules of which have shaped and restricted
the way states behave, but that these rules have also had a constitutive role in shaping
states’ identities and interests.99 International institutions have the potential to
97 Daniel Philpott, ‘Usurping the Sovereignty of Sovereignty,’ World Politics, vol. 53, 2001,
p. 309.
98Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics, op. cit., p. 155.
99 From a Constructivist perspective, Alexander Wendt, Idem, p. 382, also emphasises the
need to study international institutions to reflect these two approaches: neo-institutionalism
and its rational-choice approach and reflective theories. On these ‘reflective’ or constructivist
approaches, on the core features of constructivism, see John Ruggie, Constructing the World
Polity: Essays in International Institutionalization, London: Routledge, 2000, pp. 32–34;
Alexander Wendt, ‘Constructing International Politics,’ op. cit. From the sociological
institutional perspective, the modern territorial state is a world-wide construction by cultural
and associational processes, this perspective emphasises the role of the international system in
defining the essential characteristics of the state, see Meyer et. al., ‘World Society and the
Nation State,’ The American Journal of Sociology, vol. 103, No. 1, 1997. This perspective is
closer to Functionalism and the notion that the structure creates actors and determines their
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determine states’ preferences by influencing and shaping domestic policy, as was
shown by the membership conditionality (linking admission to an institutional
arrangement with behaviour) of the EU, whereby some candidate countries changed a
number of internal policies, the incentive being accessing the EU.100 The state, as
Axford argues, should be embedded in the structure of the international system, ‘The
state in the modern global system is both actor and social institution’.101 This includes
all attributes and privileges of statehood also, particularly that of sovereignty.
4. The Concept of Sovereignty in the Context of International Institutions
International institutions thus reflect the power structure of the international system,
and it is in this context, that the concept of sovereignty must be understood.
This means that the concept of sovereignty with all its corollaries, namely, non-
intervention and jurisdictional exclusive authority of states, depends on the power
structure of the international system. Thus powerful states, particularly the Great
Powers, will have additional influence in the design and the evolution of international
institutions, including international organisations, as the establishment of the UN, for
example, demonstrates.102 Sovereign equality lives sides by side with a form of
hierarchy in the international system, which means that Great Powers have a legalised
hegemony in the structure of the international system, as in the case of the UN system
patterns of action. For more detail from this perspective, see Daniel Little, Varieties of Social
Explanation: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Social Science, Boulder: Westview Press,
1991, pp. 102–112.
100 Judith Kelley, ‘International Actors on the Domestic Scene: Membership Conditionality
and Socialization by International Institutions,’ International Organization, vol. 58, 2004;
Oran R. Young, Governance in World Affairs, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999, p. 4.
On the impact of international rules on domestic policy choices, see Andrew P. Cortell and
James W. Davis, ‘How Do International institutions Matter? The Domestic Impact of
International Rules and Norms,’ International Studies Quarterly, vol. 40, 1996.
101 Barrie Axford, The Global System: Economics, Politics and Culture, New York: St
Martin’s Press, 1995, p. 134.
102 For the same line of reasoning see Gerry Simpson, Great Power and Outlaw States, op. cit.
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where the Great Powers are represented in the Security Council, as Wendt and
Friedheim argue:
Despite the juridical sovereignty of virtually every modern state,
hierarchical political authority is also a pervasive phenomenon in
international politics. Great Powers are widely acknowledged to
have special prerogatives in their ‘spheres of influence’ to help
‘manage’ the international system.103
Power asymmetries and issues of bargaining power in the establishment of
international institutions are not irrelevant either, as Gruber explains:
The fact that the United States emerged from the war as the world’s
dominant economic power afforded it tremendous leverage. As the
world’s largest consumer and producer of traded goods, the United
States could threaten to close off its market to nations that did not
share its commitment to multilateral norms and principles. U.S.
officials had recourse to other forms of leverage, such as denying
other countries vital military or economic assistance.104
Once international institutions are established, exiting them comes at a high cost to
states, considering that the benefits of membership in institutional arrangements
exceed the costs of opting out. The WTO is an example of this, where the potential
benefits of membership (access to the Global Trade Regime) exceed the costs of
staying out.
However, if these institutional arrangements start challenging state sovereignty – by
claiming a sphere of authority that rivals that of the state – the options for states in
countering those claims decreases, considering the high costs of exiting. As a
103 Alexander Wendt and Daniel Friedheim, ‘Hierarchy under Anarchy: Informal Empire and
East German State,’ in Thomas J. Bierkesterand and Cythia Weber (eds.), State Sovereignty
as a Social Construct, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996, pp. 240–41.
104 Lloyd Gruber, op. cit., pp. 35–36.
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consequence, although states might have the ‘legal’ option of withdrawal from an
international institutional arrangement, the costs of exit would leave states worse
off.105 As a result, the only viable mechanism for states is to increase ‘Voice’, that is,
their political participation in the institutional arrangement
Furthermore, the costs of re-coordination into different and alternative institutional
arrangements make international institutions more likely to persist over time, as
Hardin notes, ‘A coordination regime is commonly strong just because it is extremely
difficult to re-coordinate large numbers on doing things some other way’,106 which
confirms that although international institutions are the voluntary creations of states,
the mechanisms of change in international institutions tend to be path-dependent, as
Krasner emphasises: ‘an institutionalist perspective implies that something persists
over time and that change is not instantaneous and costless’.107 For instance, Post-
World War II international institutions are explained by path-dependence and
responsive to the logic of increasing returns.108
International institutions constrain states and challenge state authority by the process
of ‘legalisation’ in which institutional practices became institutionalised in formal
rules. This is significant, because it is necessary to explore the extent to which global
authoritative structures, which challenge state sovereignty, emerge from international
institutions. The legalisation of rules at the international level implies three
processes:109
105 This is the case of the EU, where challenges to sovereignty are common, but the cost of the
exit option is too high to be contemplated, in which case, the only viable mechanism would
be that of ‘Voice’, whereby states often change the nature of their political participation in the
EU as a way to assert their own preferences and sovereignty. See Albert Hirschman, Exit,
Voice, op. cit.
106 Russell Hardin, Liberalism, Constitutionalism and Democracy, op. cit., p. 15.
107 Stephen Krasner, ‘Sovereignty: An Institutional Perspective,’ Comparative Political
Studies, vol. 21, No. 1, 1988, p. 71.
108 Ikenberry, op. cit., pp. 204–205.
109 The terms, Obligation, Precision and Delegation are used, see Goldstein et. al.,
‘Introduction: Legalization and World Politics,’ op. cit., pp. 385–399. See also Raustiala’s
framework that uses different terms to express the same reality: Legality, Substance and
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d) The identification and binding of the rules (Obligation);
e) The extent to which international obligations are weak or
strong (Precision);
f) The creation of third-party enforcement mechanisms
(Delegation).
The institutionalisation of the rules of GATT with the creation of the WTO and the
mandatory dispute settlement mechanism is an example of institutionalisation of rules
or ‘legalisation’.110 The process of legalisation or ‘legality’ often serves three
purposes: ‘First, legality is important to state officials, as evidenced by the often
considerable debate over whether a proposed pact will be a contract or a pledge.
Second … an agreement’s legality often has implications for domestic law, which in
some cases may explain why states – and private actors – argue over legality. Third,
the politics of legal agreement as opposed to political agreement are distinctive’.111
The structure of international obligations, whether a mere ‘pledge’ or a ‘contract’112 is
particularly relevant when analysing the impact of dispute resolution mechanisms
upon sovereignty. Thus it is important in order to understand the role that dispute
resolution processes have in the evolution of international institutional arrangements,
as Ostrom observes:
It is obvious to most institutional analysts that rules must be
enforced in some manner to achieve robust governance; the
question of how rules will actually be enforced is frequently
Structure, Kal Raustiala, ‘Form and Substance in International Agreements,’ The American
Journal of International Law, vol. 99, No. 1, 2005, pp. 581–614.
110Alec Stone Sweet, ‘Judicialization and the Construction of Governance,’ in Martin Shapiro
and Alec Stone Sweet, On Law, Politics and Judicialization, Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2002, pp.71–78. Contrary to this perspective, see Jeffrey Dunoff who is particularly
sceptical of the process of ‘constitutionalization’ (an example of ‘legalisation’) of the WTO
by emphasising the politics of the organisation, Jeffrey Dunoff, ‘Constitutional Conceits: The
WTO’s “Constitution” and the Discipline of International Law,’ European Journal of
International Law, vol. 17, No. 3, 2006.
111 Kal Raustiala, op. cit., p. 590.
112 Idem, p. 584.
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ignored when proposed institutional changes are analyzed and a
reform is proposed.113
This issue relates to the process of judicialization of politics, ‘the ever accelerating
reliance on courts and judicial means for addressing core moral predicaments, public
policy questions, and political controversies’.114 Judicialization is part of the process
of legalisation of institutional arrangements, of which an example is the changes made
to the WTO–GATT dispute settlement process following the Uruguay Round, which
established compulsory jurisdiction in all disputes.115 As Stostad stresses, ‘the change
from GATT to the WTO is often described as a shift from a largely diplomacy-based,
113 In the context of resource regimes see Elinor Ostrom, Understanding Institutional
Diversity, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005, p. 265.
114 Ran Hirschl, ‘The New Constitutionalism and the Judicialization of Pure Politics
Worldwide,’ Fordham Law Review, vol. 75, No. 2, 2006, p. 721. According to Baudenbacher,
[Judicialization] ‘in the broadest sense of the term means replacing non-judicial proceedings
of legislation, administration, or dispute settlement with judicial proceedings,’ see Carl
Baudenbacher, ‘Judicialization: Can the European Model be Exported to Other Parts of the
World?’ Texas International Law Journal, vol. 93, 2004, p. 381. On the proliferation of
judicial bodies in international affairs, see Romano Cesare, ‘The Proliferation of International
Judicial Bodies: The Pieces of the Puzzle,’ International Law and Politics, vol. 31, 1999.
115 Panels might not be established by the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) if this is decided
by consensus (‘negative consensus’, Article 6.1. Dispute Settlement Understanding or DSU),
however, considering that an aggrieved party would have reasons to object, the negative
consensus is seldom reached, which explains why the WTO dispute settlement is seen as
compulsory. Mitsuo Matsushita, Thomas J. Schoenbaum and Petros C. Mavroidis, The World
Trade Organization, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006, pp. 115–16. Similarly, Bernhard
Zangl, ‘Judicialization Matters! A Comparison of Dispute Settlement under GATT and the
WTO,’ International Studies Quarterly, vol. 52, 2008. Arguing against the relevance of the
WTO panels as a pure example of legalisation, particularly considering that the panels’
decisions are just ‘recommendations’ to the DSB and only after they have been adopted do
they become binding in relation to the parties’ disputes, see Andreas F. Lowenfeld,
International Economic Law, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003, pp.155–56.
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or negotiated, apparatus for dispute resolution to a more rules-based, or adjudicatory,
model’.116
Judicialization has a constitutive effect on international arrangements because it
increases the levels of states’ compliance, thus affecting their authority. This is why it
is necessary to understand the phenomenon of judicialization as the creation of new
spheres of authority that go beyond the state. Judicialization renders obsolete the
notion that the state has the ‘ultimate authority’, because in many instances, the
decisions of those judicial bodies at the international level claim a sphere of authority
that often collides and supersedes the sovereign authority of the state. For these
reasons, it is important to understand the potential implications of judicialization on
the concept of sovereignty.
4.1.Global Governance
The rationale for international institutions in an anarchical international system needs
to be complemented with a theory of international (global) governance. Governance
‘relates to any form of creating or maintaining political order and providing common
goods for a given political community on whatever level’.117 At the international
level, governance imposes constraints on states by the foundational rules of the
international system even in a world without formal hierarchical authority over the
states. This means that global governance per se is based on a ‘non-hierarchical mode
of steering’.118
A theory of international governance will explain the different types and mechanisms
of authority and how it is exercised in international institutions in certain issue-areas
116 Timothy Stostad, ‘Trappings of Legality: Judicialization of Dispute Settlement in the
WTO, and its Impact on Developing Countries,’ Cornell International Law Journal, Vol. 39,
2006, p. 812.
117 Thomas Risse, Global Governance and Communicative Action: Government and
Opposition, vol. 39, Issue 2, 2004, p. 289.
118 Thomas Risse, op. cit., p. 292.
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of international affairs119 because global governance ‘invokes shifting the location of
authority in the context of integration and fragmentation’.120 Thus, global governance
implies a significant reconfiguration of power away from the modern territorial state
towards international institutions.121. Authority in an era of global governance should
be seen as pluralistic, considering the different forms of governance that exist in
global politics. One needs to detach the concept of authority from the modern
territorial state; as a result, a theory of sovereignty needs to take into account the
different modes of authority that go beyond the state, as Rosenau recalls:
It follows that world affairs can be reconceptualised as governed
through a bifurcated system – what can be called the two worlds of
world politics – one an interstate system of states and their national
governments that has long dominated the course of events, and the
other a multi-centric system of diverse types of other collectivities
that has lately emerged as a rival source of authority with actors
119 The mechanisms of international governance include different types, ranging from
international regimes (institutional frameworks in certain issue-areas, an example is the
governance regime of the sea under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, which
regulates the Law of the Sea), to the creation of formal International Organisations (like the
UN and the EU), informal institutions like G-20 (partially informal) or mechanisms of
political partnership between polities like federalism (in the case of federal arrangements
between sovereign states). The literature also includes regulatory regimes in the framework of
Global Governance, where private actors are preeminent; examples include the private bond-
rating agencies. See Craig N. Murphy, ‘Global Governance: Poorly Done and Poorly
Understood,’ International Affairs, vol. 76, No. 4, 2000, p. 794.
120 Thomas G. Weiss, ‘Governance, Good Governance and Global Governance: Conceptual
and Actual Challenges,’ Third World Quarterly, vol. 21, No. 5, 2000, p. 806.
121 This reconfiguration of authority also implies a reconfiguration of spaces and the processes
for severance of the link between authority and territory (deterritorialization of authority). It
also opens up new opportunities for participation of groups, as Gaventa argues: ‘Thus, just as
globalisation contributes to a separation of power from territory, so does it open up broader
possibilities for action by relatively powerless groups not only at the supranational level but
also through the interaction of these various levels,’ see John Gaventa, ‘Levels, Spaces and
Forms of Power,’ in Felix Berenskoetter and M. J. Williams (eds), Power in World Politics,
London: Routledge, 2007, p. 210.
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that sometimes cooperate with, often compete with, and endlessly
interact with the state-centric system.122
The problem of legitimacy123 of international institutions becomes particularly
poignant when the growing importance of international institutions, in exercising a
sphere of authority that goes beyond the state, is considered. International institutions,
particularly organisations, have powers delegated to them by states, thus challenging
the exclusive authority of the state. The delegation of power124 exists because
‘optimal solutions to some international problems, however, require more than a
simple exchange of promises. Rather, they require a delegation of authority to some
entity that, ideally, can make decisions that maximize the total gains to the parties to
the agreement and perhaps address distributional issues among states’.125 As
Hathaway argues, ‘When a state grants authority to an international body to take
action or make decisions, that consent rests on a certain expectation of what the
international body will do with the authority granted to it. But once the authority has
been given away, states inevitably lose control of the exercise of it’.126
122 James N. Rosenau, ‘Governance in a New Global Order,’ in David Held and Anthony
McGrew, Governing Globalization, Power, Authority and Global Governance, Cambridge:
Polity Press, 2002, pp. 72–73.
123 Daniel Bodansky, ‘The Legitimacy of International Governance: A Coming Challenge for
International Environmental Law?’ American Journal of International Law, vol. 93, 1999,
which discusses one of the most important themes relating to the EU.
124 On the two usages of delegation, the first of which presupposes a principal-agent
relationship of hierarchical nature whereby states delegate certain powers to international
organisations, the other, whereby states delegate authority over policy domains to
international organisations and institutions; the former is close to the classical delegations,
and the latter, closer to sharing of sovereignty, David A. Lake, ‘Delegating Divisible
Sovereignty: Sweeping a Conceptual Minefield,’ International Organization, vol. 2, 2007, pp.
231–232.
125 Andrew T. Guzman and Jennifer Landsidle, ‘The Myth of International Delegation,’
California Law Review, vol. 96, 2008, p. 1693.
126 Oona A. Hathaway, ‘International Delegation and State Sovereignty,’ Law and
Contemporary Problems, vol. 71, 2007, p. 23.
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And it is here that the crux of the problem of sovereignty lies; in an anarchic
international system, international institutions and international organisations exercise
authority as a part of global governance, which often collides with the authority of the
modern territorial state. This is why a new theory of sovereignty is required; one that
recognises the ‘disagreggation of authority’127 at the international level, as Higgot
argues:
But for international organizations to deliver better global
governance, it is necessary to escape from a bounded notion of
sovereignty and narrow definitions of security and state interest in
international relations. Central to overcoming these limitations, as
normative scholarship suggests, must be the recognition that
sovereignty can be disaggregated and redistributed across
institutional levels from the local to the global.128
Keohane, writing from an institutional perspective, sees sovereign statehood as an
institution ‘whose rules significantly modify the Hobbesian notion of anarchy’.129
Sovereignty must, therefore be understood according to which part of the world it
applies, and depending on the context, and in the contexts of ‘complex
interdependence’ (as in the EU).  For those reasons, The traditional view of
sovereignty ‘is no longer applicable’.130
Keohane sees sovereignty as ‘less a territorially defined barrier than a bargaining
resource for a politics characterized by complex transnational networks’.131 However,
sovereignty is not a bargaining resource; one state cannot be more or less sovereign
127 James N. Rosenau, ‘Governance in the Twenty-First Century,’ in Rorden Wilkinson, The
Global Governance Reader, London: Routledge, 2005, p. 48.
128 Richard Higgot, ‘International Political Institutions,’ in R. A. W. Rhodes, Sarah A. Binder
and Bert A. Rockman, The Oxford Handbook, op. cit., p. 623.
129 Robert Keohane, ‘Hobbes’s Dilemma and Institutional Change in World Politics:
Sovereignty in International Society,’ in Robert Keohane, Power and Governance, op. cit., p.
65.
130 Idem., pp. 72–73.
131 Idem., p. 74.
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because the attribute of sovereignty – a legal category – derives from statehood. The
misunderstanding may have its root in the fact that many authors use the term
sovereignty to merely describe ‘decision–making’ at state level, as Jackson clarifies:
Most (but not all) of the time that ‘sovereignty’ is used in current
policy debates, it actually refers to questions about the allocation of
power; normally ‘government decision-making power’. That is,
when someone argues that the United States should not accept a
treaty because that treaty infringes upon U.S. sovereignty, what the
person most often means is that he or she believes a certain set of
decisions should be made, as a matter of good governmental policy,
at the nation-state (U.S.) level, and not at the international level.132
This does not mean that states are forbidden to delegate sovereign powers.133 In the
case of European integration, as will be explored further in Chapter 4, sovereignty is
not merely a matter of degree, but is seen to be at the core of statehood.
Notwithstanding this, it is important to comprehend the concept of sovereignty in a
world with multiple centres of authority other than the modern territorial state.
132 John Jackson, Sovereignty-Modern: ‘A New Approach to an Outdated Concept,’ The
American Journal of International Law, vol. 97, No. 4, 2003, p. 790. Similarly, Eli
Lauterpacht, ‘But to invoke the concept of national sovereignty as in itself a decisional factor
is to fall back on a word which has an emotive quality lacking meaningful specific content’,
see Eli Lauterpacht, ‘Sovereignty-Myth or Reality?’ International Affairs, vol. 73, No. 1,
1997, p. 141. On the many uses of sovereignty in International Economic Law and in the
WTO context, see Kal Raustiala, ‘Rethinking Sovereignty in International Economic Law,’
Journal of International Economic Law, vol. 6, No. 4, 2003.
133 This point is especially relevant for those that distinguish between transfers of sovereignty
and transfers of competences, considering that sovereign powers cannot be transferred as they
are the sole attributes of states. See Arnaud Haquet, The Concept of Sovereignty in French
Constitutional Law (Le concept de souveraineté en droit constitutionnel Français), Paris:
Presses Universitaires de France, 2004, p. 25. On the problem of conferral of sovereign
powers to International Organisations, see Dan Sarooshi, International Organizations and
Their Exercise of Sovereign Powers, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005.
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From the perspective of Constructivism, the concept of sovereignty derives from the
structure of the international system, as Jinks and Goodman argue: ‘According to the
sociological model we advance, the constitutive features of states derive from world-
level cultural models, and the nature of sovereignty itself is a global cultural
product’.134 In this approach, the structure of the international system requires
exploration in order that state ‘autonomy’ and the legal concept of sovereignty are
understood.
Moreover, in order to understand how international institutions have challenged
Westphalian sovereignty, it is necessary to look into the enforcement mechanisms of
these institutions, particularly the role of dispute resolution in regional and functional
regimes, as Held asserts:
Instead if sovereignty as a concept is to retain its analytical and
normative force – as the rightful capacity to take final decisions and
make and enact the law within a given community – it has to be
conceived as divided among a number of agencies and limited by
the very nature of this plurality and the rules and procedures which
protect it.135
It is this Althusian understanding of sovereignty that pervades world politics,
considering the diversity of modes of authority that overlap and conflict with the
authority of the state.
5. Conclusion
This chapter has analysed the contribution of international institutions to International
Law, offering analysis of the various institutional approaches to international
institutions, particularly in the context of International Relations.
134 Ryan Goodman and Derek Jinks, ‘Toward an Institutional Theory of Sovereignty,’
Stanford Law Review, vol. 55, 2003, p. 136.
135 David Held, Political Theory and the Modern State, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1989, p. 238.
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It has explored the reasons behind the emergence and design of international
institutions, particularly with reference to the need for states to address negative
externalities, but also as durable mechanisms of international governance with a set of
constitutional rules and enforcement mechanisms.
The chapter has offered an explanation for the durability of international institutions,
considering the different mechanisms by which institutions have evolved, particularly
with reference to the notion of path-dependence. The thesis pointed out that this is
relevant, because states cannot easily change institutions without incurring high
transaction costs, and considering the constitutive and regulative effect that
international institutions have on the modern territorial state, this means that
sovereignty can only be understood in the context of existing international
institutions.
The chapter concluded with an analysis of power asymmetries in the design and
evolution of international institutions, and looked at the processes of
institutionalisation, particularly with ‘judicialization’, and how this is redefining the
idea that states have the ultimate authority. Finally, the chapter has discussed the
different mechanisms of global governance and how this affects states’ ‘ultimate
authority’ or sovereignty.
That international institutions comprise different mechanisms of multi-level
governance – federalism being one type of a multi-level governance system136 in
which authority is shared between different polities – will be the focus of discussion
in the following chapter.
136 Liesbet Hooghe and Gary Marks, ‘Unraveling the Central State, but How? Types of Multi-
level Governance,’ The American Political Science Review, vol. 97, No. 2, 2003
91
Chapter 3
The Federalist Tradition and the Concept of Sovereignty
1. Introduction
This chapter examines the contribution made by federalism to legal and political
theory in the context of an analysis of sovereignty as a concept.
In order to gain a better understanding of the theoretical basis behind the concept of
sovereignty, an adequate understanding of federalist theory is invaluable. This is
because the concept of sovereignty in the federalist tradition is different from that
typically found in the legal and political literature, which, written in the Bodinian
tradition is associated with the modern territorial state.1 This chapter will also analyse
the origins of federalism as political theory, used to express the principle of
partnership that is based on a contract or covenant between different polities in order
to maintain self-rule of the constituent polities (whether States, Cantons or Länder)
and, at the same time, to maintain shared-rule in common institutions. The federalist
principle, as will be discussed below, should be distinguished from the concept of
decentralisation, which implies a hierarchical element.
In order to better understand the historical origins of federalism, it will be necessary to
identify the different historical experiences of it, which are examined in this chapter
with particular reference to the United States and the different federal arrangements
there.
It should be pointed out that there is no single American federal ‘experience’ because
the United States had at least three federal experiments that can all be included within
the federalist tradition. It is in the United States that the distinction between federation
and confederation was first made.
1 Suffice to say that in order to understand federalism it is necessary to look at some of the
successes as well as the failures of the federal unions, see Ursula K. Hicks, Federalism:
Failure and Success, A Comparative Study, Basingstoke: The Macmillan Press, 1978.
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This chapter will also present a discussion of the European tradition of federalism,
focusing in particular on Germany and Switzerland because of their historical
experiences with it, but also because these countries offer a view in stark contrast to
the American experience, being that they are closer to the type of federalism found in
the European Union today. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the
possibilities of federalism beyond the state.
6.1. Federalism as Political Theory Revisited
Federalism etymologically comes from the Latin word foedus, which means literally
covenant2. This enquiry focuses on the uses of the political theory of federalism
applied to describe a set of relationships, different political arrangements, following in
the tradition of Johannes Althusius.3 Federalism as a political theory is based on the
partnership of different polities into a larger political arrangement where elements of
self-rule and common rule are preserved. Developed as a pragmatic necessity,
federalism as a concept, described the necessity of preserving autonomy and unity in a
political system. The will to preserve this balance, is where the political theory of
federalism lies, as Elazar puts it:
Federal principles are concerned with the combination of self-rule
and shared-rule. In the broadest sense, federalism involves linking
of individuals, groups, and polities in lasting but limited union in
such a way as to provide for the energetic pursuit of common ends
while maintaining the respective integrities of all parties.4
Federalism is a pluralistic mechanism of governance that allows the creation of a
common federal system between different polities, organised along territorial lines,
while, at the same time, preserving each polities’ autonomy.5
2 Daniel J. Elazar, Exploring Federalism, Alabama: Alabama University Press, 1987, p. 5.
3 See Chapter 1 of this thesis for more discussion on the legacy of Johannes Althusius.
4 Elazar, Exploring Federalism, 1987, op. cit., p. 5.
5 In this regard, federal theory has striking similarities with the notion of consociational theory
(dealing with the recognition and inclusion of different communities within a polity or a
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As a political theory, federalism embraces a non-exclusivist understanding of
sovereignty as opposed to that found in the modern Leviathan, the territorial state that
slowly emerged after Westphalia. What is meant by this is that federalism is based on
a voluntary partnership of different polities, which establish a federal political system
by sharing sovereignty. Here lays the genius of federalism: a political theory that does
not assume a single unitary centre of authority, but which assumes several, as Elazar
argues:
Federalism can be defined as the mode of political organization that
unites separate polities within an overarching political system by
distributing power among general and constituent governments in a
manner designed to protect the existence and authority of both.6
6.2. Federalism v. Decentralisation
To fully understand the concept of federalism and its function in a political system, it
is important to differentiate it from the concept of decentralisation. Too often these
two concepts are associated, mainly because they have some similarities, in the sense
that they represent the notion that in a political system it is possible for different levels
of power, in terms of territorial polities, to coexist at different levels.
In order to fully grasp this point, it is necessary to distinguish between unitary and
federal states. In unitary states, ultimate authority rests centrally with the state, and
although unitary states can be decentralised and do recognise the autonomy of
different local authorities or regions, this authority is given or recognised by the
central state because it is the central state that creates the local government. Unitary
states presuppose a hierarchical relationship between the central state and lower
state). Lijphart sees federalism as a special and limited type of consociational theory. See
Arend Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration, New Haven:
Yale University Press, 1977, p. 42.
6 Daniel J. Elazar, American Federalism: A View from the States, New York: Harper & Row,
Publishers, 1972, p. 2.
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levels. Furthermore, in unitary states, decentralisation7 is seen as a mechanism for
recognition of local loyalties and interests (self-government in municipalities) and
also to promote better governance. As Jellinek puts it when contrasting unitary states
with federal states:
The federal state is not a corporation of the State, just like the unitary
state cannot be conceived as an association formed by the union of
the municipalities of the state. It can be compared, where it
dominates in its sphere, with the unitary state. Just like it dominates
also over its territory and people…8
In federal states, federalism is recognised as a principle of partnership between the
different polities and the federal state, whereby, the constituent polities and the federal
state share authority by a written constitution. Authority does not emanate primarily
from the federal state that grants autonomy to constituent units or states, but authority
is shared between the federal state and its constituent units and is foundational of the
federal covenant. In unitary states, authority is primarily one that belongs to the
7 It is also important to distinguish between the concepts of ‘Devolution’ and
‘Decentralisation’ as they are not the same. Decentralisation ‘refers to the delegation of
central government powers without the relinquishment of supremacy by the central
legislature. Devolution may be legislative or administrative or both, and its more advanced
forms involves the exercise of powers by persons or bodies who, although acting on authority
delegated by the Westminster Parliament, are not directly answerable to it or to the central
government.’ Paul Jackson and Patricia Leopold, Constitutional and Administrative Law,
London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2001, p. 83; as Jackson and Leopold put it, Devolution ‘…
should be distinguished from “decentralisation”, which is a method whereby some central
government powers of decision-making are exercised by officials of the central government
located in various regions and federalism’. Jackson and Leopold, op. cit., p. 83. With
Devolution there is no constitutional division of powers between the central government and
the devolved regions, and there is a clear supremacy (sovereignty) of the central government
(the state) over the devolved regions which can always revoke the status of devolution, so that
in this way, also, it is different to federalism and decentralisation.
8 Georg Jellinek, General Theory of the State (Teoria General del Estado), Mexico: Fondo de
Cultura Economica, 2000 (first published in 1900, Staatslehere), p. 666.
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central state and the constituent polities (regions, provinces or states) may enjoy a
degree of autonomy that is recognised and given by the central state and not
negotiated as pact or covenant between different polities.
For Kelsen however decentralisation could also be applicable to federal states,
because according to his understanding, the concept of decentralisation is a matter of
degree.9
Considering all of this, the question of whether federalism is similar to
decentralisation – although legitimate – assumes the perspective and the traditional
bias inherited from political theory in the Bodinian tradition: wearing the lenses of the
modern territorial State. First, this is because there is an assumption that states are and
were always the basic units in the international system, and second, that the question
itself makes federalism redundant because it equates it with decentralisation,10 which
is not correct. Third, the question in itself sees federalism as a phenomenon that only
occurs within the boundaries of the modern territorial state, while wishing away the
long tradition of federalism in legal and political literature, at least since Althusius.
Johannes Althusius, writing in the context of the Holy Roman Empire, proposed an
understanding of federalism that described the relationship of the different polities
with the Empire by proposing a pluralistic governance system based on consent, as
9 Perhaps stemming from his Pure Theory of Law, see Hans Kelsen, General Theory of Law
and State, New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2006 (first published in 1945), pp. 316–
17.
10 Decentralisation is a term applicable to the phenomenon of creating autonomous local
communities within a unitary territorial state. It is closely associated with the term devolution,
which is used in common law, legal and political literature. Decentralised political systems
require a hierarchy, a single centre of authority, a strong central government which then
decides to create and delegate powers to local authorities, see Daniel J. Elazar, ‘Federalism
vs. Decentralization: The Drift from Authenticity,’ Publius: The Journal of Federalism, vol.
6, No. 4, 1976, pp. 9–19.
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was explained previously.11 Although Althusius did not use the concept of federalism
in the modern sense – as a political arrangement based on multiple levels of authority
– his ideas are nonetheless a part of the foundational moment of the modern federalist
tradition, in the sense that he advocates and describes a political theory based on a
decentralised system of governance, in which different political communities share
power in a larger political arrangement by preserving their autonomy,12 as Elazar puts
it:
Decentralization implies the existence of a central authority, a
central government. The government that can decentralize can
centralize if it so desires. Hence, in decentralized systems the
diffusion of power is actually a matter of grace not right, and, as
history reveals, in the long run it is usually treated as such.13
Federalism does not imply a relationship between the centre and periphery, as in the
concept of decentralisation, but suggests a non-hierarchical understanding of a
political partnership, between political communities, based on the idea of power built
around a matrix model.14,Federalism, therefore, is not only a descriptive term but it is
also a normative one, because it ‘refers to the advocacy of multi-tiered government
combining elements of shared-rule and regional self-rule … and the essence of
11 On Hueglin’s interpretation of federalism in the context of the Holy Roman Empire see
Thomas Hueglin, ‘Johannes Althusius: Medieval Constitutionalist or Modern Federalist?’
Publius: Federalism as a Grand Design, vol. 9, No. 4, 1979.
12 H. H. F. Eulau, ‘Theories of Federalism under the Holy Roman Empire,’ The American
Political Science Review, vol. 35, No. 4, 1941, pp. 648–649.
13 Elazar, Federalism vs. Decentralization, op. cit, pp. 13; similarly, Friedrich: ‘But as the
word decentralization clearly indicates, such an approach posits the center as a given and
primary, and allows for subcenters as, in effect, governmental entities to which some power
and authority have been delegated for purely pragmatic and heuristic reasons’. See Carl J.
Friedrich, Trends of Federalism in Theory and Practice, New York: Frederick A. Praeger,
1968, p. 4.
14 Federalism presupposes a ‘constitutional diffusion of power’. See Daniel Elazar, Exploring
Federalism, op. cit., pp. 5–6.
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federalism, as a normative principle is the perpetuation of both union and non-
centralization at the same time’.15
Nonetheless, federalism has the potential to generate different and contradictory
meanings, which is why it is necessary to understand its evolution and its diversity by
considering different federal experiences, as Black states:
Attempts to differentiate the various ideas of federalism bring us to
problems of definitions. Concepts of government like federalism
achieve precise meaning only through being used in similar ways
over time and by a variety of people. Precision of meaning is
impaired, however, whenever somebody tries to use such concepts
to promote a particular political view – whether for ideological or
programmatic reasons.16
1. 3. Federalism and the Union of States
The Althusian tradition17 posits federalism as a concept applicable to the union of
states, and not only to the modern territorial state. A concept of federalism was
traditionally used to analyse the internal arrangement within the Holy Roman Empire,
but with the emergence of the modern territorial state, however, authors found it
increasingly difficult to explain the nature of the relationship between the multiplicity
of states within the jurisdictional sphere of the Empire, with the result that their
15 Ronald L. Watts, Comparing Federal Systems, Ontario: McGill-Queen University, 1999, p.
6. Similarly, Filippov et. al., Designing Federalism: A Theory of Self-Sustainable Federal
Institutions, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004, p. 34. For Watts, federalism is a
normative concept distinct from federal political systems, the descriptive term that includes
federations, confederations, decentralised unions, leagues, condominiums, associated states
and other types of federal systems. See also Ronald L. Watts, ‘Federalism, Federal Political
Systems and Federations,’ Annual Review of Political Science, vol. 1, 1998, pp. 120.
16 Edwin R. Black, Divided Loyalties: Canadian Concepts of Federalism, Montreal: McGill-
Queen University Press, 1975, p. 7.
17 The contributions of Ludolph Hugo and Gottfried Leibniz were discussed in Chapter 1.
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explanations appeared increasingly anachronistic in the post-Westphalian
international system.18
The will to explain the relationships between the different states within the Holy
Roman Empire led early authors, writing within the tradition of federalism, to
introduce important arguments in favour of federalism. The abolition of the Holy
Roman Empire19 brought federalism, as a mechanism of multi-level governance to the
fore, and its framework was applied to the newly formed German Confederation.20
The German Confederation was created after the Congress of Vienna to accommodate
the states that had been part of the Holy Roman Empire and, according to Philimore21
it was a union in which states created a ‘federal union’22 for the purposes of common
defence.23 It is clear that contemporary writers saw these types of union, not in the
modern sense of either an international organisation or a territorial federal state, but as
a union of states, and they used the word ‘federal’ to denote a union of sovereign
states.
The German political literature, following in the Althusian tradition, also accepted the
notion of a union of states, particularly that of the confederation, and clearly
18 See Chapter 1 about the nature of different polities before the rise of the modern territorial
state.
19 Forced on Francis I by Napoleon Bonaparte; see Blanning, op. cit., p. 285.
20 Deutscher Bund in 1815 was preceded by the Confederation of the Rhine (Rheinbund) a
Napoleonic creation. See Henry Wheaton (1785–1848), Elements of International Law, (first
published in 1836 by Boston: Little Brown Company), fifth edition, London: Steven and Sons
Limited, 1916, p. 59.
21 Robert Philimore was a British lawyer (1810–1885), his work, relevant to this discussion is
Commentaries Upon International Law, London: Butterworths, 1871.
22 The term ‘federal union’ was also applicable to confederations. The distinction between
federation and confederation was brought about by the establishment of the American Federal
Union, and was only solidified after the American Civil War as will be discussed below.
23 Philimore, op. cit., pp. 133–34.
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distinguished the concept of Bundesstaat from that of Staatenbund.24 The former
referred to federations as sovereign states, while the latter was used in the sense of
confederations or the union of states. Confederations, as a type in the genus
federalism, were considered a union between states; something in between a mere
alliance and federal state, as Forsyth argues:
Insofar as they represent the intermediary stage between the
interstate and the intrastate worlds, federal unions or
confederations have a particular fascination. They open a new
perspective on these two worlds. In making such a union,
individual states place themselves within a totality which has its
own distinct representation, its own external policy and its own
internal policy.25
However, the terms ‘federal’ and ‘confederal’ have been used interchangeably
throughout most of the history of federalism to denote federations and confederations,
but it was not until the advent of American constitutional experiences that the terms
federation and confederation were used to describe different federal political
arrangements and that a clear distinction was then made. Nonetheless in International
Law the difference is clear: in a confederation, states remain fully independent26 and,
in general, free to withdraw from the confederation; sovereignty is transferred to the
confederation, which is limited in its purposes, and usually created for common
defence or foreign affairs. In a Federation, on the other hand, there is a single
24 Bundesstaat refers to federations while Staatenbund refers to confederations; see Sobei
Mogi, The Problem of Federalism: A Study in the History of Political Theory, London:
George Allen & Unwin, vol. 1, 1931, p. 349. This was also found in earlier writers of
International Law: see Murray Forsyth, Union of States, Leicester: Leicester University Press,
1981, pp. 133–46.
25 Murray Forsyth, Ibid., p. 7.
26 This included the capacity to enter into international agreements (jus tractatum), capacity to
have diplomatic representation (jus legationis), which was particularly relevant in the debates
about the legal nature of the Union between Norway and Sweden in 1814. See Eirik
Holmoyvik, ‘The Theory of Sovereignty and the Swedish-Norwegian Union of 1814,’
Journal of the History of International Law, vol. 7, 2005.
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sovereign state, although in a federal form, with a single unitary will and capacity to
enter into international relations. As the Montevideo Convention on the Rights and
Duties of States declared in Article 2 ‘The federal State shall constitute a sole person
in the eyes of international law’.27 This means that in confederations, the states and
the union have effectively a shared sovereignty28 although each state retains a separate
legal personality. In federations defined in the modern sense, only the federation is
sovereign (externally) and not the sub-units or constituent parts, whether they are
called States, Länder or Provinces.29 Similarly, for the Swiss legal scholar Bluntschli30
the difference between a confederation and a federation was that in the former, states
retain their external sovereignty, while in the latter, the central power exercises
sovereignty exclusively. But as discussed below, in the debates in the American legal
and political literature, this was not consensual.
2. The Federal ‘Experiences’ of the United States of America
The federal experiences of the United States are fundamental to understanding the
contribution federalism, as a political theory, made to the study of sovereignty.
The American Founding Fathers,31 in order to maintain the unity of the new country
while at the same time retain the autonomy of the original colonies, devised a political
27 Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States of 1933.
28 Note that in the Union between Sweden and Norway of 1814 two conceptions of
sovereignty were discussed; one which considered that sovereignty was absolute and
indivisible, and the other that considered that sovereignty could be shared, Holmoyvik, op.
cit., pp. 141–46.
29 This distinction will be further explored in subsequent sections.
30 Johann Caspar Blunstschli (1808–1881), was one of the most preeminent legal scholars of
the nineteenth century, International Law Codified (El Derecho Internacional Codificado),
Mexico, 1871, code 72, p. 91.
31 The term is used for the leaders of the United States from American Independence to the
adoption of the Federal Constitution in 1787.
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system that was inspired by the Enlightenment, particularly authors from the period
such as Montesquieu,32 John Locke and David Hume, among others.33
The new American Republic in its historical experiences with federalism was
influenced by its own colonial experience in self-government within the British
Empire,34 particularly relevant to which was the ‘Covenant Tradition’35 and the
emphasis of constitutions as covenants between communities. The US was also
influenced by European historical experiences in federalism; especially the
contribution of the Swiss Confederation,36 the United Provinces of the Netherlands37
and other experiences of pluralistic governance systems.
32 Charles de Secondat, Baron de Montesquieu (1689–1755), was deeply influential in the
Federalist Papers with his work, The Spirit of Laws (Le Spirit de Lois), first published in
1748, New York: Prometheus Books, 2002. Of particular importance was the discussion that
ensued in the Second Period of American federalism about the possibilities of republican
governments in a large territory, where Montesquieu, discussing the concept of confederacies,
believed that it was not possible. See Montesquieu, Book VIII, op. cit., p. 120; Book IX, op.
cit., pp. 126–128. The authors of the Federalist Papers, considering the novelty of the new
American Republic, believed it was possible to forge an ‘extended republic’ in a federal form
in North America.
33 On the influences of the European Enlightenment, particularly the Scottish Enlightenment
in early American political thought, see Douglas Adair, ‘“That Politics May be Reduced to
Science:” David Hume, James Madison, and the Tenth Federalist,’ Huntington Library
Quarterly, vol. 20, No. 4, 1957.
34 Which, until its independence was more than one century old, A. E. Dick Howard, ‘The
Uses of Federalism: The American Experience,’ American University Journal of
International Law and Policy, vol. 8, 1992, pp. 392–94.
35 On the Covenant tradition, Daniel J. Elazar, ‘What Happened to Covenant in the Nineteenth
Century?’ in Daniel J. Elazar (ed.), Covenant in the Nineteenth Century: The Decline of an
American Political Tradition, London: Rowman & LittleField, 1994.
36 Particularly, the Old Swiss Confederation from 1291 to 1798, which was discussed in the
Federalist Papers.
37 The Federalist Papers give the example of the United Provinces of the Netherlands (before
the centralisation imposed by France after its conquest) as an example of a confederation
(‘confederacy’) and argues: ‘I make no apology for having dwelt so long on the
contemplation of these federal precedents. Experience is the oracle of truth; and where its
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The United States had during its short but turbulent history several ‘experiences’ –38
which are elucidative of the misunderstanding into which part of the literature has
fallen – and account for some of the problems of the conceptualisation of federalism,
considering the issues of historical specificity.39 First of all, a federation is not
federalism; second, the larger phenomenon of federalism encompasses several
realities that go far beyond the reality of a federation, as a brief survey of the relevant
history will confirm; third, in the American federal experiences, the concept of a
federation had at least two different meanings historically. Thus, in order to avoid the
reductionist fallacy40 of reducing federalism to the federation type, the significance
and relevance of the contribution made to federalist thought by American political and
legal literature should be considered.41 This contribution was expressed in the
responses are unequivocal, they ought to be conclusive and sacred’, Federalist No. 20, The
Federalist Papers, op. cit.
38 The term is ‘experiences’ in the plural and not experience in the singular because the
United States had at least three types of federal arrangements. The ‘proto-confederal’
experience of the Articles of the Confederation from 1781 to 1789; the federal experience
which began with the approval of the second American Constitution of 1789 and lasted until
the end of the Civil War in 1865, and the national federal experience since 1865. On the three
faces of American Federalism see Randy E. Barnett, ‘Three Federalisms,’ Loyola University
Chicago Law Journal, vol. 39, 2008. On the different periods of American federalism see
Ellis Katz, ‘The Development of American Federalism,’ in The Federal Idea, The History of
Federalism from the Enlightenment to 1945, edited by Andrea Bosco, London: Lothian
Foundation Press, 1991, pp. 39–50; Daniel H. Deudney, ‘The Philadelphian System:
Sovereignty, Arms Control, and Balance of Power in the American States-Union,’
International Organization, vol. 49, No. 2, 1995, pp. 191–228. In addition, Ackerman
identifies three historical periods in American Constitutionalism, each of which, according to
him, was as original and deep, and which he calls a ‘constitutional regime’: the Founding, the
Reconstruction and the New Deal, see Bruce Ackerman, We The People: Foundations, vol. 1,
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1991, pp. 40–44.
39 The problems related to historical specificity were noted in Chapter 1.
40 A Reductionist fallacy in which one takes the part for the whole.
41 On the conceptual distinction between federalism and federation, see also Michael Burgess
and Alain G. Gagnon (eds), Comparative Federalism and Federation, Hemel Hempstead:
Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1993.
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‘Philadelphia Convention,’42 the final document that approved the project of the new
Constitution, which represented a significant and original contribution to federal
theory, and which invented the modern notion of federation, creating a new
vocabulary for legal and political theory that was different to the earlier writings of
authors working in the context of the Althusian tradition. This new vocabulary was
novel in the history of political theory, because it separated the federation, as a species
of the larger genus which is federalism, as King states: ‘We shall take it that
federalism is some one or several varieties of political philosophy or ideology, and
that federation is some type of political institution. The intention is not that such a
distinction is widely observed, but only that it is useful’.43 Moreover, the Convention
inaugurated the distinction between federation and confederation. For all these
reasons the American contribution to federal theory is important, but the
developments and innovations of the federal experiences in America, which
culminated in a national federalism, are also significant.44 It is in the Federalist
Papers45 that a conceptual distinction between a federation and a confederation
emerges for the first time, as Federalist Paper Number IX states:
42 The Philadelphia Convention was called to ‘revise’ the Articles of the Confederation and
was responsible for the draft of the American Constitution of 1787; the ‘revision’ was in fact
a new constitutional moment. See Walter E. Derlinger, ‘The Recurring Question of the
“Limited” Constitutional Convention,’ The Yale Law Journal, vol. 88, No. 8, 1979, p. 1625.
43 Preston King, Federalism and Federation, London: Croom Helm, 1982, p. 75. Similarly,
‘Without a doubt the Philadelphia Convention marks the starting point for an understanding
of the origins of federalism and the meaning of the term today’. Deil S. Wright, and Carl W.
Stenberg, ‘Federalism, Intergovernmental Relations, and Intergovernmental Management:
The Origins, Emergence, and Maturity of Three Concepts across Centuries of Organizing
Power by Area and by Function,’ Chapter 11, Handbook of Public Administration, London:
Taylor & Francis Group, 2006.
44 Here, one is not debating the issue of whether the Federalist Papers have a nationalist
tendency as opposed to states’ autonomy. For more on this controversy see, Jean Yarbrough,
‘Rethinking “The Federalist’s View of Federalism,”’ Publius: The Journal of Federalism, vol.
15, 1985, pp. 31–53. See also the following note on the Federalist Papers.
45 The Federalist Papers were of particular importance: a collection of 85 articles published
between 1787 and 1788 by James Madison, Alexander Hamilton and John Jay under the
collective pseudonym ‘Publius’. The Papers explored the contours of the new American
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The definition of a confederate republic seems simply to be an
assemblage of societies or an association of two or more States into
one State… The proposed Constitution, so far from implying an
abolition of the State governments, makes them constituent parts of
the national sovereignty, by allowing them a direct representation
in the Senate and leaves in their possession certain exclusive and
very important portions of sovereign power. This fully corresponds,
in every rational import of the terms, with the idea of federal
government.46
2.1. Confederation v. Federation in American Federalism
In their enterprise, the American Founders devised and created a new genus of
political organisation: the federation.47 The term federal was used in the eighteenth
Constitution, in order to convince New Yorkers to ratify the federal constitution. As Thomas
Jefferson wrote, ‘With respect to the Federalist, the three authors had been named to me. … It
does the highest honour to the third as being, in my opinion, the best commentary on the
principles of government ever written’. ‘Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison, 18
November 1788,’ in The Life and Selected Writings of Thomas Jefferson, New York: The
Modern Library, 2004, p. 418. The influence of the New American Constitution on political
and legal theory should be acknowledged because of the innovations present in it, such as
judicial review, federation, the creation of the office of the presidency, separation of powers
along republican lines, and many other constitutional principles that have influenced several
other constitutions worldwide. However, that having been acknowledged, the legacy of the
Constitution towards an understanding of federalism can also be a hindrance because of the
reductionist perspective in which federation becomes embroiled in all that is of the federal
experience. For a more critical viewpoint, see Jean Yarbrough, ‘Rethinking “The Federalist’s
View of Federalism,”’ op. cit. To overcome the legacy, a recovery of federalism in the
Althusian tradition is required.
46 Federal Paper Number IX, (written by Alexander Hamilton) in James Madison, Alexander
Hamilton and John Jay, The Federalist Papers, London: Penguin Books, 1987, p. 122. Unless
noted otherwise, this will be the edition used throughout this chapter.
47 K. C. Wheare, Federal Government, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1963, pp. 10–11.
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century to represent unions of states, and was a synonym of what was known as a
confederation. It was neither a unitary state48 nor a union of sovereign states, but
independent under International Law.
The American Founders created a political system to replace the Articles of the
Confederation, which regulated relations between the original thirteen colonies. This
new genus was a federation that constituted a single sovereign state under
International Law; a single polity that was different from a confederation – a union of
several sovereign states, all of which retain their individual legal personality and
statehood under International Law, but which, however, delegate limited powers to a
new legal entity by effectively sharing sovereignty. This distinction only became
clear in the new American federal commonwealth because federalism was used to
describe different types of federal political systems, including confederations.
Moreover, the previous institutional arrangement seen in the Articles of the
Confederation did not follow the model of a federation, but that of a confederation;
akin to a union of states, in which individual states retain their individual sovereignty
and remain unitary actors under International Law, whilst sharing sovereign powers
in a limited political arrangement usually for the purposes of common defence and
foreign affairs.49 It is important to bear in mind this distinction because these two
political forms are manifestations of federalism as political theory. Furthermore, in
both forms, sovereignty is divided and effectively shared by the union that is formed;
hence both these federal arrangements were somehow anti-Bodinian, in the sense that
they did not describe sovereignty as indivisible or absolute, but saw sovereignty as a
shared attribute of the constituent units of the federal arrangement.
The creation of the federal union in the Second Period of the American Republic
created a single sovereign territorial state – although with limited powers attributed to
the central government – because sovereignty was shared between states and the
48 A unitary state is characterised by a high degree of centralisation in the hands of the central
state, which determines the pattern of decentralisation of local governments, and which is
based on a centre-periphery model as discussed previously.
49 This was the case of the early Swiss confederation.
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federal union in the Althusian tradition, with the understanding that sovereignty
ultimately belonged to the people,50 as Ackerman acknowledges:
It was an elementary principle of eighteenth-century political
science that every nation had to have one – and only one –
sovereign. Who was ours? A flat-footed answer would endanger
the entire enterprise. On the one hand, to proclaim the national
government as the sovereign would alienate large portions of the
public committed to their state’s political identity and fearful of the
prospect of centralizing tyranny. On the other hand, to identify the
state governments as unequivocal “sovereigns” undermined the
point of the Federalist initiative – which was to construct a new
central government that could wield limited, but substantial power.
The Federalists brilliantly saw that the Radical Whig ideology
permitted a third answer: deny that any government should be
viewed as “sovereign”; insist that, in America, the only legitimate
sovereign was The People, who could delegate different powers to
different governments in any way that would serve the common
good.51
In all periods of the American federal experiences, the process of institutional change
was made through different institutional processes; judicial52 and political. It is not the
purpose of this thesis to offer a detailed description of the processes of evolution of
American federal experiences, but to shed light on the debate about the nature of
sovereignty by considering the different American federal experiences.
50 On this point see Jean Yarbrough, ‘Rethinking “The Federalist’s View of Federalism,”’ op.
cit., p. 42.
51 Bruce Ackerman, We The People: Foundations, vol. 1, op. cit., pp. 216–217.
52 The judicial process has been very influential in the history of the evolution of American
federalism, since the decision Marbury vs. Madison 5 U.S. 137 (1803), which established the
doctrine of judicial review, an innovation which is now part of the majority of Constitutions
worldwide.
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The study of American federalism is invaluable towards an understanding of the
different dimensions of federalism, particularly concerning its practical
manifestations in the forms of federation and confederation. The American political
experiment of Federalism started with the Articles of the Confederation, and by
following through the literature, three main periods of the manifestation of federalism
in the United States can be identified.53
2.2. First Period of American Federalism
The rationale used in the exposition of the Federalist Papers was to overcome the
limitations found in the first American Constitution, The Articles of the
Confederation.54 The limitation of the institutional arrangement was the argument
used by the Federalists, which was based on the apparent weakness of the central
union and its dependence on the will of the states in order to operate
autonomously, particularly on issues related to common defence and foreign
affairs; this is expressed by Hamilton in Federalist Paper XV: ‘In our case the
concurrence of thirteen distinct sovereign wills is requisite under the
53 Following Bruce Ackerman, who acknowledges three periods: The Founding Period, The
Reconstruction (Post-Civil War) Period and the New Deal Period, see We The People:
Foundations, vol. 1, op. cit., p. 40. For the purposes of this research, the Articles of the
Confederation mark the beginning because it is a forgotten manifestation of the federal
phenomenon. In addition, the constitutional changes and innovations of the Reconstruction
period are identified but that is the limit of the research here because, largely, since the end of
the Civil War, American federalism can be seen in light of the phenomenon of
decentralisation. This is because after the Civil War, the US became a national state closer to
unitary states in many respects, and federalism, became basically a policy tool for devolution.
On the historical origins of American federalism and its relationship with earlier federal
political theory see Charles S. McCoy, ‘Federalism: The Lost Tradition?’ Publius: The
Journal of Federalism, vol. 31, No. 2, 2001, pp. 1–14.
54‘The Articles of Confederation and Perpetual Union’ (its official name) was approved by the
original thirteen colonies in 1777, and ratified by the original colonies in 1 March 1781. It
lasted until it was replaced by the US Constitution on 4 March 1789 after its ratification.
Available at: http://www.loc.gov/rr/program/bib/ourdocs/articles.html [Accessed 18.12.2010].
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Confederation to the complete execution of every important measure that
proceeds from the Union’.55
The weakness of the central government56 in The Articles of the Confederation
was one of the reasons that justified the call for a Constitutional Convention,
which culminated in the final document that approved the Constitution of 1787.
The framers of the American Constitution emphasised the limitations of their
previous constitutional order, especially the practical limitations of a political
arrangement based only on states’ agency, which excluded private individuals.
This is why Hamilton makes clear that the new Constitution should not be merely
a compact between states, but a compact between the people as well:
The great and radical vice in the construction of the existing
Confederation is in the principle of Legislation for States and
Governments, in their Corporate Collective Capacities, and as
contradistinguished from the Individuals of whom they consist.57
55 The Federalist Papers No. XV, op. cit., pp. 145–149. On the deficiencies of the American
Confederation. On the debates about the weakness of the Articles of the Confederation and
the different historical approaches see Richard B. Morris, ‘The Confederation Period and the
American Historian,’ The William and Mary Quarterly, Third Series, vol. 13, No. 2, 1956.
56 The federal government lacked taxation powers and generally coercive power, thus it
needed to be changed into a stronger centralised political federal union, this was the argument
presented by the Federalist Papers in supporting a revision of the Articles of the
Confederation. However, one could argue that the framework of the Federalist Papers is
somehow biased and incomplete and that a new paradigm is needed; one that acknowledges
that the federal government was not much weaker than in the Constitution approved in
Philadelphia, and which recognises the continuities between the Articles of the Confederation
and the Constitution of 1787. See, Eric M., Freedman, ‘Why Constitutional Lawyers and
Historians Should Take a Fresh Look at the Emergence of the Constitution from the
Confederation Period: The Case of the Drafting of the Articles of the Confederation,’
Tennessee Law Review, vol. 60, 1993, pp. 787–91.
57 Federalist Paper XV.
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The Articles of the Confederation stated in Article II that ‘Each State retains its
sovereignty, freedom, and independence, and every power, jurisdiction, and right,
which is not by this Confederation expressly delegated to the United States, in
Congress assembled’.58 The confederation was based on an interstate basis; a
compact between the thirteen original colonies, now states, and not a compact
established by the ‘American people’. The provisions also stipulated that the
confederation was to be perpetual and that alterations to its character should be
approved by the legislatures of all states, as Article XII stipulates:
Every State shall abide by the determination of the United States in
Congress assembled, on all questions which by this confederation
are submitted to them. And the Articles of this Confederation shall
be inviolably observed by every State, and the Union shall be
perpetual; nor shall any alteration at any time hereafter be made in
any of them; unless such alteration be agreed to in a Congress of
the United States, and be afterwards confirmed by the legislatures
of every State.
This provision was not respected by the Constitutional Convention in
Philadelphia, however, which in a Constituent Act, approved a new Constitution
with different provisions that required approval of only nine states, instead of the
original thirteen.59 This action was not, however, free from controversy: the Anti-
58 This Article merely represents the notion of the United States as a ‘compound republic’
and, as Smith argues, ‘Thus, the key to maintaining the federal structure in a confederate
republic was a constitutional protection for the continued existence of states as entities’, see
Douglas G. Smith, ‘An Analysis of Two Federal Structures: the Articles of Confederation and
the Constitution,’ San Diego Law Review, vol. 34., No. 1, 1997, p. 312. This argument also
applies to the Constitution of 1787, approved in Philadelphia, because, although it created a
new genus – the federation – one key element of a federal political system is the autonomy of
the constituent units.
59 Article VII of the Constitution of the United States. On the controversy of the ‘illegality’ of
the constitutional norm of the Federal Constitution, see Ackerman, We The People:
Foundations, vol. 1, op. cit. pp. 41–42. On the interpretation of the transition from the
Articles to the New Constitution, and the claims that Constitutions are coordination
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federalist60 movement demonstrated by opposing the adoption of the federal
Constitution of 1787 while holding a ‘proto-federalist’ position, in the sense that
they considered a confederation – as a union of states – as the supreme
embodiment of the federal principle, and criticising the new Constitution, ‘The
Pennsylvania Minority’ as they were known, declared:
In short consolidation pervades the whole constitution. It begins
with an annunciation that such was the intention. The main pillars
of the fabric correspond with it, and the concluding paragraph is a
confirmation of it. The Preamble begins with the words: “We The
People of the United States” which is the style of a compact
between individuals entering into a state of society and not a
confederation of states.61
2.3. Second Period of the American Federalism
The new Constitution was created as covenant among the ‘People’ of the United
States of America as a whole, and not just as a covenant between the separate
states. In the preamble to the Constitution, there appears the symbolic rationale of
a building up a national political system with the words: ‘We the People’, instead
of ‘we the States’, as would be expected in a confederal political system. As a
consequence, ‘the national government was conceived as one of limited and
mechanisms and not contracts, see Russell Hardin, Liberalism, Constitutionalism and
Democracy, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999, pp. 82–141.
60 Name attributed to the opponents of the Federal Constitution of 1787; see Herbert J.
Storing, What The Anti-Federalists Were For, Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1981.
61 The Pennsylvania Minority or ‘The Address and Reasons of Dissent of the Minority of the
Convention of Pennsylvania to their Constituents,’ was an address signed by the minority of
voters on the Pennsylvania Convention ratifying the new Constitution. It appeared in two
Pennsylvania newspapers in 1787 and in other publications, criticising the new American
Constitution. See Ralph Ketcham (ed.), The Anti-Federalist Papers and the Constitutional
Convention Debates, New York: Signet Classics, 2003, p. 246.
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enumerated powers. The powers of states were simply everything left over from
that enumeration’62.
Once the new federation was established,63 conflicts appeared in the interpretation
of the powers between the federation and states,64 which were not easily resolved
in the judicial or in the political process. Notwithstanding this, the prevailing
understanding was that the new American polity was based on the principle of
‘dual sovereignty’; those of states and the union. And herein lies the relevance of
the study of federalism – in particular of the American federal experiences –
towards the understanding of sovereignty, because the American federation
offered a non-Bodinian understanding of the concept of sovereignty, as Alexis de
Tocqueville65 commenting on the second period of American federalism stresses:
Two sovereignties are necessarily in presence of each other. The
legislator may simplify and equalise the action of these two
sovereignties, by limiting each of them to a sphere of authority
62 Barnett, op. cit., p. 286. That is why the Tenth Amendment was of such importance as a
limit to federal power. The first Ten Amendments were adopted on 15 December 1791. For
an overview of the American Constitution of 1787 see
http://www.loc.gov/rr/program/bib/ourdocs/Constitution.html [Accessed 18.12.2010].
63 On the Philadelphia Convention and the foundational moment of the new Constitution see
Bruce Ackerman, We the People: Transformations, vol. 2, Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 1998. On Federalism as the core hallmark of the new Constitution see
Michael Burgess, Comparative Federalism: Theory and Practice, London: Routledge, 2006,
p. 56.
64 The nullification crisis of 1833, in which South Carolina defended the principle that states
could ‘nullify’ federal Laws, see Keith E. Whittington, ‘The Political Constitution of
Federalism in Antebellum America: The Nullification Debate as an Illustration of Informal
Mechanisms of Constitutional Change,’ Publius: The Journal of Federalism, vol. 26, No. 2,
1996, pp. 1–24.
65 Alexis de Tocqueville (1805–1859), French author whose seminal work on America and its
legal and institutional framework is entitled Democracy in America (De la Democratie en La
Amerique), first published in 1835. (Henry Reeve translation), Democracy in America, New
York: Bantam Classic, 2000.
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accurately confined; but he cannot combine them into one, or
prevent them from coming into collision at certain points.66
The concept of sovereignty in the American federation, in both the internal and legal
narrative,67 was that of ‘concurrence of sovereignties’, although for International Law
it constituted a single state. Nevertheless, this was not the position of those who, like
John Calhoun,68 held the view that the American Constitution was still a compact or
covenant among sovereign states instead of the constitutional charter of a single state
in a federal form. Calhoun’s views are particularly relevant to the current discussion,
because he represents a prevalent view held in the literature of the period that saw
federalism in a very different light to that of scholars before him after the
Reconstruction, commenting on the Constitution of the United States, he stated that:
It is federal (the polity) because it is the government States united
in a political union, in contradistinction to a government of
66 Tocqueville, op. cit., p. 189. Similarly, Kelly et. al., The American Constitution, Its Origins
and Development, New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1983, pp. 105–106.
67 The reference is to sovereignty in its internal dimension, because in federal states
sovereignty is shared internally between different levels of government, here sovereignty
refers to domestic sovereignty, Krasner, Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy, op. cit. p. 9.
However, sovereignty can also be shared in its external dimension, and confederations are a
prime example of that.
68 John Calhoun (1782–1850), Vice-President of the United States and Senator from South
Carolina, developed the theory of ‘nullification’ as an expedient of solving political impasses
in which states could consider inapplicable federal ordinances and laws by ‘nullifying’ them,
thus he saw nullification as improvement to federal government, and many concurred in that
understanding, as his views were considered at the time an improvement on the Federalist
Papers. As a corollary of his theory, he developed the doctrine of concurrent majorities and
the right of secession for states. See John Calhoun, ‘A Disquisition on Government: A
Discourse on the Constitution of the United States,’ The Works of John Calhoun, vol. 41,
New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1853; John Turnbull (Brutus), The Crisis, or Essays
on the Usurpations of the Federal Government, Charleston: S. E. Miller, 1827 and Edoardo
Tortarolo in Sergio Fabrini (ed.), Democracy and Federalism in the European Union and the
United States, Abingdon: Routledge, 2005, p. 88.
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individuals socially united: that is by a social compact. To express
it more concisely, it is federal and not national, because it is the
government of a community of States, and not the government of a
single State or Nation.69
But this interpretation did not hold, mainly because of the pervasiveness of the federal
understanding inherited from the Madisonian paradigm70 in which a federal
government, and not a mere Confederation, was established. These two rival
paradigms would eventually be tested in the American Civil War.
2.4. Third Period of American Federalism
The Third Period of American federalism was sealed by the end of the American Civil
War71 and also by those who, like Calhoun, saw federalism in the light of the states’
rights theory, as Wheare puts it:
A long controversy, which was not finally closed until after the
Civil War of 1861–5, continued between those who regarded the
general government as the agent of the states and those who
maintained that it was or ought to be an independent government.
Indeed it took ‘the terrible exercise of prolonged war’ in Woodrow
69 Calhoun, ‘A Discourse on the Constitution of the United States,’ op. cit. p. 113.
70 By reference to James Madison, considered the most important author of the American
Constitution of 1787; see also Federalist Papers, No. XXXIV.
71 This was known as the “Reconstruction” period, during which time the American federal
process was increasingly centralised. On the constitutional changes that superseded the
constitutional paradigm of the original text of the Constitution of 1787, as Ackerman puts it:
‘The Republican Reconstruction of the Union was an act of constitutional creation no less
profound than the Founding itself: not only did the Republicans introduce new substantive
principles into our higher law, but they reworked the very process of higher lawmaking itself’.
Bruce Ackerman, 1990, We the People: Transformations, vol. 2, op. cit., p. 46. See also
Daniel J. Elazar, ‘Civil War and the Preservation of American Federalism,’ Publius: The
Journal of Federalism, vol. 1, No. 1, 1971, pp. 39–58.
114
Wilson’s phrase, to resolve the conflict between the two
principles.72
In the Reconstruction Period, in the internal debates about the constitutional position
of states in the American Constitution, the Supreme Court in Texas v. White declared
that the union was indissoluble and perpetual and forbade the secession of states.73
After the end of the Civil War, three important Amendments were approved in the
Constitution, which in effect nationalised the protection of constitutional rights by the
Federal Government, as Walker argues: ‘The Civil War and its aftermath also
produced three constitutional amendments (The Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and
Fifteenth), a cluster of civil rights acts, and a highly intrusive, congressionally dictated
approach to reconstruction in the southern states – all signs of an extraordinary
72 K. C. Wheare, Federal Government, 1963, op. cit., p. 8. Nonetheless, as Laski observes: ‘If
we can say today that the interests of the American nation are supreme, and that the old
States’ rights theory of sovereignty is largely obsolete, we have to remember that a Civil War
was needed to give it a death-blow’, Harold Laski, Studies in the Problem of Sovereignty,
New Haven: Yale University Press, 1917, p. 277.
73 Texas v. White, 74 U.S. 700 (1869), this decision rejected John Calhoun’s compact theory
of federalism. Although secession is forbidden under the US Constitution, it does not rule out
the right of self-determination under International Law. In the Canadian federation, because
of the Quebec situation, ‘secession’ was considered legal, albeit only if negotiated with the
rest of the Federation, Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217 (Canadian
Supreme Court), at: http://scc.lexum.umontreal.ca/en/1998/1998scr2-217/1998scr2-217.pdf
[Accessed 09.09.10]. The prohibition of secession decreased the ‘Exit’ mechanism of states in
the federal system, thus increasing the centralisation of authority of the federal state, James
Buchanan, The Cato Journal, vol. 15, Nos 2–3, 1995–6 at:
http://www.cato.org/pubs/journal/cj15n2-3-8.html [Accessed, 11-09-10]. On ‘Voice’ vs.
‘Exit’, see Albert O. Hirschman, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty, Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 1970. On the importance of ‘Exit’ in Fiscal Federalism see Charles Tiebout,
‘A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures,’ Journal of Political Economy, vol. 64, No. 5, 1956,
pp. 416–24.
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assertion of national legal authority.’74 The end result of these constitutional changes
shifted the increasing national power in favour of the federal polity.
American Federalism was also, in part, conditioned by the transformations caused by
The New Deal;75 an ideological programme that asserted federal intervention in the
economy, and significantly altered the power relations between states and the federal
polity, it was the birth of the concept of ‘cooperative federalism’.76
Federalism emerges, understood increasingly as a mechanism of local governance, an
issue of decentralisation or devolution.77 This is the understanding prevalent
74 David B. Walker, The Birth of Federalism, Slouching Toward Washington, Chatham, New
Jersey: Chatham House Publishers, 1995, p. 77; similarly Barnett, op. cit., p. 289. The
passage of Amendments generated legal controversy because Article V of the Constitution
was not thoroughly followed see Bruce Ackerman, We the People: Transformations, vol. 2,
op. cit., 1998, pp. 99–159.
75 The New Deal was a period of centripetal federalism, with the Supreme Court that had
acted as a restraint against federal expansion in the previous decades in retreat because of an
activist government led by the American President Franklin D. Roosevelt, which decided to
tackle the Great Depression and ‘after this peaceful revolution the Tenth Amendment was but
a truism that no longer operated as a direct restriction on national actions’. See Deil S. Wright
and Carl W. Stenberg, op. cit., p. 420; ‘The economy acted as ‘centralising force,’ see
Howard, A. E. Dick, op. cit., p. 399.
76 The old notion of ‘dual federalism’ was rejected by the USSC, and the Court expanded the
scope of the commerce clause to reach into areas which were closed to the federal polity,
David S. Walker, op. cit., p. 94. The Civil Rights Era was also a decisive factor in
nationalising certain areas that were considered the reserved domain of states, considering the
need to protect constitutional rights, such as equal access to voting and enforcement of racial
equality; as a consequence, the American understanding of federalism was affected, as
Howard clarifies: ‘Alongside the centripetal effects of economic factors, another force tending
toward the concentration of government power has been the notion of justice or equality’,
Howard, A. E. Dick, op. cit., p. 405.
77 For a critique of American federalism and the different purposes of federalism historically
in America, see Edward L. Rubin, ‘Puppy Federalism and the Blessings of America,’ Annals
of American Society for Political Science, vol. 57, 2001, pp. 37–51. The old issues of
116
nowadays, federalism, not in the Althusian tradition of seeing different political
communities sharing sovereignty and effectively dividing power, but federalism as a
mechanism and a tool of local governance, as Elazar states: ‘The relatively few men
who look at American politics with greater breadth of understanding recognize
federalism as a political principle – something more than simply an administrative
device or even a legal-constitutional one’.78
The American Constitution evolved, and now accommodates principles different to
those proposed at the Founding Period, which is relevant, because these principles
although not explicit in the text of the Constitution, are now considered a part of the
‘invisible’ Constitutional framework.79
American federalism developed safeguards for the protection of states’ autonomy,
which included the principle of ‘Anti-Commandeering’,80 developed by the Supreme
Court, which forbids the federal state of mandating or compelling states to enact a
nullification and controversies on states’ rights were gone. Some authors emphasise that
federalism is now based on the notion of cooperative federalism.
78 Daniel J. Elazar, ‘First Principles,’ Publius: The Journal of Federalism, Vol. 3, No. 2,
1973, p. 2. Similarly, see David Walker, op. cit. ‘In terms of power relationships, our system
remains basically a nation-centered one’, David B. Walker, op. cit., p. 302.
79 Lawrence H. Tribe, The Invisible Constitution, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008, pp.
28–36. Purcell argues that American federalism since the Founding Period was ‘marked by
imprecise and uncertain lines of authority’, Edward A. Purcell, Originalism, Federalism and
the American Constitutional Enterprise, New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007, p. 17.
80 The Anti-Commandeering principle does not allow for the federal government to
‘commandeer’ states to pursue federal policies, contrary to what happens in the EU where
Directives are possible, or in German federalism with the Framework Laws, see Daniel
Halberstam, ‘Comparative Federalism and the Issue of Commandeering,’ in Kalypso
Nicolaidis and Robert Howse (eds), The Federal Vision, Legitimacy and Levels of
Governance in the United States and the European Union, Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2001. Although in practice the federal state through monetary funds can create ‘incentives’
for states to pursue federal policies; a good example was the minimum drinking age, which
was set nationally by the states at twenty-one years because of monetary incentives, see Sarah
F. Liebschutz, ‘The National Minimum Drinking-Age Law,’ Publius: The Journal of
Federalism, vol. 15, No. 3, 1985.
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federal program.81 The Limits to federal authority also include the principle of
sovereign Immunity’.82
In the case United States vs. Lopez,83 the USSC invalidated the Gun-Free School Zone
act because Congress did not legislate within the scope of the Commerce Clause, and
the banning of guns near schools did not affect intrastate commerce.84 This case
provides an example of the recent jurisprudence of the USSC in trying to revert to
some of the excessive centralisation at the hands of the federal Government.
However, these limitations of the federal state are less important than they might seem
at first. As Justice Kennedy, a supporter of the decisions, put it, ‘they involve the
etiquette of federalism’.85
The Enumerated Powers granted to Congress by Article 1 of the USC in the First
Period of American Federalism, which operated as a limit to federal power,86 is no
81 The cases New York v. United States 505 US 144. 1992 and Printz v. United States (521 US
98, 1997) are representative cases of the Anti-Commandeering Principle.
82 For a critical analysis of Sovereign Immunity in American federalism, see John F.
Manning, ‘The Eleventh Amendment and the Reading of Precise Constitutional Text,’ Yale
Law Journal, vol. 113, 2004. See also Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44,
1996.
83 United States v. Alfonso Lopez, Jr., 514 U.S. 549 (1995).Similarly, Garcia vs. San Antonio
Metropolitan Authority, 469 U.S. 528, 1985, whereby the USSC ruled that states protect their
interests through their action in the federal institutions, see George A. Bermann, ‘The Role of
Law in the Functioning of Federal Systems,’ in Kalypso Nicolaidis and Robert Howse (eds),
The Federal Vision, Legitimacy and Levels of Governance in the United States and the
European Union, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001, pp. 201–203.
84 United States v. Alfonso Lopez, Jr., 514 U.S. 549 (1995).The Commerce Clause is a
restriction on federal power by enumerating the powers of Congress in regulating intrastate
commerce, Article 1, Section 8, Clause 3 of the United States Constitution (USC). The Proper
and Necessary Clause, Article 1, Section 8, Clause 18, USC, gives the US Congress a power
that often collides with the notion of enumerated powers.
85 Mark Tushnet, The New Constitutional Order, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003,
p. 44. See also Daniel Halberstam, ‘Comparative Federalism,’ op. cit.
86 As the USSC defined inMcCulloch vs. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819).
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longer considered a limitation, neither are the limits imposed by the Tenth
Amendment (‘The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor
prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people’),
as Greve states: ‘The evisceration of enumerated powers and that of concurrent
expansion of constitutional rights spelled the death of federalism as a principal
constitutional concern and as a serious constraint on government’.87
For all of the above, the legacy of the American contribution to federalism is double-
edged, in the sense that although the American constitutional project created the
concept of a modern federation it also created a political tradition that equated
federalism with a federation, particularly in respect of understanding the American
experiences. This is incorrect, however, because as noted previously, federations are
only one manifestation of many federal arrangements88and, besides, American
federalism contains a history of competing understandings of what federalism is89 at
different historical moments. Reducing federalism to a modern understanding of a
federation is to fall into the reductionist fallacy; as Davis emphasises, ‘Thus, while
there was a time when one could speak of federalism and America in the one voice,
this easy equation is no longer possible’.90
87 Michael S. Greve, Real Federalism, Why it Matters, How it Could Happen, Washington:
The AEI Press, 1999, pp. 18–19. This is not the view of those that see the increasing
centralisation at the hands of the federal government as a positive development for improving
standards, and protecting constitutional rights, as happened in the expansion of civil rights in
the 1960s; they would have a different conception of federalism.
88 For an exemplificative and non-typological list of federal arrangements, see Elazar,
Exploring Federalism, op. cit., pp. 39–64; Watts, Comparing Federal Systems, op. cit. pp. 8–
20; Daniel J. Elazar, ‘International and Comparative Federalism,’ Political Science and
Politics, vol. 26, No. 2, 1993, pp. 190–195.
89 On the competing approaches to modern American federalism, see Donald B. Rosenthal
and James M. Hoefler, Competing Approaches to the Study of Federalism and
Intergovernmental Relations, vol. 19, No. 1, 1989, pp. 1–23.
90 S. Rufus Davis, The Federal Principle: A Journey Through Time in Quest of Meaning,
Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978, p. 182.
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3. The European Tradition of Federalism
The European tradition of federalism offers a rich overview of the issues associated
with federalism, especially the tension between the need for autonomy and the desire
for shared rule. Manifestations of the federal experience are found in the union of
sovereign states, but also within a sovereign state. Nonetheless, some authors persist
in seeing federalism through the lenses of the American experiences, without
considering the different historical experiences in the US, and at the same time,
disregarding the European tradition of federalism. This is the case with many authors
when applying the federal framework to the EU, as Scharpf argues:
When ‘Europeanist’ politicians and social scientists were
considering processes of integration that might lead to a ‘United
Europe’, what they had in mind was a federal system fashioned
after the American model. What was created, however, were
institutional arrangements corresponding more closely to the
tradition of German federalism.91
Germany and Switzerland offer good examples of federal politics considering the
present idiosyncrasies of their federal political systems, and attending to the evolution
of federalism in their own historical experiences:
Naturally all those interested in the federal idea and how it can be
out to practice look to Switzerland as an example of a successful
federal state rooted in a pluri-cultural, if not pluri-national society.
Students and observers of the process of European integration and
especially of its ‘end-state’ often debated in relation to the federal
model-figure prominently among the latter.92
91 Fritz W. Scharpf, ‘The Joint-Decision Trap: Lessons from German Federalism and
European Integration,’ Public Administration, vol. 66, 1988, p. 242.
92 Clive Church, and Paolo Dardanelli, ‘The Dynamics of Confederalism and Federalism:
Comparing Switzerland and the EU,’ Regional and Federal Studies, vol. 15, No. 2, 2005, p.
163.
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3.1. Germany
The federal tradition in Germany offers an indication of the evolution of federal
arrangements following the abolition of the Holy Roman Empire. The German
political and legal tradition provides a significant contribution to federal political
theory, although federalism in Germany followed a different trajectory to that in the
US, where the impetus of centripetal forces was stronger. In Germany, federalism
remains a stronger constitutional principle although it is organised in a matrix, where
the dispersion of power remains the norm, particularly considering the centralisation
of the previous regime; first in the Weimar Republic and afterwards in the Third
Reich, as Johnson argues:
The constitutional settlement of 1949 was intended to promote this
kind of dispersion of political power and to avoid what was seen as
a disastrous experience of centralization and the abuse of power
after 1933. The controlling parameters within which the Federal
Republic evolved after 1949 and consolidated its constitutional
provisions turned out to be exceptionally favourable to the
realization.93
In Germany, for reasons of history; the presence of the Holy Roman Empire94 and late
unification,95 a strong federalist spirit in the Althusian tradition has been maintained.
The German Confederation, as discussed above, was a creation of the Congress of
93 Nevil Johnson, ‘Territory and Power: Some Historical Determinants of the Constitutional
Structure of the Federal Republic of Germany,’ in Charlie Jeffery (ed.), Recasting German
Federalism: The Legacies of Unification, London: Pinter, 1999, p.37; David P. Conradt, The
German Polity, New York: Longman, seventh edition, 2001, p. 244.
94 The Holy Roman Empire was established in Germany and Austria as its core areas, and to
paraphrase Voltaire, it was not Holy, Roman or Empire. See. Peter H. Wilson, The Holy
Roman Empire 1495–1806, London: Macmillan Press, 1999, p. 1.
95 Led by the Kingdom of Prussia in 1871 after the defeat of France and Napoleon III, it
replaced the North-German Confederation by establishing a national German Federal State.
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Vienna96uniting most of the German states into one single confederal polity, as
Wheaton argues:
Germany, as it has been constituted under the name of the
Germanic Confederation, presents the example of a system of
sovereign States united by an equal and permanent Confederation.97
The German experience is interesting, because the design of German federalism took
into account the different historical experiences of Germany and, particularly, the
German Confederation, as Johnson recalls: ‘The Basic Law was thus a thoroughly
German constitutional document in which can immediately be discerned remarkably
clear continuities with past experience of constitution-making over the previous
century and longer’.98
Federalism in the German polity is protected by the ‘Eternity Clause’ in the Basic
Law (Article 79 3), which forbids changes in the federal principle of the German
State. The ‘Principle of Federal Loyalty’ mandates the Federation and the Länder to
respect the idea of the federation.99 These two legal protections of federalism are
effectively guaranteed by the Federal Constitutional Court, which is keen to protect
the essence of German federalism, particularly the participation of the Länder in the
federal structures through the Bundesrat, and also to avoid encroachments of their
competences by expansion of the federal state.100
96 Wolfgang Renzsch, ‘German Federalism in Historical Perspective: Federalism as a
Substitute for a National State,’ Publius: The Journal of Federalism, vol. 19, No. 4, pp. 17–
33.
97 Wheaton, op.cit. p. 59.
98 Nevil Johnson, ‘German Federalism Today,’ in Charlie Jeffery and Peter Savigear (eds),
Recasting German Federalism: The Legacies of Unification, London: Pinter, 1999, p.33.
99 On the principle of Federal loyalty or Comity (Bundestreue), see Uwe Leonardy, ‘The
Institutional Structures of German Federalism,’ in Jeffery, Charlie (ed.), Recasting German
Federalism: The Legacies of Unification, London: Pinter, 1999, pp. 19–20.
100 Philip Blair and Peter Cullen, ‘Federalism, Legalism and Political Reality: The Record of
the Federal Constitutional Court,’ in Jeffery, Charlie (ed.), Recasting German Federalism:
The Legacies of Unification, London: Pinter, 1999, p. 123.
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In the German federal state, in the Bundesstaat101 there is a strong emphasis on the
self-rule of the states (Länder). As an illustrative example of the degree of deep
federalism in Germany as compared to American federalism, German second-
chamber (Bundesrat) representatives are indicated by the Länder governments,102 a
practice that ended with the Seventeenth Amendment in the American Senate in
1913103 which provided for the direct election of Senators.
At first glance, American federalism is more consistent with representative
democracy, but that interpretation does not hold when it is considered that although
direct election of senators provided independence from the states’ legislatures, it
weakened the federal element that had been inherited from the Madisonian
Constitution, this is because states’ representative bodies could not influence decision-
making in the federal political process by appointing senators to Congress.
Hence the influence of the states – as unitary agents – decreased in the Senate, which
was created as a body to represent states’ legislatures. In federal political theory,
every federal arrangement is idiosyncratic, and when designing the rules of a polity –
whether a confederation or a federation – there is a choice between the careful
balancing of elements of self-rule and shared-rule. The American institutional
evolution favoured the national element to the detriment of the federal element,
101 Federation established by the German Basic Law (Das Grundgesetz) in 1949. On German
Federalism see Arthur Gunlicks, The Länder and German Federalism, Manchester:
Manchester University Press, 2003.
102 Articles 50–54 of the German Basic Law.
103 Replaced Article 1, Section 3. The Seventeenth Amendment reduced states’ powers and
interests by taking a voice in the common federal institutions and increasing the power of
federal government, as Filippov and colleagues argue: ‘The original intent of legislative
apportionment, of course, was to peripheralize the American federation by giving state
governments some direct control over the federal center. With direct election, or at least with
ineffective state control of senators, however, the power of the center relative to that of state
governments was increased.’ Mikhail Filippov et. al., Designing Federalism, 2004, op. cit., p.
126.
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which, as already noted, was inherited from the Madisonian Constitution.104 But in
Germany – in part because of its historical experiences with federalism – a strong
version of federalism was adopted in which the constituent units had a larger
participation in the federal political process, as Gunlicks observes:
German federalists, after all believed that the Länder should
participate in law-making and in the administration of federal laws,
both which were very much in the German tradition. This favoured
the representation of the Land governments in a second chamber of
the Länder that would mediate between the federal and the Land
governments. This is the solution that is most federal, in the sense
that it provides for a federal division of powers in which both levels
are represented by governments. A Senate solution would have
duplicated in the Bundesrat the party representation in the
Bundestag, whereas representation was to be based on the different
principles of continuity, stability (i.e. long-standing interests of the
Länder) and administrative expertise.105
The rationale was to decrease centralisation, precisely the opposite path to that chosen
for American federalism.106 The Bundesrat ‘not only embodies the
intergovernmentalism of the federal system, but to a large extent it is also responsible
for the efficient management and coordination of many of the wide-ranging
institutional interdependencies arising from the intergovernmental structure’.107 The
Bundesrat alongside the Bundestag (lower chamber directly elected to represent the
whole country) has significant powers in the enactment of federal legislation – which
is the case – because in the German federal system, the Länder are responsible for
104 By reference to James Madison considered as one of the most influential members in the
draft of the American Constitution in the Philadelphia Convention.
105Arthur Gunlicks, op. cit., p, 343.
106 William H. Riker, The Senate and American Federalism, The American Political Science
Review, vol. 49, No. 2, 1955, pp. 452–469.
107 Uwe Leonardy, op. cit., p. 5.
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most of the administration, while the federal state is responsible for most of the
legislative activity.108
German federalism is also characterised by the practice of ‘joint-decisions’, whereby
the Länder and the federal state are engaged in a kind of cooperative federalism in that
both are engaged in joint planning, implementation and financing of certain tasks
under a joint decision-making procedure.109 This practice significantly altered the
nature of the political process in the federal political system. The ‘dual government’,
whereby each government is responsible for its own sphere – a common feature in the
United States – is not a feature of the German federal system.
The German federal system allows for the representation of the different polities’
communities in the federal political system as a whole, and this is the essence of
federalism, to allow not only persistence of autonomy (self-rule) of the polities, but
also to allow them to participate as autonomous units in the political process of the
federal union (shared rule).
3.2. Switzerland
Switzerland and federalism are almost synonymous.110 The Swiss Federation (its
official title is the ‘Swiss Confederation’) is a significant case for the study of
108Uwe Leonardy, op. cit., p. 12. Article 83 of the Basic Law refers to the implementation of
the federal legislation by the Länder in their own right; Article 84 of the Basic Law refers to
implementation of federal legislation under supervision of the federal government and Article
85 of the Basic Law refers to the implementation of federal legislation for the federation. Note
the similarities with EU Directives.
109Hartmut Klatt, ‘Centralizing Trends in West German Federalism, 1949–89,’ in Charlie
Jeffery, Recasting German Federalism: The Legacies of Unification, London: Pinter, 1999, p.
42, The practice is in Articles 91a and 91b of the Basic Law (Constitution). This practice is
also common in the EU institutional arrangement; for a criticism, see Fritz Scharpf, op. cit.
110 Considering its historical federal experiences; for a critical analysis of Swiss federalism
see J. Wayne Baker, ‘The Covenantal Basis for the Development of Swiss Federalism,’
Publius: The Journal of Federalism, vol. 23, No. 2, 1993; Daniel Thurer, ‘Switzerland: The
Model in Need of Adaptation?’ in Joachim Jens Hesse and Vincent Wright, Federalizing
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federalism as a political theory because of its long tradition of federalism, first as a
confederation, and in its present form as a federation.111
Although Switzerland is now a federal national state, it is also one of the least
centralised, where the constituent polities (the cantons) enjoy a significant degree of
independence within the national federal state. In Switzerland, the logic of
representation is based primarily around federalism, and cantons are represented at the
federal common institutions as separate polities. This means that cantons are seen as
the primary actors for political action in the Council of States, the second chamber
(Standerat) or in the Federal Council (Bundesrat), which is the federal executive.
Another feature of Swiss federalism is the dual membership of deputies to the first
chamber, the National Council (Nationalrat) and cantonal assemblies.112 Cantons are
also the expression of primary political action in terms of the participation of
individual citizens via democratic referendums.113
The political process in Switzerland represents the country’s most important
institutions through the operation of federalism, in contrast to American federalism,
where the judicial process has been seen as a stronger participant in the federal
political system throughout history, and to this day. For instance, the Federal Tribunal
Europe? The Costs, Benefits, and Preconditions of Federal Political Systems, Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1996.
111 In its old form, the Swiss Confederation traces its origins back to 1291 and the Oath of
Fellowship (Eidgenossenschaft) or to 1315 in the Pact of Brunnen (Morgatenbrief) that lasted
up until 1798, when it was destroyed after the Napoleonic invasions, after which a centralised
state was established until 1815. From 1815 to 1848 there was another constitutional
arrangement that tried to revive the old confederation based on a union of states. Two other
Constitutions followed, one in 1848, which followed the American federal arrangement by
establishing for the first time a Confederation, and another in 1874, which followed the
federal model. The present Constitution is from 2000. See Murray Forsyth, op. cit., pp. 18–
30; Thomas Fleiner, ‘The Current Situation of Federalism in Switzerland,’ REAF, No. 9,
2009.
112 Ronald L. Watts, Comparing Federal Systems, op. cit. p. 23.
113 On the characteristics of Swiss federalism, see Michael Burgess, 2006, op. cit., p. 119.
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cannot rule on the validity of federal laws in Switzerland, only on cantonal laws, thus,
disputes on federal laws are ultimately determined by referendum.114 This means that
disputes on the acts of the federal legislature can be solved within the federal
legislatures or by referendums, for which, there is a principle of double majority that
demands a majority of both Swiss citizens and cantons. In Switzerland, as in
Germany, the cantons and the communes perform most federal administration.115
The history of federalism in Switzerland offers invaluable insight into the nature of
federal political systems and the concept of sovereignty, because it shows the
diversity of federal experiences and how they allocate ultimate power. In the case of
Switzerland, there is a need to preserve the autonomy of irreducible polities (the
cantons) because of linguistic and religious reasons, which makes Switzerland an
archetype of polity where non-centralisation – despite the small size of the country,
and in terms of population and territory – is the rule. The Swiss federal state,
organised as a modern territorial state, in its present form since 1848, demonstrates a
balance between the need for shared-rule and the desire for self-rule.116
Sovereignty, in Switzerland, in its internal dimension – because the cantons do not
have the attributes of statehood, as they are not independent states – is shared between
the federation and the cantons. The Swiss Constitution recognises in Article 3 the
sovereignty of the cantons by stating that: ‘The Cantons are sovereign except to the
114 Watts, Comparing Federal Systems, op. cit., p. 100: in Switzerland all Courts are cantonal
in organisation, which means that as the only type of court, cantonal courts in Switzerland,
apply both cantonal and federal law; however there is no judicial review as there is in the US
or Germany, Fleiner, op. cit., pp. 58, 61.
115 Jurg Steiner, ‘Continental Integration and Swiss Federalism: A New Openness to Europe?’
in Harvey Lazar et. al. (ed.), The Impact of Global and Regional Integration on Federal
Systems, Kingston, Canada: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2003, p. 177.
116 Although some have argued that Swiss federalism is also in need of change, particularly
before the approval of the present Constitution; Sonia Walti, ‘Institutional Reform of
Federalism: Changing the Players Rather than the Rules of the Game,’ Swiss Political Science
Review, vol. 2, No. 2, 1996.
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extent that their sovereignty is limited by the Federal Constitution. They shall exercise
all rights that are not vested in the Confederation’.117
This is unusual for national constitutions – even federations – to seek recognition of
sovereign powers to sub-units; nonetheless this sovereignty refers to internal
sovereignty, which as noted above, for federations, constitutes a single sovereign state
in International Law. Another interesting Article in the present Swiss Constitution is
the principle of subsidiarity in Article 5a,118 which stipulates, ‘The principle of
subsidiarity must be observed in the allocation and performance of state tasks’. This is
interesting, because in the Swiss Constitutional system, the concept of sovereignty is
seen as a core attribute in which cantonal autonomy and independence from the
federation are enshrined, and at the same time, sees subsidiarity as an organising
principle in addition to cantonal sovereignty, and not as a replacement.
However, sovereignty from a pure Schmitian-concept point of view119 lies at the
cantonal level: it could be argued that even cantons do not hold the exclusive
authority, and this is because one the key factors in the Swiss federal partnership is
the notion that authority is exercised in common; sovereignty is shared between the
cantons and the federation. In this sense, therefore, ultimate authority is decoupled
from a single holder, whether the federal state or just the Swiss People in general,
because first and foremost, political participation in the federal system is defined by
the people in the cantons or half-cantons.120 Hence, the concept of sovereignty should
117 Swiss Constitution available at: http://www.admin.ch/ch/e/rs/101/a3.html [Accessed
22.12.2010].
118 This is particularly important, because this principle first manifested in the European
Union and was imported into Swiss constitutional Law, which will be discussed in context in
Chapter 4.
119 ‘Sovereign is who decides on the exception’; Carl Schmitt, op. cit., 2005, p. 5.
120 As it is the case of Functional and Overlapping Competing Jurisdictions (FOCJ), a
normative proposal, but one seen by Frey and Eichenberger as similar to that functioning in
Switzerland, which are not territorial, but based along functional lines; see Bruno Frey and
Reiner Eichenberger, The New Democratic Federalism for Europe: Functional, Overlapping
and Competing Jurisdictions, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 1999, pp. 49–52.
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be seen from the notion of shared and non-exclusive political authority between the
cantons and the federal state.
4. Federalism beyond the State
The importance of Federalism as a political theory beyond the state is important,
especially considering the multiple manifestations of federal arrangements. It is in this
context of multiple manifestations that the concept of sovereignty should be
understood when considering the relevance of federalism to the study of sovereignty,
and by acknowledging the plethora of different federal arrangements, particularly the
federal form known as a confederation.121
Federalism, as discussed above, is a concept applicable to different political
arrangements other than the sovereign state. These legal arrangements include the
union of states, defined by a political partnership in which states could retain their
individual sovereignty, but at the same time, creating a legal entity with limited
powers sharing sovereignty. A theory of federalism beyond the state will
acknowledge that ‘Inevitably globalization will result in an increasing shift of
sovereignty from the national government to global institutions’.122 Nevertheless, that
shift, understood in the Althusian tradition will also mean that sovereignty should be
seen as a pluralistic concept that can be attributed to other polities other than the
modern territorial state.
121 The problem of sovereignty in confederations is different to the problem of sovereignty in
federations. In confederations, states still retain their individual legal personality, hence their
independence. In federations, the problem of sovereignty is internal, because only the federal
entity has international legal sovereignty, and with sovereignty, comes the problem of who
holds supremacy or the summa potestas internally, considering the division of powers
associated with a federation.
122 Charles H. Koch, ‘Judicial Review and Global Federalism,’ Administrative Law Review,
vol. 54, 2002, p. 510.
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4.1. Beyond the Modern Territorial State
In a world of modern territorial states, the irrelevance of all political forms beyond the
state seemed assured, but what is meant by this, in fact, is that it was assumed that the
only legitimate polities were states.
Kant’s normative proposals saw a Law of Nations based on ‘a federalism of free
states’123 which was to challenge the state-centred perspective of polities that were
imagined only within the tradition of the Westphalian state.
This notion has been challenged in the last decades, however, by limitations imposed
on states in different areas of Law – from the need for the protection of the rights of
minorities to recent developments in International Humanitarian Law.124
It is not the purpose of this research to explore the challenges posed to sovereignty by
these different issue-areas, but this point does illustrate the limits of assigning to the
modern territorial state a privileged position as the only legitimate polity in the
international system. The contribution of federalism to a proper understanding of
sovereignty resides in challenging the view that the international system is composed
of mere agents –the modern territorial state – which has an exclusive monopoly of
action in the international system. As discussed above, this is not historically accurate,
considering the different actors in the various international systems since the Peace of
Westphalia, and it is still not true of the present international system, therefore, a new
paradigm shift is required, as Elazar argues:
Let us understand the nature of this paradigm shift. It is not that
states are disappearing, it is that the state system is acquiring a new
dimension, one that began as a supplement and is now coming to
123 Immanuel Kant, ‘To Eternal Peace’ (first published 1795); translated by Carl Friedrich in
Allen W. Wood, Basic Writings of Kant, New York: The Modern Library, 2001, p. 444.
124 The ICC, Humanitarian intervention, but also in the limitations of the constitutional rules
of the international system; for a discussion about sovereignty and the individual see Chapter
2 of this thesis.
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overlay (and, at least in some respects, to supersede) the system
that prevailed throughout the modern epoch. … This overlay
increasingly restricts what was called state sovereignty and forces
states into various combinations of self-rule and shared-rule to
enable them to survive at all. That means federalism, understood in
the broadest political sense as a genus involving combinations of
self-rule and shared-rule rather than as the one species of
federalism accepted in modern times – federation.125
This means that ‘today, there appears to be no principal methodological or doctrinal
objection to applying the concept of federalism to the levels beyond the state’.126
A federal political system is based on states’ consent, which as an essential
characteristic, is fundamental in identifying the nature of federalism.127 Federal
experiences are based on shared rule, motivated by members’ belief in the potential
for mutual benefits for all the different constituent units. The limitation of sovereignty
that the creation of a federal arrangement brings about, therefore, is undertaken on a
voluntary basis and membership is based on the anticipation of the potential benefits
of a federal arrangement. Traditionally, these goals of membership were related to the
promotion of economic and commercial interests and defence and security affairs.128
Although federal arrangements are based on voluntary associations, as pointed out
and emphasised by Althusius, they are not based on the dichotomy between centre
and periphery, but on a matrix model.129 This model is characterised by the notion that
in a federal arrangement there is no hierarchy; there are no higher centres of
125 Daniel Elazar, ‘From Statism to Federalism: A Paradigm Shift,’ International Political
Science Review: ‘New Trends in Federalism,’ vol. 17, No. 4, 1996, p. 419.
126 Jost Delbruck, ‘Transnational Federalism: Problems and Prospects of Allocating Public
Authority beyond the State,’ Indiana Journal of Global and Legal Studies, vol. 1, No. 1,
2004, p. 48.
127 Its origins are from compact theory. On the consensual basis for federal arrangements see
Daniel Elazar, Exploring Federalism, 1987, op. cit. p. 33.
128 Michael Burgess, Comparative Federalism, 2006,op. cit., p. 76.
129 Proposed by Daniel Elazar in Exploring Federalism 1987, op. cit. p. 27.
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authority.130 In a matrix model, federalism is based on a non-centralised concept,
where the coexistence of multiple poles ensures that there is no claim to supreme
authority, as Elazar states:
Federal polities are characteristically non centralized; that is, the
powers of government within them are diffused among many
centers, whose existence of authority are guaranteed by the general
constitution, rather than being concentrated in a single center.131
5. Representation
The issue of representation is highly relevant, and yet it is probably one of the most
misunderstood facets of federalism. This is because one of the characteristics of
federalism resides in the view that legitimate representation is based not only on direct
representation of citizens in federal common institutions, but also that legitimate
representation is based primarily on the notion that representation132 – and this is the
normative aspect of federal arrangements – is based on the direct participation of the
different polities in the common institutions of the federal political system. This
means that the problem of representation is primarily about the political participation
of the individual polities, as units, which compose the federal system. Hence, as
discussed above in the context of the American federation, the decreased role of
states, as units, in the federal political process, weakened the federal elements present
in the American Constitution and increased the national element. This was because
the logic of representation in non-federal systems is based on the view that
representation is only legitimate when people, as individual citizens, participate
directly in the central representative bodies of central government, and this is the case
in particular when central government holds supreme authority.
130 Daniel Elazar, Exploring Federalism, 1987, op. cit., p. 37.
131 Daniel Elazar, Exploring Federalism, 1987, op. cit., p. 34.
132 For the role of participation, or ‘Voice’ as a political mechanism, see Albert O. Hirschman
Exit, Voice and Loyalty, 1970, op. cit.
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In federal political systems, no single body or polity holds supreme authority because
sovereignty is shared. In this way, legitimate representation is not only about
representation of the citizens, but also of the individual polities that compose the
federal system. This is in order to preserve the distinctiveness and autonomy of
individual polities.
In federal political systems, the focus of the problem resides in insufficient
participation of the different polities in a federal political system, as Hueglin observes:
This type of representative participation in the process of
government has hardly anything in common with the Anglo-Saxon
tradition of parliamentary representation. On the contrary, it
constitutes, a different and, arguably, older tradition of
representation and legitimacy. It can still be discerned today in the
construction of German federalism, where the upper legislative
chamber is a federal council whose members represent their
provincial or Land governments, and whose votes are given
collectively by each Land. Similarly, one can see this form of
representation in the Council of Ministers of the European Union.
The ministers primarily represent their respective countries, not the
Community as a whole. Their decisions still rely mainly on
unanimous agreement, not majority voting. In a way, the common
criticism that the European Union therefore lacks political
legitimacy –because the European Parliament does not possess full
legislative powers –is misleading because it presupposes that the
other tradition of representation – parliamentary and majoritarian –
is the only possible and legitimate.133
133Hueglin, ‘Althusius: Medieval Constitutionalist’ op. cit., p. 67.
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5.1. Elements of Federal Political Systems
Considering all of the above, all federal polities have in common certain features, in
order to be considered federal:
1) Non-hierarchical: meaning that the constituent polities as part of the federal
political system are not simply decentralised local authorities defined by the
federal or ‘central’ state, but that they preserve their own autonomy and
sovereignty in the framework of the federal arrangement. The federal
arrangement is not superior to the individual polities, however, although it
maintains some elements of primacy within its own sphere of jurisdiction.
2) A compact or covenant: between the different polities that compose the
federal arrangement. This compact is voluntary and based on the polities that
decide to create the federal political structure. In some circumstances, the
compact also includes ‘The People’ but the essence of the compact is between
individual polities.
3) Shared sovereignty: the sharing of sovereignty is based on the compact
between the different polities, which decide to delegate limited powers to a
central, federal arrangement. This shared sovereignty – the American
Federalist Papers called it ‘dual sovereignty’ – was limited to powers and
functions attributed to the central federal structure. This notion of shared
sovereignty does not abolish the ‘irreducible sovereignty’134 of individual
polities, which maintain a sphere of action which cannot be absorbed by the
federal arrangement.
4) Federal polities as independent agents: this derives as a corollary of the
principle of shared sovereignty and means that the polities are part of the
134 This means that individual polities, when part of a federal arrangement keep their own
sphere of powers and supremacy within their own jurisdiction and their internal sovereignty,
which cannot be delegated; if this should occur, we are no longer in the presence of a federal
arrangement, but in a unitary state with decentralisation or devolution.
134
federal political system, participate in the larger federal framework and federal
decision-making process as units, and that their independent agency should not
be hindered by the federal structure. Federalism is not state unification.
5) Multiplicity of federal political systems:135 ‘in which there are two or more
levels of government which combine self-rule for the governments of the
constituent units with elements of shared-rule through common
institutions’.136 They include different types of federal political systems.137
5.2. Federalism and Sovereignty
The point about federalism and sovereignty is critical, because it explains the concept
of federalism and makes clear that a federal arrangement is not based on a notion of
decentralisation, which implies a hierarchical relationship between the different units
in a federal polity. It is this understanding – within the Althusian tradition – that sees
federalism in the matrix model and which informs this analysis of the concept of
sovereignty. In the federalist tradition based on multiple centres of authority,
sovereignty assumes not just a non-absolute character, but also one based on a non-
hierarchical understanding; sovereignty, therefore, is based on a pluralistic
understanding; on a notion of shared and competing sovereignties of different polities
in the federal political system.
Seen in this tradition, federalism is a covenant of different polities sharing together in
common institutions. The creation of the federal arrangement does not eliminate the
sovereignty of the constituent units as one might expect from a Bodinian perspective,
because in that tradition, sovereignty is indivisible and absolute and can only rest in
one place: that of the sovereign state. The Althusian tradition rejects this
135 Meaning that the constituent units of a larger political system should act directly in the
common federal institutions as individual polities, this is in order to preserve their individual
territorial interests.
136 Ronald L. Watts, ‘Comparing Forms of Federal Partnerships,’ in Dimitrios Karmis and
Wyane Norman, Theories of Federalism: A Reader, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005, p.
234.
137 Daniel Elazar, Exploring Federalism, 1987, op. cit.
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understanding, building on the notion that sovereignty can be shared within the
sovereign state through a federation (internal sovereignty), but also between sovereign
states through confederations or other types of federal arrangements (external
sovereignty).138 This means that in federal political systems, sovereignty is not seen as
indivisible or absolute, as King argues:
If the mark of sovereignty were a single authority then of course it
(or he or she) could not be divided. But if the mark of sovereignty
is finality of decision, then clearly such sovereignty can be divided
among and shared by (as in any voting situation) a plurality of
agents – without prejudice to finality.139
Federalism is not merely based on the division of powers between polities; it is also
built on a process in which different polities decide to create a political partnership by
maintaining their political autonomy and creating common institutions. This process
is dynamic and not static, which means that a federal arrangement evolves according
to the different institutional processes that drive it.140 To comprehend the significance
of federalism to the study of sovereignty, one needs to grasp the importance of the
different institutional processes within a federal arrangement.
138 Arguing that federal political systems involve an absence of a sovereign authority, see
Geoffrey Sawer,Modern Federalism, Victoria: Pitman Australia, 1976, p. 97.
139 Preston King, Federalism and Federation, 1982, op. cit., p. 115.
140 In the American federation, the most important institutional process was the judicial led by
the Supreme Court, and as in the EU today, this poses some problems, particularly with
legitimacy of the judiciary and ‘judicial activism’, as Wheare argues: ‘People sometimes ask
why it is that the function of deciding the meaning of the division of powers and indeed of the
whole constitution in a federal government comes to be performed by courts. It is not a
strange thing that one branch of the general government – the judiciary – should have the
power to decide whether the other branches – the legislature and administration – are keeping
within the limits of their powers’. See K. C. Wheare, Federal Government, 1963, op. cit., p.
61.
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5.3. Rebirth of the Federal Phoenix: The EU as a Post-Modern Confederation
Federalism as a political theory could be applied to the framework of the European
Union as a federal arrangement.141 The use of federalism as an arrangement has
returned – phoenix-like – to revive a lost tradition that had been buried and hidden in
a narrative dominated by a notion of a nation-state, much as if it were an imagined
community142 that had slowly emerged after the French Revolution, and following the
Westphalian pattern of the gradual emergence of the sovereign state, as Elazar
observes: ‘With the emergence of permanent multinational “communities”, of which
the European Community (EC) is the prime example, we are now witnessing a revival
of confederal arrangements’.143 The EU is an example of a federal political system
beyond the state.144 However, the EU challenges even the broadest understanding of
federalism, here proposed, as Brand argues: ‘If the United States of America
represented a dramatic development in concepts of federalism at the end of the
141 This point will be further explored in Chapter 4 about the European Union.
142 The appropriate term would be territorial sovereign state, as discussed in Chapter 1 of this
thesis.
143 Daniel Elazar, Exploring Federalism, 1987, op. cit., pp. 50–1; similarly Warleigh
(following Murray Forsyth in Union of States, 1981, op. cit.), argues for a recovery of the
federal tradition and the classification of the EU as a confederation. See Alexander Warleigh,
‘Better the Devil you know? Synthetic and Confederal Understandings of European
Unification,’ West European Politics, vol. 21, No. 3, 1998, p. 2.
144 An ‘Intergovernmental Federalism’, Maurice Croisat and Jean-Louis Quermonne, Europe
and Federalism (Europe et le Federalism), Paris: Montchrestien, 1999; a ‘federal union’
according to Murray Forsyth, ‘The Political Theory of Federalism: The Relevance of
Classical Approaches,’ in Joachim Jens Hesse and Vincent Wright, Federalizing Europe? The
Costs, Benefits, and Preconditions of Federal Political Systems, Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1996, p. 40. For a criticism of the federal form, that it is an outdated form under which
to classify the EU, see Peter Hay, Federalism and Supranational Organization: Patterns for
New Legal Structures, Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1969, pp. 79–101. Only a handful
of studies have applied federalism as a political theory to the EU, see Filippov et. al.,
Designing Federalism, 2004, op. cit., p. 316.
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eighteenth century, so too does the EU represent such development at the beginning
of the twenty-first century.’145
Nevertheless, the application of federal theory to the European Union is a return to a
lost tradition, but also perhaps ‘the constitutional language of federalism appears to be
helpful in order to analyze and discuss the ways in which the division of power is
organized among the different levels of government and the EU’.146
6. Conclusion
This chapter has sought to demonstrate that federalism as a political theory has
multiple manifestations. It is a theory aimed at protecting the autonomy of polities
(self-rule), while at the same time, preserving the shared-rule of the constituent units
in a federal political system based on consent.
The chapter has highlighted the fact that, as such, federalism cannot be seen as tool to
employ for the purposes of devolution or decentralisation because it is not a
hierarchical concept. Another common mistake made by some authors is to reduce the
federal experience to the type of federation. The American historical experiences on
federalism along with the European experiences, especially those of Germany and
Switzerland, illustrate that the relationship between polities within the federalist
tradition can assume different forms.
The chapter has shown that the concept of sovereignty within the federalist tradition is
not based on the idea of absolute, exclusive and ultimate authority; rather it is based
on the notion that sovereignty is a historically-bound concept dependent on each
international system; that it is contingent, and can be shared and divided between
different polities.
145 Ronald A. Brand, ‘Federalism and the Allocation of Sovereignty beyond the State in the
European Union,’ Duquesne Law Review, vol. 44, 2005, p. 76.
146 Tanja, A. Borzel and Madeleine O. Hosli, ‘Brussels between Berlin and Bern:
Comparative Federalism meets the European Union,’ Amsterdam: VU University
Amsterdam, Working Paper, 02/2002, p. 5.
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The chapter has also addressed the possibilities of federalism beyond the state,
considering that federalism could be applicable not just to polities within a modern
territorial state, but also between states, particularly in the context of international
arrangements. Here, some common elements often found in federal political systems
were identified. The chapter has also brought the relevance of the Althusian tradition
to the fore, in the context of the study of sovereignty, which can be summarised as:
He somehow had to find a reconciling compromise between the
new principle of territorial sovereignty and the autonomous
aspirations of socio-economic, cultural-religious, and territorial
minorities. By grafting the principle of sovereignty upon the
organized body of people rather than a state somehow representing
individual citizens, he may indeed deserve to be regarded as one of
the first early modern theorists of popular sovereignty.147
This understanding of sovereignty – in the Althusian tradition – offers insight into
how sovereignty should be seen in the European Union, as will be argued in the
following chapter.
147Hueglin, ‘Althusius: Medieval Constitutionalist …’ op. cit., p. 115.
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Chapter 4
The European Union and the Concept of Sovereignty
1. Introduction
This chapter examines the nature of sovereignty in the European Union. Furthermore,
in adopting a federal framework, it analyses briefly the institutional architecture of the
European Union, and examines some of the relevant innovations introduced by the
Treaty of Lisbon.
Subsequently, the chapter analyses the concept of supranationalism as applicable to
the European Union, and in contrast to federalism. The recent decision of the German
Federal Constitutional Court regarding the Treaty of Lisbon is also examined as an
archetype of the challenges posed by national Supreme and Constitutional Courts to
European integration.
The chapter will also address some of the issues related to the possibilities of
constitutionalism beyond the state, considering that the European Union presents itself
as constitutional legal order. The chapter also examines whether a constitutionalism
beyond the state is consistent with national constitutionalism, which is particularly
relevant to the concept of sovereignty because a constitutionalism beyond the state
opens up the possibilities for a pluralistic understanding of sovereignty.
The chapter will conclude with an analysis of the concept of subsidiarity; comparing it
to the concept of sovereignty, particularly the changes introduced by the Treaty of
Lisbon, which introduced a new mechanism allowing the participation of national
Parliaments in the decision-making process of the EU.
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1.1 The Problem of Sovereignty in the European Union
The nature of sovereignty in the European Union1 relates to the perspective adopted
when analysing the nature of the relationship between the EU and member-states.
For Intergovernmentalists, the EU remains an organisation based on a compact, one
derived from the consent of its members, and with attributed powers set down in
Treaties. In this respect, states can revoke the powers delegated to the EU,2 which
means that the nature of sovereignty is still a statehood attribute belonging exclusively
to the modern territorial state. This view contrasts with that which assumes that the
EU is a proto-constitutional project, and that the nature of sovereignty is related to the
different institutional processes at the European level.3
For the Neo-functionalist School, the European integration process is based on the
‘spill-over’ of supranationalism to the different policy areas promoted by the various
actors in the European political process.4 These approaches have tried to explain the
1 Hereinafter the EU.
2 See Andrew Moravcsik, ‘Preferences and Power in the European Community: A Liberal
Intergovernmentalist Approach,’ in Metter Eilstrup-Sangiovanni (ed.), Debates on European
Integration, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006.
3 The ‘different institutional processes’ refer to Comparative Institutional Analysis proposed
by Neil Komesar, which provides comparative analysis of different institutional processes,
taking into consideration the participation of different actors. Hence, in analysing institutional
arrangements such as the EU, it is necessary to look at the judicial and political processes. For
example, the political process, whereby national governments represent their national interests
in the common institutions of the EU (in the European Council and Council of Ministers) and,
particularly importantly, the role of the adjudicative process, especially the European Court of
Justice (ECJ). On Comparative Institutional Analysis, see Neil Komesar, ‘Imperfect
Alternatives: Choosing Institutions in Law,’ Economics, and Public Policy, Chicago: Chicago
University Press, 1994; and Neil Komesar, Law’s Limits: The Rule of Law and the Supply and
Demand for Rights, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001.
4 Ernst B. Haas, ‘Does Constructivism Subsume Neofunctionalism?’ in Metter Eilstrup-
Sangiovanni, Debates on European Integration, op. cit. On different approaches to European
integration see also Dimitris N. Chryssochoou, Theorizing European Integration, London:
Routledge, 2009.
141
mechanisms of regional integration in the European continent, and at the same time,
offer an account of its uniqueness and originality.
European political integration is a unique process in which the narrative about the
concept of sovereignty – as summa potestas – is fiercely contested. In order to address
the problem in hand, therefore, the distinctiveness of the European legal framework,
and the nature of the powers attributed to the EU, will be the subject of analysis. The
institutional design and evolution of the European integration mechanism also
requires consideration in this context, particularly the crucial role of the judicial
process in creating and developing a system of legal principles and rules that define
the nature of the European integration process.
The discussion of the concept of sovereignty in the EU should not be limited to the
analysis of the Treaties and the political process, either, but should consider the
different institutional processes that have helped to define the relationship between the
European Communities5 and member states, from a historical perspective.
The approach delineated here considers several levels of analysis: The first is an
analysis of why the EU – when compared to other international institutional
arrangements – presents itself as a unique arrangement; second, consideration of the
processes of the evolution of European institutions, and third, the role of the
institutional processes in developing European integration from a comparative
perspective, will be put under scrutiny. In undertaking these different levels of
analysis it will be necessary, in addition, to analyse the structure of the European legal
system. Together, these discussions will shed light on the current understanding held
by many authors about sovereignty in the context of the European institutional
arrangement, in particular, the question of ultimate authority, which in itself is linked
to the approach chosen by this research in order to analyse sovereignty – whether in
the Bodinian or the Althusian tradition.
5 Considering that historically the EEC was the predecessor of the EU.
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This approach, in turn, relates to the nature of the European polity; whether one sees it
as a ‘multi-level governance system’,6 a ‘constitutional order of states’,7 a ‘post-
modern confederation’,8 a ‘polycentric polity’9 or a ‘sui generis’ project.10 It is not the
purpose of this research to offer a full explanation of the European-integration process
or to provide a definitive classification for the process, but rather to explore the
implications of the historical institutional evolution of the EU and how it has affected
the concept of sovereignty. The first step will be an analysis of the uniqueness of the
European integration process, particularly with regard to similar international
institutional arrangements, such as the United Nations, or other regional organisations.
The European Sonderweg11 derives from the unique nature of the European legal
system, especially when considering how different it is to other international legal
systems, functional or regional organisations. Observers might point to the fact that
the supranational character of the EU makes the European experience different in
contrast to other international experiences, to which the retort might be that
6 Tanja Alberts sees the EU as a multi-level governance system: Tanja Aalberts, ‘The Future
of Sovereignty in Multilevel Governance Europe: A Constructivist Reading,’ Journal of
Common Market Studies, vol. 42, No. 1, 2004.
7 Alan Dashwood, ‘States and the EU,’ European Law Review, vol. 23, 1998, p. 221.
8 Daniel Elazar, ‘The United States and the EU: Models for their Epochs,’ in Kalypso
Nicolaidis and Robert Howse, The Federal Vision: Legitimacy, Levels of Governance in the
United States and the EU, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001, p. 48; see also Michael
Longo, Constitutionalising Europe: Processes and Practices, Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006.
9 Marlene Wind, ‘The EU as a Polycentric polity: Returning to a Medieval Europe?’ in Joseph
H. Weiler and Marlene Wind (eds), European Constitutionalism Beyond the State,
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003, pp. 122–23.
10 Pavlos Eleftheriadis, ‘The European Constitution and Cosmopolitan Ideals,’ Columbia
Journal of European Law, vol. 7, 2001.
11 To use Joseph Weiler’s expression; for which a literal translation might be ‘special way’.
See ‘Federalism without Constitutionalism: Europe’s Sonderweg,’ in The Federal Vision:
Legitimacy, Levels of Governance in the United States and the EU, Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2001, p. 54.
143
supranationalism, as a result of the European Communities pursuant to the Treaty of
Rome, was not a fait accompli in the early stages of its development.12
The evolution of the various European institutions is intrinsically linked to the role of
the many institutional processes within the EU, the history of which cannot be seen as
a linear development towards further integration, but one which was one marked by
deep disagreements between member states, advances and breaks in the European
integration project.13
The exceptional nature of the European integration process was further determined by
the different institutional processes14 that conditioned the future evolution of its
institutions. The interplay between the political and judicial processes must be borne
in mind, which with regard to both of these processes, the following questions and
observation are made: to the former, what role did member states play in negotiating
the Treaties and accommodating all the different interests, and how did the different
bodies of the EU interact with member states and private actors; as for the latter, the
fundamental role of the ECJ in creating and developing a new European legal order
distinct from the canons of classic Public International Law, should be acknowledged,
because in the judicial process, the ECJ in ground-breaking decisions – in needing to
consider the role of the private actors involved in the litigation – was instrumental in
preserving the integrity of European Law and in coherently interpreting them for all
member states, as MacCormick argues:
Taking the view of the sovereign state which I suggested or any
reasonable variant on its terms, it seems obvious that no State in Western
12 As Pierson argues: ‘As a number of critics have noted, choice-theoretic treatments of
institutions often make an intentionalist or functionalist fallacy, arguing that the long-term
effects of institutions explain why decision makers introduce them’, Paul Pierson, ‘The Path
to European Integration: A Historical Institutionalist Analysis,’ in Metter Eilstrup-
Sangiovanni, Debates on European Integration, op. cit., p. 312.
13 As the Luxembourg Compromise demonstrated by briefly replacing qualified majority
voting for unanimity in 1966. See:
http://europa.eu/scadplus/glossary/luxembourg_compromise_en.htm [Accessed 07.10.10].
14 Neil Komesar, ‘Imperfect Alternatives,’ op. cit.
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Europe any longer is a sovereign state. None is in a position such that all
the power exercised internally in it, whether politically or legally,
derives from purely internal sources. Equally, of course, it is not true
that all the power which is exercised by, or through, on the grant of, one
or more organs of the European Community. Nor has the community as
such a plenitude of power politically or normatively that could permit it
remotely to resemble in itself a sovereign state or sovereign federation of
states.15
The nature of sovereignty in the EU needs to be understood in the context of
‘deterritorialization’; of an authority that saw the exclusion of a Bodinian
understanding of statehood: one that viewed sovereignty as the exclusive and supreme
authority of the state in its territory where other types of authority were also excluded.
As will be discussed below, this paradigm has shifted, and the EU is a paradigmatic
example of that shift, as Walker argues:
In the new Post-Westphalian order, in contrast with the emergence of
functionally-limited polities, which do not claim comprehensive
jurisdiction over a particular territory it becomes possible to conceive of
autonomy without territorial exclusivity to imagine ultimate authority,
or sovereignty, in non-exclusive terms.16
In analysing the EU, it is necessary to ‘unpick’ it as it were in order to understand its
idiosyncrasy, particularly its novel legal nature. The EU as a polity has long
fascinated scholars because the union does not easily fit the description of either an
international organisation or any similar type of structure, and it is this originality that
drives the purpose of this chapter; to undertake a thorough analysis of the concept of
sovereignty in the context of the EU.
15 Neil MacCormick, ‘Beyond the Sovereign State,’ Modern Law Review, vol. 56, No. 1,
1993, p. 16.
16 Neil Walker, ‘Late Sovereignty in the EU,’ in Neil Walker (ed.), Sovereignty in Transition,
Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2003, p. 23.
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2. The Nature of the Polity: The EU as a Federal Political System
Employing the definition of federalism as discussed in the previous chapter, the
notion that the EU is a proto-federation while also asserting that it is an international
organisation, should be rejected from the outset.17 The EU can be classified as a
‘confederal’ polity, and as such, it is a federal political system. The nature of
confederations is in itself a rejection of statehood, whether the national state is
unitary, decentralised or federal. As it is today, the EU is more akin to the notion of
confederation (Staatenbund), as in the German Bund,18 and the preservation of
sovereign statehood of its constituent polities is part of the project when creating a
new federal polity with common institutions. Arguing, therefore, that the EU is a new
state in the making, or just an international organisation, is missing the point entirely
as to the nature of the European integration process and its legal order, where the
preservation of state sovereign status (self-rule) and the autonomous character of the
union (shared-rule) is essential to the concept of sovereignty in the context of a
federal arrangement, in particular, of the EU.
Those that state that the solution to the problems of 19 the Union is a move towards
statehood,20 fail to understand the relevance and the importance of the different uses
17 On the EU as an international organisation see Karen Alter, Establishing the Supremacy of
European Law: The Making of an International Rule of Law in Europe, Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2003, p. 4. According to some authors, the EU is an example of multi-state
unification, for example, see Jack L. Goldsmith and Eric Posner, The Limits of International
Law, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006, p. 5. These two positions are defensible only if
the modern territorial state is seen as the sole legitimate polity within the Bodinian tradition.
This is one that does not recognise that different institutional arrangements can share
sovereignty and their legal systems, as will be discussed below.
18 On the analogy of the German nineteenth-century confederation (Deutscher Bund) with the
EU and federalism, as models of organisation see Stefan Oeter, ‘Federalism and Democracy,’
in Armin Bogdandy and Jurgen Bast (eds), Principles of European Constitutional Law,
Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2006, pp. 60–61.
19 The problem is related to the nature of sovereignty and the challenges that the EU poses to
modern territorial states within the EU.
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of the concept of federalism in history, particularly the different conceptions of
representation in federal political systems. This chapter will argue with Schmitter that
‘The EC/EU is still “un object politique non-identifie” and that it will be some time
before we discover for sure what type of polity it is going to become’.21 This, the
thesis asserts along with Schmitter, is because of the dynamics of the European
integration process, along with the fact that the EU is not a fixed polity, either
geographically or politically. In order to understand the EU, therefore, it is important
to discuss its institutional architecture.
2.1. Institutional Architecture of the EU22
The EU could be seen as a supranational organisation that evolved from the need for
cooperation, within a stable framework, between the multiple states in Europe and
which culminated in the Treaty of Rome. The EU can also be seen as an institutional
framework holding different institutions that supply certain public goods,23 among
which are peace, security and wealth through market integration.24 An important
insight present in the studies of institutionalism, particularly in historical
institutionalism, is the distinction between the design and establishment of the rules,
in this case the negotiation of the Treaties and the mechanisms of change in the
20 For Example, for: Federico G., Mancini, ‘Europe: The Case for Statehood,’ European Law
Journal, vol. 4, No. 1, 1998; against: Joseph H. Weiler, ‘The Case Against the Case for
Statehood,’ European Law Journal, vol. 4, No. 1, 1998.
21 Philippe C. Schmitter, ‘Imagining the Future of the Euro-Polity with the Help of New
Concepts,’ in Gary Marks, Fritz W. Scharpf, Philippe C. Schmitter and Wolfgang Streeck, et.
al., Governance in the EU, London: Sage Publications, 1996, p. 147.
22 Institutions are not organisations or bodies, but refer to ‘formal or informal constraints that
constrain behaviour’. See Douglass North, Institutions, Institutional Change op. cit., p. 4. On
the application of the tools of institutionalism in the European integration process see
Angelina Topan, The European Integration Process: A Historical and Comparative
Institutional Analysis, London: LIT, 2001.
23 Public goods are goods that have two primary characteristics: they are available for all to
consume (non-exclusion) and are in the public domain (non-rivalry), Inge Kaul et. al.,
Providing Global Public Goods, op. cit. See also Chapter 2 of this thesis on institutions.
24 AngelinaTopan, op. cit., p. 44.
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institutional framework of the EU. As will become clearer during discussion of the
nature of the European legal order, the informal changes25 promoted by the ECJ can
be seen as an unintended consequence, not anticipated by member-states,26 in the
political process. The notion of path-dependence27 may also be relevant to the
discussion in order to explain the future integration process, considering the high
transaction costs of amending the Treaties.28
In the first Pillar of the European Community, a comparative institutional analysis
allows the process of market integration to be viewed from the perspective of the
‘community method’, where decisions or legislation in the political process are
decided by simple majority with member-states, represented at the Council of
Ministers, save otherwise in the Treaty (Article 205 of the Treaty of Rome). Instances
of simple majority voting are now rare, however, and Qualified Majority Voting
(QMV) is the rule. In order to fully understand the mechanisms that drive European
integration, the roles of the political bodies that constitute the EU need to be clarified,
including analysis of the political processes of the institutional framework,
particularly the role of member states.29 In the EU, member states, through the
Council of Ministers (Article 203 of the Treaty of Rome) are the primary actors in the
creation of the legislation. This is a model that mirrors other international
organisations and, also, federal arrangements, and does not replicate the model of the
territorial state, where parliaments are the primary bodies of representation and
25 Considering that the ECJ has been the most important contributor to changes in the
European legal order. This contrasts with formal changes in the Treaties by member states,
see Jeffrey Stacey and Berthold Rittberger, ‘Dynamics of Formal and Informal Institutional
Change in the EU,’ 2003, op. cit.
26 On the unintended consequences in the context of the European integration, see , Angelina
Topan , op. cit.
27 On path-dependence as one of the key mechanisms of institutional change, and the
constraints it imposes on further change, see John Campbell, Institutional Change and
Globalization, Princeton: Princeton University Press, pp. 65–69.
28 On the role of transaction costs see Angelina Topan, op. cit. pp. 23–26.
29 It is not the purpose of this thesis to offer a complete explanation of how the EU functions;
however, a discussion of the problems of sovereignty in the context of the EU demands a
brief exposition of the institutional framework of the EU.
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legislation. Had the EU followed the model of the territorial state, the European
Parliament would be the primary body for legislation but, as it stands, its role as co-
decision-maker in some policy-areas, was expanded with the Treaty of Lisbon.30
The role of the European Commission, in fact, is to be the ‘guardian of the Treaties’,
‘ensure the proper functioning and development of the common market’ (Article 211)
and to own almost exclusive right of initiative in legislation.31
The European Parliament represents a direct attempt to replicate for the Union the
logic of representation of the modern territorial state. The European Parliament is not
a Parliament in the national sense, however, because the legislative organ par
excellence in the EU is the Council, although the European Parliament does oversee
the Commission and does participate in the legislative process through the co-decision
mechanism (Article 251, Treaty of Rome) while, in addition, its role is enhanced with
the Treaty of Lisbon.
This is not the case for the Second Pillar (Common Foreign and Security Policy) or
the Third Pillar (Justice and Home affairs), as these two Pillars remain based in the
intergovernmental process, where unanimity is the rule and the jurisdiction of the ECJ
is not mandatory.32 In the case of the Third Pillar, measures regarding asylum,
immigration, visas, borders and civil law follow the community method of QMV,
while measures regarding policing and criminal law follow the intergovernmental
process.33
Although much of this still holds true, the changes brought about by the Treaty of
Lisbon significantly modified the institutional framework of the EU, which is why it
30 On the role of the Council, see Anthony Arnull, et. al, European Union Law, London:
Sweet & Maxwell, 2006, pp. 32–37.
31 Anthony Arnull, Ibid., pp. 37–44.
32 For discussions about the intergovernmental process of the third Pillar and the extent of
judicial control of the ECJ under the same, see Steve Peers, EU Justice and Home Affairs,
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006, pp. 17–19.
33 On these distinctions, see Steve Peers, Ibid.
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is necessary to discuss some of the provisions of the Treaty and consider their impact
on the relationship between member states and the EU.
2.2. Innovations in the Treaty of Lisbon34
The Treaty of Lisbon is composed of two main Treaties: The Treaty of the European
Union (TEU) and the Treaty on Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), the
former deals with the European Union, while the latter replaces the Treaty on the
European Community (Treaty of Rome),35 where the three-Pillar structure is
eliminated.36
34 It is not the goal of this thesis to offer an extended analysis of the Treaty of Lisbon. The
objective is to discuss some of its key provisions and to look at the extent to which they relate
to the research, particularly the question of sovereignty in the context of a federal polity such
as the EU. The Treaty of Lisbon was approved on 13 December 2007 and is composed of
several Protocols and Declarations. For a full analysis, see the ‘House of Lords, European
Union Committee, Tenth Report of the Session 2007–2008, The Treaty of Lisbon: An Impact
Assessment,’ London: the Stationery Office Limited, 2008, available at:
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200708/ldselect/ldeucom/62/62.pdf [Accessed
20.12.2010]. See also the ‘The Treaty of Lisbon: A Second Look at the Institutional
Innovations, Joint Study, 2010,’ Centre for European Policy Studies, Egmont: European
Policy Centre, available at: http://www.ceps.eu/book/treaty-lisbon-second-look-institutional-
innovations [Accessed 20.10.2010]. The full text of the Treaty is available at: http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/JOHtml.do?uri=OJ:C:2007:306:SOM:EN:HTML [Accessed 22.10.2010]. Also
see Robert Schutze, ‘Lisbon and the Federal Order of Competences: A Prospective Analysis,’
European Law Review, vol. 33, No. 5, 2008.
35 Jean-Claude Pris, The Lisbon Treaty: A Legal and Political Analysis, Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2010, p. 35.
36 Although the Treaty still retains some residual characteristics of the Pillar structure. See
Jean-Claude Pris, Ibid., p. 67; Damien Chalmers, Gareth Davies and Giorgio Monti,
European Union Law, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010, p. 46.
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The Treaty of Lisbon recovers most of the innovations of the defunct project of the
‘European Constitution’.37 The EU legal personality is recognised (Article 47,
TEU).38 The competences of the Union are limited by the principle of conferral
(Article 5, 1/2 TEU), which means that the EU can only act within the limits of the
powers conferred by the member states, and competences not conferred to the EU,
remain with the member states.39
It is of particular significance that the principle of Subsidiarity as seen in the EC
Treaty is recognised (Article 5/3, TEU), because it is in the Protocol on Subsidiarity
and Proportionality that the role of national Parliaments was introduced into the EU
system (Article 12, TEU) via the ‘Early Warning System’,40 and which constitutes an
innovation that actually strengthens the powers of member states in the EU
institutional framework, as Manzanella argues: ‘Deciding to give national Parliaments
a direct role (without government intermediation) which is listed among the
fundamental principles of European Union action, meets a political requirement.’41
The role of states in the common institutions of the EU is thus enhanced, providing a
37 C. W. A. Timmermans, ‘The Genesis and Development of the European Communities and
the European Union,’ in P. J. G Kapteyn, et. al., The Law of the European Communities,
Alphen aan den Rijn: Walters Kluwer, 2008, pp. 42–44.
38 The same principle is expressed in Declaration No. 24 annexed to the Treaty of Lisbon.
39 Jean-Claude Pris, op. cit., p. 82. The US Constitution has a similar provision in the Tenth
Amendment. However, as noted in Chapter 3 on federalism, the Tenth Amendment does not
constitute a limit to federal power, at least not anymore. Declaration 10, annexed to the Treaty
of Lisbon, also recognises the principle of conferral.
40 On the new powers conferred to the national Parliaments in the EU System as an example
of ‘multilevel constitutionalism’ see Ingolf Pernice, ‘The Treaty of Lisbon: Multilevel
Constitutionalism in Action,’ The Columbia Journal of European Law, vol. 15, No. 3, 2009,
pp. 390–391. This will be explored further in the section on the principle of Subsidiarity; see
also ‘House of Lords Tenth Report,’ op. cit., p. 236.
41 Andrea Manzanella, ‘The Role of Parliaments in the Democratic Life of the Union,’ in
Stefano Micosi and Gian Luigi Tosato, The European Union in the Twenty-First Century:
Perspectives from the Treaty of Lisbon, Brussels: Centre for European Policy Studies, 2009,
p. 261.
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contrast with the notion held by those who see the Treaty of Lisbon as promoting
further centralisation and integration.42
The Charter of Fundamental Rights acquires the same legal value as the Treaties, so
that it is in effect ‘constitutionalised’ (Article 6/1, TEU). As in all federal political
systems, the Treaty presents the notion of dual representation by citizens and member
states in the common institutions of the Union, in this case, citizens in the European
Parliament and member states, through the Council.
The European Council is introduced as one of the main institutions of the EU43
(Article 9, TEU), with the creation of a President of the European Council by QMV
for a term of two and a-half years, renewable44 (Article 15/6, TEU). There is a new
method for calculating QMV under which votes are not based on ‘weighted voting’,
but on the notion of ‘double majorities’ (the number of states and number of citizens).
This means that the voting has two criteria: to include at least 55 percent of the total
number of member states and 65 percent of the European population45 (Article 16,
TEU); overall, in the Treaty, QMV is extended to around twenty new areas.46
The Treaty of Lisbon provides a new High Representative of the Union for Foreign
Affairs and Security Policy appointed for a five-year term (Article 18/3, TEU), who is
42 Jean-Claude Pris, op. cit. pp. 122–130.
43 The Previous five institutions included the European Parliament, The Council (of
Ministers), The European Commission, the European Court of Justice and the European Court
of Auditors. See Jean-Claude Pris, op. cit., p. 205. Now there are seven institutions, which
include the European Council (heads of government of the member states, (Articles 15, 2,
TEU)) and the European Central Bank. See P. J. G Kapteyn et. al, The Law of the European
Communities, op. cit., p. 175.
44 Jean-Claude Pris, op. cit., p. 207. Nigel Smith, ‘Europe after Lisbon: Who Will Run the EU
Once the Dust has Settled?’ Social and Political Review, vol. 20, 2010.
45 Although this new method will only apply from the 1 November 2014, Jean-Claude Pris,
op. cit., p. 213.
46 Jean-Claude Pris, op. cit., p. 212. On QMV see Stephen C. Sieberson, ‘Inching toward EU
Supranationalism? Qualified Majority Voting and Unanimity under the Treaty of Lisbon,’
Virginia Journal of International Law, vol. 50, No. 4, 2010.
152
selected from one of the Vice-Presidents of the Commission (Article 18/4, TEU), and
who chairs the Foreign Affairs Council (Article 18/2, TEU).
The right of withdrawal from the EU by member states is explicitly stated (Article 50,
TEU), ending the legal debate about the legality of withdrawal.47
The Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (TFEU) replaces the EC Treaty, and makes
significant changes; many of them already part of the case law of the ECJ. The TFEU
delineates the sphere of competences48 of the Union by dividing it into exclusive
competences (Article 2/1, TFEU), shared competences (Articles 2/2; 4, TFEU) and
coordinated competences (Article 2/5, TFEU).
The powers of the European Parliament are strengthened in the co-decision procedure,
now called ‘ordinary legislative procedure’,49 in the appointment of the European
Commission, its President, and the New High Representative, as well as in many
other areas.50
The Democratic Principle of the EU is expressed in the new ‘Citizens’ Initiative’
which allows citizens of the member states to invite the Commission to submit
proposals for adoption of certain legal acts (Article 11/4, TEU).
The jurisdiction of the ECJ has been extended after the Lisbon Treaty and now covers
the whole Area of Freedom and Justice (‘Old third Pillar’). There is also an extension
to the scope for actions of annulment by individuals (for instance, actions for
47 Joseph H. Weiler, ‘The Transformation of Europe,’ Yale Law Journal, vol. 100, 1991, p.
2412.
48 On the division of competencies see Finn Laursen, ‘The (Reform) Treaty of Lisbon: What’s
in it? How Significant?’ Jean Monnet / Robert Schuman Paper Series, University of Miami,
vol. 9, No. 1, 2009, pp. 7–8.
49 Herve Bribosia, ‘The Main Institutional Innovations in the Lisbon Treaty,’ in Stephan
Griller and Jacques Ziller (eds), The Lisbon Treaty: EU Constitutionalism without a
Constitutional Treaty, Vienna: Springer Wien New York, 2008, p. 61.
50 For an overview of these changes, see Pris, op. cit., pp. 118–120. The EP is seen as one of
the beneficiaries after Lisbon, see Jean-Claude Pris, op. cit. p. 235.
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annulment against acts of the European Council). The ECJ is renamed as the ‘Court of
Justice of the European Union’, while the Court of First Instance is now called the
‘General Court’.51
The powers of the European Commission have also been increased with the Lisbon
Treaty, in particular in relation to the TFEU, which now requires unanimity in the
Council when amending proposals if the Commission does not agree with the
amendment (Article 293).52
3. Supranationalism v. Federalism in the EU Context
The origins of the concept of supranationalism can be traced back to 1951 and the
creation of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC).53 The ‘High Authority’
was the first European body considered as ‘supranational’. The special provisions of
the ECSC Treaty made it a novelty,54 and the same formula was included in the EC
Treaty of Rome. There are, however, problems with supranationalism as a legal
concept, particularly regarding its normativity,55 and precisely because of the negative
connotations that surround it; that it is seen as neither national nor international.56
51 Jean-Claude Pris, op. cit., pp. 231–232.
52 Jean-Claude Pris, op. cit., p. 225.
53 See, Article 9/5 of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), the Community was
supposed to be a first step for a ‘European federation’ according to post-war visionaries such
as the French foreign minister Robert Schuman, http://europa.eu/abc/symbols/9-
may/decl_en.htm [Accessed 20.12.12]. On the ECSC, European Political Community and the
European Defence Community see Martin J. Dedman, The Origins and Development of the
EU 1945–95, London: Routledge, 1996.
54 For a brief historical overview of the literature at the time regarding the ECSC, see Robert
Schutze, ‘On “Federal Ground”’, The EU as an (Inter)national Phenomenon,’ Common
Market Law Review, vol. 46, No. 4, 2009, pp. 1070–77.
55 Armin von Bogdandy, ‘Constitutional Principles,’ in Armin Bogdandy and Jurgen Bast
(eds), Principles of European Constitutional Law, Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2006, p. 40.
56 For an early account of supranationalism and its relationship with sovereignty see Forrest L.
Grieves, Supranationalism and International Adjudication, Urbana: University of Illinois
Press, 1969, pp. 10–18.
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In order to comprehend European integration, the importance of the ECJ in the
process of ‘constitutionalization’ of the Treaties should be acknowledged, defined as:
‘the process by which the EC treaties have evolved from a set of legal arrangements
binding upon sovereign states, into a vertically integrated legal regime conferring
judicially enforceable rights and obligations on all legal persons and entities, public
and private, within EC territory’.57
This process was defined by a set of bold decisions on the part of the ECJ in
upholding the European legal order; a new legal order distinct from Public
International Law, and which stated that the Treaties are the ‘basic constitutional
charter’ of the EU.58 Earlier studies about European integration, inspired by
functionalist arguments59deemed the European Communities as supranational
following the aforementioned ECSC model.
3.1. Federalism and the EU
The contribution of federalism as a concept to the study of European integration rests
not only in the desire to recover a lost tradition in political theory, but also the will to
justify federalism by demonstrating that the concept fits a polity –not defined by
either Public International or National Law – but which exists by way of the legal
57 Alec Stone Sweet and James Caporaso, ‘From Free Trade to Supranational Polity: The
European Court and Integration,’ in Wayne Sandholtz and Alec Stone Sweet (eds), European
Integration and Supranational Governance, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998, p. 102.
58 ‘It must first be emphasized in this regard that the European Economic Community is a
Community based on the rule of law, inasmuch as neither its member states nor its institutions
can avoid a review of the question whether the measures adopted by them are in conformity
with the basic constitutional charter, the Treaty’. Partie Ecologist “Les Verts” v. European
Parliament, Para. 23, Case 294/84, 1986 and Opinion 1/91 on the European Economic Area
Treaty,1991, 2 CMLR, 217.
59 Particularly relevant are the theories of David Mitrany and Ernst Haas as the ‘fathers’ of
functionalism, see David Mitrany, ‘The Prospect of Integration: Federal or Functional?’
Journal of Common Market Studies, vol. 4, No. 2, 1965.
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arrangement that created a new legal ‘supranational’ order. The inadequacies found in
the concept of supranationalism reside in its perceived negative character; through the
reluctance to see the EU as a ‘classic’ international organisation. This ambivalence
relates to the transformations of its legal framework led by the ECJ, as Schutze
emphasises: ‘The Court has insisted on the “normative” autonomy of the European
legal order and this “originality hypothesis” severed the umbilical cord with the
international legal order’.60 With this statement in mind:
Given its normative vocation and its amenability to characterisation
pursuant to ‘comparative pluralist approaches’, federalism may be seen
to offer a practical starting point for the analysis of the EU politics.61
Michael Burgess, in seeking to avoid the dichotomy between federation and
confederation62 prefers the term ‘federality’ to express the novelty and uniqueness of
European integration, but he nonetheless concludes by saying that, ‘The EU is already
a federal polity in the extent to which its values, institutions, policies and procedures
conform to an unprecedented interlacing of basic, federal and confederal principles’.63
It is important to remember when seeking to adopt a federal framework for the EU
that the role of the member states in the Council is perhaps the most important
position, because it ensures the appropriate type of representation within the EU.
Considering this, therefore, if member states delegate or transfer their powers to a
European Parliament, they are forsaking the federal model of representation in favour
of a state-centric view of representation, where adequate representation must be
60 Robert Schutze, ‚‘On “Federal Ground”’, 2009, op. cit, p. 29. See section 4 of this chapter
of the thesis on the nature of the European legal order.
61 Michael Longo, Constitutionalising Europe, op. cit. p. 29; for a more critical tone on the
‘slippery’ nature of the literature when applying the federalism framework to the study of the
EU, see Philippe Schmitter, ‘Is Euro-Federalism a Solution or a Problem? Tocqueville
Inverted, Perverted or Subverted?’ in Lynn Dobson and Andreas Follesdal (eds), Political
Theory and European Constitution, London: Routledge, 2004, pp. 11–12.
62 Michael Burgess, Federalism and the EU: The Building of Europe, 1950–2000, London:
Routledge, 2000, p. 255.
63 Burgess, Ibid., p. 270.
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undertaken directly by individuals within the institutions. If this were to be the case,
that could abolish the role of federalism which is to preserve member states’
autonomy as irreducible polities that participate as units in the European integration
process. This relates to the current debate in the literature about ‘democratic deficit’64
in the EU, which identifies the need to further democratic participation of member
states in the light of the increasing role of EU bodies in the European integration
process. The complexities of this debate are great, as Scott stresses:
Although it need not be the case that democracy in the EU mirrors that
of its member states, it must at least do a better job than present EU
governance in terms of providing its citizens with opportunities to
participate in its law-making.65
The idea of a ‘democratic deficit’ is based on the logic of representation of the
modern territorial state, which completely disregards the logic of representation of
federal political systems.66
In federal political systems – and the EU, it might be argued, is not an exception –
representation is based primarily on the participation of the constituent units (member
states) in the common institutions of the federal arrangement, given the need to
preserve the sovereignty of states. The Treaty of Lisbon, by increasing the role of
national Parliaments in the EU decision-making process, acknowledges in many ways
the distinction between these two different logics of representation. The Treaty
acknowledges the need to enhance national participation, not just through the Council
where the executives of the member states are represented, but also through an
64 As a result of the centralisation of power in the EU which also relates to the legitimacy of
the EU; on the democratic deficit debate see Simon Hix, The Political System of the EU,
Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005, pp. 177–80.
65 Sinoaidh Douglas-Scott, Constitutional Law of the EU, Harlow: Longman, 2002, p. 521.
66 As was noted in Chapter 3.5 of this thesis, representation in federal political systems should
ensure the political participation of the units in the common institutions of the federal
arrangement.
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increased direct role of national Parliaments in the common European political
process.67
Adopting federalism as a political theory to analyse European integration, refocuses
understanding of how the different legal systems – European and national – are
articulated in the EU, which – from the point of view of the author – is a federal
arrangement according to its genus, but a confederation according to type,68 although,
as Wallace points out, this classification is in itself problematic:
I do not intend to imply by the label ‘confederation’ that the current
state of European cooperation is satisfactory or stable. In the adverse
conditions of the last decade, it may, perhaps be a matter for modest
satisfaction that the Community has survived, with so little damage to
its basic structure. One can discern contradictory trends of integration or
disintegration.69
Nonetheless, the rapid changes and the different transformations that the EU has
undergone still pose challenging questions as to the nature of the European polity, but
this does not mean that federalism is an inappropriate tool to use in order to analyse
the Union. For some, like David Mitrany, federalism could not capture the totality of
67 See this chapter, 4.2 for the Treaty of Lisbon, particularly the new Protocol on Subsidiarity
and Proportionality.
68 To use Elazar’s term: ‘post-modern confederation’. See Daniel Elazar, ‘The United States
and the EU,’ in The Federal Vision, 2001, op. cit., p. 48, and against this view, Robert
Schutze, who argued in favour of federalism, seeing it as a better approach to the study of the
EU and who described the EU as a ‘federation of states’: Robert Schutze, ‘On “Federal
Ground”,’ op. cit., p. 1102. Although Schutze’s approach in using federalism to study the EU
is largely compatible with the view held by the author of this thesis it is not possible,
however, to follow his conclusion that the EU is a federation. This is for reasons that are
discussed in the subsection to this chapter on constitutionalism, and also because this
assertion mischaracterises the nature and diversity of federal political systems, which
encompass states and unions of states, as noted in Chapter 2 of this thesis.
69 William Wallace, ‘Europe as a Confederation: The Community and the Nation-State,’
Journal of Common Market Studies, vol. 20, 1982, p. 63.
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the European experience, and as such, ‘it is plain that European federalism has been a
blend of myth and some very mixed sentiments’.70 However, these early authors
writing about the European Community, understood federalism in the sense of the
American federal experiences, which they reduced to a notion of ‘a federation’, thus
committing the reductionist fallacy. Part of the problem was related to the post-war
projects in Europe, which proposed the creation of a European federation.71 This
distinction has been pointed out in both the legal and the political literature72 as noted
by Burgess:
The federal idea is also an organising concept that is essentially anti-
absolutist, anti-centralist, its watchwords being autonomy, solidarity,
pluralism, citizenship, and a subsidiarity that has implications for the
building up of a union from the bottom upwards rather than a
hierarchical top down approach.73
What is proposed in this thesis is a theory of federalism within the Althusian tradition,
in which member-states decide to participate in the European integration process
voluntarily, and participate in European integration as individual units. This means
preservation of their sphere of action – or sovereignty – and, in particular, it means
that European integration does not abolish sovereign statehood.
As will be seen in subsequent sections, the nature of the legal order in the EU does not
warrant an interpretation of the EU as a sovereign state, or indeed, as an international
organisation. The limitations of other theories of integration rest in the fact that they
offer a limited explanation of the concept of sovereignty in the context of the EU.
70 David Mitrany, ‘The Prospect of Integration,’ op. cit., p. 135.
71 This was the Schuman plan, see the Schuman Declaration. The view that these proto-
European plans have ‘stained’ debates on federalism by reducing federalism to a federation is
also found in Robert Schutze, ‘On “Federal Ground”,’ op. cit.
72 See the distinction inaugurated by Preston King and Daniel Elazar between federation and
federalism, and the distinctions between the two concepts presented in Chapter 3 of this
thesis.
73 Michael Burgess, Federalism and the EU, op. cit. p. 30; Antje Wiener and Thomas Diez,
European Integration Theory, Oxford: Oxford, University Press, 2004.
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Liberal Intergovernmentalism as a theory of integration is not consistent with the
autonomy of the different bodies in the institutional processes in the EU, particularly
with regard to the role played by the ECJ in developing EU Law. It also has limited
explanatory power in explaining the federal features of the European legal order,
because for intergovernmentalism to be plausible, one would expect to find a legal
system based on rules of Public International Law, and a larger role for the political
process in the EU, in which member states are the primary actors. As will be
discussed, this is not the case. A problem with the integrationist-theory approach rests
in the fact that it is deeply state-centric, and in being so, it risks committing a category
error by equating the EU with a ‘classic international organisation’. As Weiler asserts,
‘The Union, it is generally accepted, is not a state. The result is a description of
oranges with a botanical vocabulary developed for apples.’74
A comparative institutional analysis is necessary, therefore, to assess the role of the
judicial process in the construction of the European Community – now the EU –75 and
to look at the role played by different actors in the transnational political process
which led to the development of the European political and legal order.
4. The Nature of the European Legal Order
The European legal order as an autonomous legal system distinct from Public
International Law, was the creation of the different actors in the European judicial
process (national supreme courts, private litigants and member states), led by the ECJ.
74 Joseph H. Weiler, The Constitution of Europe: ‘Do the New Clothes Have an Emperor?’
and Other Essays on European Integration, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999, p.
268.
75 For a discussion on the limitations of Liberal Intergovernmentalism, particularly the narrow
focus on Treaty negotiations and issues of unanimity as inaugurated by Moravcsik, see
Andrew Moravcsik, The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power, from Messina
to Maastricht, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998; see also Frank Schimmelfennig,
‘Liberal Intergovernmentalism,’ in Antje Wiener and Thomas Diez, European Integration
Theory, op. cit., p. 81.
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More importantly, the European legal system did not serve the interests of member
states only, but those of all the different actors involved.76
To explain the role and importance of the Court and the judicial process in European
integration, particularly in developing and ‘constitutionalising’ a supranational legal
framework, there is no one better than Stein to paint the picture:
Tucked away in the fairyland Duchy of Luxembourg and blessed, until
recently with benign neglect by the powers that be and the mass media,
the Court of Justice of the European Communities has fashioned a
constitutional framework for a federal-type structure in Europe.77
The ‘constitutionalization’ of the Treaties was the result of a process in which the ECJ
interpreted the Treaties, not as mere international legal instruments in the light of the
Vienna Convention of Law of Treaties, but as the constitutional charter of the member
states and the peoples of Europe; a virtual ‘demos’. This interpretation led the Court to
establish the doctrine of ‘direct effect’78 in which the Court determined that the
application of Community Law would be done by reference to EC institutions,
particularly the Court, and not by domestic political institutions of member states
76 Alec Stone Sweet, ‘The European Court and Integration,’ in Martin Shapiro and Alec Stone
Sweet (eds), On Law, Politics and Judicialization, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002, p.
280.
77 Eric Stein, ‘Lawyers, Judges and the Making of the Transnational Constitution,’ American
Journal of International Law, vol. 75, No. 1, 1981, p. 1; see also the discussion by Joseph
Weiler, The Constitution of Europe, op. cit. p. 225.
78 The doctrine of direct effect refers to the direct applicability of community norms in the
sphere of private litigants and not just member states. Another important corollary is that
European Law status is a matter for the ECJ to decide, Van Gend en Loos v. Nederlandse
Administratie Belastingen, ECJ case 26/62, (1963) ECR 1, CMLR 105. In commenting on the
importance of the ‘direct effect’ doctrine, Arnull stresses: ‘The fact that direct effect is
nowadays taken for granted, even its very usefulness questioned, is testimony to the sureness
of the Court’s touch in the early 1960s: the vision and courage which lay behind that crucial
first step should not pass unnoticed’. Anthony Arnull, The European Union and its Court of
Justice, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006, p. 168.
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themselves including national courts, and that the application would create legal rights
for individuals.
As Alec Stone Sweet argues:
Beyond the founding of the EC itself, the single most important
institutional innovation in the history of European integration has been
the constitutionalization of the Treaty of Rome. The ECJ, in complicity
with the national judges and private litigants, constructed the legal
system on the basis of a sustained commitment to making EC law
effective within national legal orders.79
The process of constitutionalization took place within the first Pillar under the edifice
of the Common Market, and it was directly connected to the creation of the most
important principles of European Law: the doctrine of Supremacy and Direct Effect,
as Shapiro argues:
Surely everyone assumed that the Court would consider the Treaties as
supreme, that is overruling conflicting acts of the Member States. That
is what Treaties are for. The Court’s great bootstrapping operation was,
of course, its case law creating direct effect so that the Treaties and the
secondary laws made under them came to have the kind of supremacy
that occurs in federal, constitutional states rather than international
organisations operating under international law. And, as everyone
79 Alec Stone Sweet, The Judicial Construction of Europe, Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2004, p. 19. It is also important to point out that the ‘constitutionalization’ of the Treaties is a
different process from ‘institutionalisation’ because the former implies a claim to higher law
in the European legal system. Thus it relates to the process of constitutionalism beyond the
state, as will be discussed below in the section on constitutionalism. On ‘institutionalisation’
see J. L. Goldstein et. al., ‘Introduction: Legalization and World Politics,’ International
Organization, vol. 54, No. 3, 2000, pp. 378–79.
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knows, this shift in the meaning of supremacy was greatly magnified by
the flourishing of the Article 177 reference system.80
4.1. The ECJ and the National Supreme and Constitutional Courts
The European legal system developed by the ECJ is of a different nature to Public
International Law. Its sphere of application is, however, similar to the framework
found in federal political systems, particularly considering the direct effect and
supremacy of EU law, which begs the question, which Court is the ultimate umpire in
disputes over European Law, the European Court or the national Constitutional
Courts? This ‘decisive question’81 relates to the issue of articulation of national legal
orders within the European legal order. The reason this question arises at all is that,
historically, member states were willing to accept the authority of ECJ and the role of
the national courts and governments in accepting this new legal order, which
participating in the interpretation and application of European Law, was also very
instrumental. It is in this way that the roles of both the ECJ and national courts should
be understood as a dialogue, whereby national courts request the ECJ, through the
preliminary ruling system, a ruling on the proper interpretation of European Law, as
Maduro points out:
A further important element in securing the legitimacy and authority of
both the European Court of Justice and EC law was co-operation with
national courts. This was also enhanced by the individual rights flowing
from the European Economic Constitution (notably free movement
rules). The role played by national courts in requesting rulings from the
80 Martin Shapiro, ‘The European Court of Justice,’ in Paul Craig and Grainne de Burca, The
Evolution of EU Law, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999, p. 330. Article 177 (now
Article 234) refers to the Preliminary Ruling System in which national courts may refer a case
to the ECJ where an interpretation of European Law might be under dispute. See L. Neville
Brown and Tom Kennedy, The Court of Justice of the European Communities, London:
Sweet & Maxwell, 2000.
81 Theodor Schilling, ‘The Autonomy of the Community Legal Order – An Analysis of
Possible Foundations,’ Harvard International Law Journal, vol. 37, 1996, p. 404.
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ECJ and in applying these rulings provided ECJ decisions with the same
authority of national court decisions and gave these decisions added
values of both neutrality and of legitimacy in being sanctioned by a
court of the State against which the judgement had gone.82
First, in order to explore the relationship between the different legal orders at the
European level, it is necessary to point out the uniqueness of the European legal order
and to distinguish it from Public International Law. Second, it is necessary to
understand the limitations of traditional answers, monism and dualism,83 and to
discuss the notion of constitutional pluralism84 as a plausible alternative in the
comprehension of EU Law, as Weiler argues:
The constitutional discourse in Europe must be conceived as a
conversation of many actors in a constitutional interpretive community,
rather than a hierarchical structure with the ECJ at the top. 85
The European legal order, considering the different principles of European Law and
its direct applicability by member states, is akin to those found in federal states.86
82 Miguel Poiares Maduro, We The Court: The European Court of Justice and European
Economic Constitution, Oxford: Hart Publishing, 1998, p. 9.
83 On monism and dualism as theories by which to understand the nature of the relationship
between domestic legal systems and International Law, see Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public
International Law, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003, pp. 31–34; Antonio Cassese,
International Law, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005, pp. 213–37.
84 On Constitutional Pluralism see Neil MacCormick, Questioning Sovereignty: Law, State
and Nation in the European Commonwealth, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999, pp. 97–
121. On Maduro’s version of constitutional pluralism, see Miguel Poiares Maduro,
‘Contrapunctual Law: Europe’s Constitutional Pluralism in Action,’ in Neil Walker (ed.),
Sovereignty in Transition, Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2003. See also Evgeni Tanchev,
‘Supremacy of Constitutions in the Context of Constitutional Pluralism,’ in Jaap W. Zwaan
(ed.) et. al., The EU, an Ongoing Process of Integration: Liber Amicorum; Alfred E.
Kellermann, The Hague: TMC Asser Press, 2004.
85 Joseph H. Weiler, The Constitution of Europe, op. cit. p. 322.
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The process of development of European law led by the ECJ did not occur without
obstacles or opposition. A proper understanding of the European legal order,
therefore, needs to address the ongoing dialogue between the ECJ and the different
national Constitutional and Supreme courts. This is especially relevant to the current
discussion about the concept of sovereignty and the limits and nature of the European
legal order. Particularly important in this regard is the case law of the German Federal
Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht) on European integration.87 The
principle of Supremacy of European Law88 means that national courts have a duty to
abstain from applying national legal rules that are inconsistent with European Law.
The question here, therefore, relates to the discussion about who has ultimate
authority in a given legal system to interpret the rules or the problems of Kompetenz-
Kompetenz.
This discussion assumes particular relevance because of the changes introduced after
the Maastricht Treaty. Until then, European integration was viewed widely as
essentially negative, focused mainly on the build-up to the Common Market, through
the removal of the barriers and obstacles to trade, and to enforce the four freedoms.89
86 On the federal framework of European Law, see Joseph H. Weiler, ‘Federalism Without
Constitutionalism’, op. cit.
87 The German Federal Constitutional Court (hereinafter FCC) decisions have been identified
in the literature as the most relevant because of the importance of Germany in the European
integration process, and also because of the substantive issues raised, which the ECJ took as
relevant, particularly in the area of fundamental rights.
88 Flaminio Costa v ENEL, Case 6/64, 1964, ECJ. The ECJ also upheld the supremacy of
secondary community Law, even over national constitutional norms Internationale
Handelsgesellschaft, Case 11/70, 1970, ECJ. The ECJ also held that domestic legislation
would be rendered inapplicable if in conflict with Community Law, and stated that national
courts and national authorities, in general, were under a duty to set aside conflicting domestic
rules that might impair the full application of European Law, Amministrazione delle Finanze
dello Stato v. Simmenthal S. p.A. Case 106/77, ECJ.
89 The protection of the four freedoms (goods, capital, persons and services) even after the
Treaty of Lisbon, are still at the core of European integration and the protection of a Common
Market. See K. J. M. Mortelmans, ‘The Functioning of the Internal Market,’ in C.W.A.
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The Maastricht Treaty in 1992 marked a new era in European integration, through the
creation of the EU and the expansion of its competences.90 It is in this context that the
debate about the concept of sovereignty in a supranational organisation with an
expanded mandate and powers takes place.
4.2. Kompetenz-Kompetenz91
This discussion has led to the famous Solange decisions92 by the FCC which decided
that the core of fundamental rights guaranteed by the German Constitution (the Basic
Timmermans, ‘The Genesis and Development of the European Communities and the
European Union’ in The Law of the European Communities, op. cit., pp. 575–78.
90 On the changes and innovations brought about after Maastricht, particularly the creation of
the EU, see Martin J. Dedman, The Origins and Development, op. cit., pp. 93–129; Michael J.
Baun, An Imperfect Union: The Maastricht Treaty and the New Politics of European
Integration, Oxford: Westview Press, 1996; Andrew Duff, John Pinder and Roy Pryce (eds),
Maastrichtt and Beyond, London: Routledge, 1994.
91 ‘Competences of Competences’, the German term is salient because of its importance in the
literature, and because of the objections of the German Federal Constitutional Court on the
ability to determine its own competences. In the context of the current discussion, this might
refer to the debates about who has the power to decide on the interpretation of the powers of
the EU, and also, to the most fundamental question of all: who has the power to decide on its
own powers. See Gunnar Beck, ‘The Problem of Kompetenz-Kompetenz: A Conflict Between
Right and Right in Which There is No Praetor,’ European Law Review, vol. 30, No. 1, 2005.
92 Solange I (BverGE 37, 271, 1974) at:
http://www.utexas.edu/law/academics/centers/transnational/work_new/german/case.php?id=5
88 [Accessed 16.12.2010]; and Solange II: (BverGE 73, 339, 1986)
http://www.utexas.edu/law/academics/centers/transnational/work_new/german/case.php?id=5
72 [Accessed 16.12.2010]. For a discussion of both decisions in the context of German
Constitutional Law see Anne Peters, ‘The Bananas Decision (2000) of the German Federal
Constitutional Court: Towards Reconciliation with the European Court of Justice as Regards
Fundamental Rights Protection in Europe,’ German Yearbook of International Law, vol. 43,
2000.
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Law or ‘Grundgesetez’) must not be abrogated by Community Law.93 These decisions
are related to two explicit exceptions placed by the German Court on the principle of
supremacy of European Law: the protection of fundamental rights, the other exception
being acts of the Union that might be ultra vires;94 where the German Court declares
the power to review acts of the Union that might violate the principle of attribution of
competences or principle of conferral in the Treaties, as Chalmers argues:
The principle of conferred powers expresses two complementary ideals.
One is that of limited government: the EU is to operate only in specific,
confined fields. It has no general law-making power. The other is
derived government: the EU has only such powers as are assigned to it
by the Treaties.95
In the famous decision of Maastricht-Urteil96 the FCC declared that the EU was
composed of an ‘association of sovereign states’ (Staatenverbund). That decision
conflicted with the ECJ interpretation, however, which held the view that only
93 On the role that the Solange decisions had in actually strengthening the protection for
fundamental rights in Europe see Steve J. Boom, ‘The EU after the Maastricht Decision: Will
Germany be the Virginia of Europe?’ The American Journal for Comparative Law, vol. 43,
No. 2, 1995, p. 181.
94 For a discussion of these two exceptions in German Constitutional Doctrine see Hans-Peter
Holz, ‘The Approach to European Law in German Legal Doctrine,’ in Peter-Christian Muller-
Graff and Erling Selvig (eds), The Approach to European Law, Berlin: BWW, 2004; on the
concept of ultra vires and its definition see Paul Craig, Administrative Law, London: Sweet &
Maxwell, 2008, pp. 5–18.
95 Damian Chalmers, et. al., European Union Law, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2006, p. 211.
96 Manfred Brunner and Others v The EU Treaty (Cases 2 BvR 2134/92 & 2159/92), available
at Common Market Law Reports 1994, vol. I. The Maastricht Treaty also created the need for
a Constitutional amendment in Germany, for a discussion of the decision of the Court in the
context of Germany’s Constitution, see Sabine Michalowski and Lorna Woods, German
Constitutional Law, Aldershot: Ashgate, 1999, pp. 63–66.
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Community Courts (ECJ) had the competence to review the legality of acts of the
Community.97
In discussing the legacy of the Maastricht decision, Cruz observed: ‘We have seen
that the Maastricht-Urteil is not part of legal history: it is well alive’.98 The grounding
of the discussion by the German Federal Constitutional Court somehow determined
the context of the debates that followed in other constitutional Courts.99 It is for these
reasons that the concerns of the FCC are taken as the most salient case to express
some of the issues that the various Constitutional and Supreme Courts of the nation
states deemed relevant to include in a discussion on the process of European
integration.
The challenges of the different national courts are not based – in the view of the
author – on a simplistic representation of an old view of ‘state’s sovereignty’ by the
national Constitutional Courts, and a ‘modern’ supranational view of the ECJ as a
result of European integration. Rather, it demonstrates the problems of the European
constitutional order, its limits, and the problems associated with building new legal
arrangements beyond the modern territorial state. In summary, the Maastricht decision
could be seen evidence of the FCC’s concern to be part of the debate on sovereignty
in a multilevel polity, as Kirchoff agues:
97 Case 314/85 Foto-Frost, ECR, 1987, ECJ.
98 Julio Baquero Cruz, ‘The Legacy of the Maastricht-Urteil and the Pluralist movement,’
European University Working Paper, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, 2007/13,
p. 23.
99 On the Italian Constitutional Court decision of reserving the ultimate word, the so called
“Frontini reservation” 1974 2 CMLR, 372 concerning Maastricht, see Marta Catarbia, ‘The
Legacy of Sovereignty in the Italian Constitutional Debate,’ in Neil Walker (ed.), Sovereignty
in Transition, Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2003. On the Danish Supreme Court concerning
Maastricht, Sten Harck and Henrik Palmer Olsen, American Journal of International Law,
vol. 93, No. 1, 1999, pp. 209–14. On the Judgement of the Spanish Constitutional Court
regarding the project of the European Constitution, see CMLR, 2005, 1, pp. 981–1019. On the
Polish Constitutional Court regarding the Polish accession to the EU, see Chalmers, et. al., op.
cit., 2006, pp. 199–201.
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Were the entire power to decide disputes allotted to the European
Community, then one basic condition of legal dispute resolution would
be absent from the outset: equality of legal armaments among parties to
the conflict.100
In the EU, if the old notion of sovereignty is ‘dead’, no one announced the death of
the sovereignty of the state as a unitary actor in International Law. Furthermore,
federalism, according to the author of this thesis, in following the Althusian tradition,
and rejecting the identification of federalism with the particular federal-type known as
‘a federation’,101 offers a superior explanation as to the nature of the transference of
powers to the EU; the sharing of the ‘atom’ of sovereignty in limited areas, and the
counter-claim by member states of keeping sovereignty for themselves, defined as the
ultimate authority. Considering the diversity of federal political systems, the claim
that sovereignty still resides with the member states, does not contradict the view that
sovereignty can reside also in the common federal political system, which is closer to
the type known as a confederation.
Here, the model of state-centrality in ascertaining the contours of sovereignty is
rejected, but this should not lead to a replacement of the state and its claim to
sovereignty by the supranational or federal political system. It is important to
emphasise, therefore, that these claims are not incompatible; that in any case, the
sovereign status of the EU is based historically and factually on the transfer of powers
by member states. Thus, assuming that the modern territorial state is where the
plenitude of powers rest (plena potestas), sovereignty should be seen as a concept that
can be applicable beyond the state; to a plural governance system that includes
different polities sharing and articulating in a constructive relationship, maintaining
their own sphere of power, and with consideration for their individual claims to
authority.
100 Paul Kirchoff, ‘The Balance of Powers Between National and European Institutions,’
European Law Journal, vol. 5, No. 3, 1999, p. 232.
101 A federation is still a sovereign state and not a union of states, on the ‘federation’
proposals for Europe after the war see Chapter 3.5.2 of this thesis.
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It is difficult, however, to see this working in the case of the EU, which is based on a
European demos rather than the multiple demoi,102 because European integration has
not yet reached the stage of a single European demos based on a civic ideal. 103
Highlighting these decisions has been an important exercise, particularly to illustrate
that the ECJ has been assertive in ensuring that the development and application of
the rules of the Treaties were not written in stone, and that, therefore, they found
resistance in the national courts of the member states. The Constitutional Court in
Germany is one example of that resistance, which was grounded not only in national
assertiveness, but should be seen as a dialogue that has been taking place since the
beginning of the European integration process, and which will certainly continue. The
discussions will include the ‘borders’ of the European legal framework, its
competences against those of the member states, and ultimately, an analysis of the
nature of sovereignty in the Union.
The sphere of Community powers was determined and discussed by the ECJ in the
Casagrande case104where the ECJ held the view that Community competences should
102 Different peoples of Europe sharing together in a common polity – the EU – but primarily
through their own states; against this view is Weiler, who argues that people can be part of
different demoi as well as a single European one based on a civic ideal. See Joseph H. Weiler,
‘Does Europe Needs a Constitution? Demos, Telos and the German Maastricht Decision,’
European Law Journal, vol. 1, No. 3, 1995. See also Habermas’s notion of ‘constitutional
patriotism’ and how it could be applicable to Europe, Jurgen Habermas, The Postnational
Constellation, Cambridge: Polity Press, 2004, p. 74. For an argument about the impossibility
of a constitutional patriotism, see Mattias Kumm, ‘Why Europeans Will not Embrace
Constitutional Patriotism,’ International Journal of Constitutional Law, vol. 6, No. 1, 2008.
On analogies between European identity and American federalism see Paul Magnette and
Justine Lacroix, ‘EU Constitutionalism and the ‘American Experience,’ in Grainne de Burca
and Joanne Scott, Law and New Governance in the EU and the US, Oxford: Hart Publishing,
2006.
103 This was the argument of the German FCC in its decision regarding the Maastricht Treaty
and the Lisbon Treaty.
104 Case 9/74, Casagrande, ECR, 1974. See also Joseph H. Weiler, ‘The Transformation of
Europe,’ op. cit. 1991, pp. 2403–483.
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be seen autonomously without any reference to member states, and that the remaining
powers of member states must be exercised against the framework of Community
Law. It is this interpretation of Community powers that led the FCC to re-evaluate EU
Law and its scope, particularly concerning ultra vires acts. The debate about the EU
and its legal framework also reflects a wider discussion relating to two different
conceptions of sovereignty in German legal scholarship, these in turn relate to two
distinct legal traditions in Germany as well,105 and, as Murkens reminds us: ‘The
relationship between national and European law can be analysed from two
diametrically opposed standpoints: one rooted in the tradition of the state, and the
other on the tradition of the constitution’.106
The line of reasoning in the decisions of the FCC, particularly in the Maastricht
decision, do emphasise the notion that only the ‘Nation-state’ or modern territorial
state can have a Constitution, and that non-state entities such as the EU – because they
do not have a demos or nation – is not a state, and that, therefore, there is no
constituent process107 at the European level, and that being so, the conclusion will be
that the locus of sovereignty still resides at the national level. Furthermore, the limited
attribution of sovereign rights results from the fact that the European peoples at the
105 For the distinction between Staatsrecht (State Law) and its state centrality, and the
Verfassungsrecht (Constitutional Law) and its centrality to the Constitution, see Jo Eric
Khushal Murkens, ‘The Future of Staatsrecht: Dominance, Demise or Demystification?’
Modern Law Review, vol. 70, No. 5, 2007, pp. 731–58; similarly, Miriam Aziz, ‘Sovereignty
Uber Alles,’ in Neil Walker (ed.), Sovereignty in Transition, Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2003,
pp. 279–304.
106 Murkens, op.cit. p. 740.
107 On the constituent process, of particular relevance is the distinction between constituent
power and constituted power. Pouvouir constituant, or constitutive power, is the foundational
moment of a Constitution, the constitutional act by the people (demos) of the creation of a
new constitutional legal order, and pouvouir constitue as the power established under the
constitutional order that was created. This distinction first appeared in the work of the Abbé
Sieyès, ‘What is the Third Estate?’ (‘Qu’est-ce que le tiers état?’) in the context of the French
Revolution. See Lucien Jaume, ‘Constituent Power in France: The French Revolution and its
Consequences,’ in Martin Loughlin and Neil Walker, The Paradox of the Constitutionalism,
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007, p. 69.
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national level have voluntarily decided to create a supranational organisation, which is
not a state or a federation, but an association of states (Staatenverbund):
The Union Treaty establishes – as mentioned – an association of states
for the realization of an ever closer union of the peoples of Europe
(organised in the form of states), not a state based on a European
people.108
It is in the light of the modern territorial state that the decision of the German
Constitutional Court should be understood. However, this must not misdirect one to
the wrong conclusion of seeing the objections of the German Court as part of the
archaeology of an ‘old’ conception of sovereignty vested in the territorial state. In
Germany, as a result of its history and the different manifestations of federalism, the
concept of sovereignty is not understood in the Bodinian sense, but in the plural one,
just as Althusius proposed. Therefore, the German Court in its Maastricht decision
was not making a normative claim as to how sovereignty should be understood, but a
positive one as well. The Court saw that in the present state of European
integration,109 sovereignty still resided with the member states originally, and thus it
called the member states the ‘masters of the treaties’. Nevertheless, here the author of
this thesis is in slight disagreement, because a key characteristic of European
integration, since its beginning, was the limitation of sovereignty and the transfer of
limited powers to the European Community. This was stated in several decisions of
the ECJ, although these transfers were based on the principle of limited attribution of
competences or conferred powers.110
108 Manfred Brunner and Other vs EU Treaty, Para. 51, see also Boom, op. cit., p. 208. The
notion that member states are also the masters of the treaties was also expressed in the
Kloppenburg decision, ibid., p, 209.
109 The decision was post-Maastricht Treaty of 1992; The Judgement was in 1993.
110 On the Principle of attribution or speciality of powers (or conferral) in International Law
for international organisations, see Malcolm N. Shaw, International Law, Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2003, p. 1195. On problems related to the contestation of
sovereignty as a result of conferral of powers to international organisations, see Dan Sarooshi,
International Organizations and Their Exercise of Sovereign Powers, Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2005, pp. 3–17.
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However, the decision of the FCC must be understood in the context of the
constitutional principle that unites a state to a particular constitutional order as well,
which means that in the absence of a European constitutional order replacing that of
the states, no permanent sovereignty could be transferred without eliminating the
sovereign statehood of Germany.
In the view of the author, this interpretation is still consistent with federalism as an
organising principle, although one would differ as to whom holds the power to decide
on issues about European Law. The solution proposed in the Maastricht decision, that
the national courts have the power to decide on issues about EU Law without
reference to the case law of the ECJ, would be inconsistent with the need for uniform
application of European Law, as it was argued by the ECJ in the Foto Frost
decision,111 and this would necessarily involve a different interpretation, because in
International Law, courts and tribunals are the judges of their own competences.112
Notwithstanding, this means that the ECJ has the power only to determine its own
jurisdiction on the basis of the limited attributions or ends in the Treaties, hence, the
ECJ has the power only to determine the competences, or powers attributed to them,
by the international treaties and not to go beyond its ‘delegated powers’, as these are
bound by the principle of conferral.113 This means that states alone have a general
unlimited power to determine their own sphere of competences, or the power to
determine their own powers, as the German Federal Constitutional Court
acknowledged:
The exercise of sovereign power through an association of sovereign
states like the EU based on authorisations from States which remain
111 Foto Frost, Case 314/85 (22 October 1987), ECJ.
112 The issue of Kompetenz-Kompetenz is the power of the Court to determine its own
jurisdiction, as Shaw, referring to the ICJ states: ‘The Court has underlined that the question
as to the establishment of jurisdiction is a matter for the Court itself’, Malcolm N. Shaw, op.
cit, p. 969.
113 See also Dan Sarooshi, op. cit.
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sovereign and which in international matters generally act through their
governments and control the integration process thereby. It is therefore
primarily determined governmentally. If such a community power is to
rest on the political will-formation which is supplied by the People of
each individual State, and is to that extent democratic, presupposes that
the powers is exercised by a body made up of representatives sent by the
member-States’ governments, which in their turn are subject to
democratic control.114
This understanding is not entirely based on a classic conception of sovereignty and
state. The tradition of federalism proposed here is one that preserves states’
sovereignty, and recognises the multilevel constitutionalism within the EU, by virtue
of the principle of conferral. Hence the logical conclusion will be that:
The Federal Republic of Germany, therefore even after the Union Treaty
comes into force, will remain a member of an association of sovereign
states, the common authority of which is derived from the member-
states and can only have binding effects within the German sovereign
sphere by virtue of the German instruction that its law be applied.
Germany is one of the ‘masters of the Treaties’ which have established
their adherence to the Union Treaty concluded ‘for an unlimited period’
with the intention of long-term membership, but could also ultimately
revoke that adherence by a contrary act.115
In order to understand the challenges facing national courts with regard to European
integration, the discussion will now focus on the recent Lisbon decision of the FCC
which, like Maastricht, is an archetype of the discussions around the concept of
sovereignty in a post-national arrangement beyond the state.
114 FCC, Maastricht Decision, Para. 46.
115 FCC, Maastricht Decision, Para. 55.
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4.3. The Lisbon Decision of the German Federal Constitutional Court
The Maastricht decision still resonates today, as mentioned by Cruz, and which was
expressed in the recent decision116 of the FCC regarding the German ratification of the
Treaty of Lisbon.117
The German Court restates some of the concerns expressed in the Maastricht decision,
and adds important considerations about the role of the member states in the build-up
of a European political Union, retracing the history of European integration in light of
German Constitutional Principles. The FCC dissects and discusses at some length the
concept of sovereignty for member states (in this case Germany), and its meaning in
the context of the European post-national multilevel system.
The objections of the German Court to European integration, as already stated,
represents the archetype of the objections posed by the different High, national courts,
which is why a discussion of its merits is warranted, particularly considering the
changes introduced by the Treaty of Lisbon.118 The decision is not in itself an
116 The constitutional compliant was brought by the Parliamentary Group Die Linke, but the
literature refers to it as the Lisbon decision (because it reviews the Lisbon Treaty in light of
the German Constitution) to contrast with the FCC’s previous decision on the Maastricht
Treaty.
117 The decision, unusually, was also published in English (unofficial translation) on the site
of the German Federal Constitutional Court, 2 Be 2/08 of 30.06.2009.
http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/entscheidungen/es20090630_2bve000208en.html
[Accessed 20.12.2010]. For a more descriptive analysis of the decision see ‘Editorial
Comments,’ Common Market Law Review, vol. 46, 2009, pp. 1023–33.
118 On the importance of the FCC for ‘judicial cross-fertilisation’ on other national courts in
Europe, but also the German constitutional specificity, see Philipp Kiiver, ‘German
Participation in EU Decision‐Making after the Lisbon Case: A Comparative View on
Domestic Parliamentary Clearance Procedures,’ German Law Journal, vol. 10, 2009, p. 1292;
on the importance of the FCC for Germany’s Constitutional Justice, see Donald P. Kommers,
‘Germany: Balancing Rights and Duties,’ in Jeffrey Goldsworthy, Interpreting Constitutions:
A Comparative Study, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006. Chalmers calls the decision ‘a
powerful indictment of the European Union,’ Damien Chalmers, et. al., op. cit., 2010, p. 46.
175
endorsement of a pro-integration bias or a Euro-sceptic one, but rather, a reading
consistent with a proper interpretation of German Basic Law. It is in this sense that
the concept of sovereignty needs to be understood. The argument proceeds in several
stages:
First, the German Court reiterates the view that it will not exercise its jurisdiction,
concerning the impact of secondary EU Law with regard to human rights, as long as
the EU ‘guarantees an application of fundamental rights which in substance and
effectiveness is essentially similar to the protection of fundamental rights required
unconditionally by the Basic Law’.119
Second, the German Court, in discussing the constitutional principle of constitutional
identity, points out that the constituent power of the German people ‘set an
insurmountable boundary to any future political development … the so-called eternity
guarantee takes the disposal of the identity of the free constitutional order even out of
the hands of the constitution-amending legislature. The Basic Law thus not only
assumes sovereign statehood but guarantees it’.120 For this reason, the Court
concludes: ‘In this respect, the constituent power has not granted the representatives
and bodies of the people a mandate to dispose of the identity of the constitution. No
constitutional body has been granted the power to amend the constitutional principles
which are essential pursuant to Article 79.3 of the Basic Law. The Federal
Constitutional Court monitors this’.121
Third, and of particular importance in this context, is the discussion of the German
Court regarding the concept of sovereignty – as a statehood attribute – in the context
of the German constitution: ‘openness to International Law and European Law’122 and
its voluntary participation in the international community by binding the state to those
specific commitments, as the Court states: ‘The Basic Law calls for the participation
of Germany in international organisations, an order of mutual peaceful balancing of
119 German Federal Constitutional Court, idem., Para. 191.
120 Ibid., Para. 216.
121 Ibid, Para. 218.
122 This, too, found parallel with the Maastricht decision.
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interests established between the states and organised co-existence in Europe’.123 The
Court therefore asserts sovereignty as a concept deprived of its absolute character by
stating that ‘This understanding of sovereignty becomes visible in the objectives laid
down in the Preamble. The Basic Law abandons a self-serving and self-glorifying
concept of sovereign statehood and returns to a view of the state authority of the
individual state which regards sovereignty as ‘freedom that is organised by
international law and committed to it’.124
Fourth, the Court reasserts that the EU is still an association of sovereign states, and
for this reason, it is still bound by the principle of conferral; by the competences
explicitly attributed by the Treaty, and in that sense, it recovers the language used in
the Maastricht judgement by saying:
The Federal Republic of Germany takes part in the development of a
European Union designed as an association of sovereign states
(Staatenverbund) to which sovereign powers are transferred. The
concept of Verbund covers a close long-term association of states which
remain sovereign, a treaty-based association which exercises public
authority, but whose fundamental order is subject to the decision-
making power of the Member States and in which the peoples, i.e. the
citizens, of the Member States, remain the subjects of democratic
legitimation.125
This is particularly the case with the new Treaty of Lisbon that explicitly establishes
the right of withdrawal (Article 50 of the Treaty of the EU) of the Union by the
member states, and which is why the EU cannot be regarded as a state. The right of
withdrawal, therefore, must be understood as ‘merely the withdrawal from a
123 Ibid., Decision on the Lisbon Treaty, Para. 222.
124 Idem., Para. 223. This point is emphasised by Frank Schorkopf, ‘The European Union as
an Association of Sovereign States: Karlsruhe’s Ruling on the Treaty of Lisbon,’ German
Law Journal, vol. 10, No. 8, 2009, p. 1224.
125 Ibid., Para. 229.
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Staatenverbund which is founded on the principle of reversible self-commitment’.126
This is an important point, illustrating that the reasoning of the Court takes the view
that the nature of the polity is based on the principle of association or political
partnership, which in the view of the current thesis, is central to its understanding of
the federal principle. The Court also emphasises the limitations of a Union based on
the principle of conferral and its inability to give itself powers beyond those of the
Treaty.127 This relates to the notion that states are still the ‘master of the Treaties’128
as in the Maastricht decision.
Finally, the Court discussed the problems associated with the acts of the Union which
might be ultra vires; acts that went beyond the powers explicitly attributed in the
Treaties, and looked at how this related to the German Constitution. Here the Court
denied the EU an unlimited sphere of competences – or Kompetenz-Kompetenz –
because it was still bound by the principle of conferral of powers in the EU, and
asserted that:
The Basic Law does not authorise the German state bodies to transfer
sovereign powers in such a way that their exercise can independently
establish other competences for the European Union. It prohibits the
transfer of competence to decide on its own competence (Kompetenz-
Kompetenz)’.129
Considering this limitation, which, similarly, formed part of the Maastricht decision,
and assumes an ultimate right of judicial review of ultra vires acts of the EU, ‘where
Community and Union institution transgresses the boundaries of their
126 Ibid., Para, 234. It is true that national states can provide for the right of secession as it was
recognised in the case of Canada by the Canadian Supreme Court; see discussion in Chapter
3.
127 This does not mean that the EU does not possess implied powers; the principle of conferral
does not limit the possibility of implied powers. See Carl Lebeck, ‘Implied Powers beyond
Functional Integration,’ Journal of Transnational Issues, vol. 17, 2008.
128 Ibid., Para. 231.
129 Ibid., Para. 233.
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competences’,130 but only if there is no protection afforded at the Union level; hence it
is a subsidiary level of protection to which the Court refers in this regard; the
‘principle of loyal cooperation’ with EU bodies. In addition, the Court opens up the
review on the constitutional identity of the German Basic Law, basing its reasoning
on the notion that the identity review ‘ensures that the primacy of the application of
Union Law only applies by virtue of, and in the context of, the constitutional
empowerment that continues in effect’.131
It is easy for some to dismiss these arguments as mere parochialisms and forget the
limits of European integration. The Court – perhaps responding to its critics 132 also
defined sovereignty as a relative concept, claiming that the ‘state is neither a myth nor
an end in itself but the historically grown and globally recognised form of
organisation of a viable political community’.133 This does not mean, however, that
sovereignty is an entirely dispositive concept, as there are irreducible aspects of
sovereignty which cannot be changed. This is not the result of an outdated view of
sovereignty, but one borne out of the sovereign statehood of the territorial state,
130 Ibid., Para. 240.
131 Ibid., Para. 240.
132 Joseph Weiler called the earlier Maastricht decision an ‘embarrassment’ and ‘pathetic’.
See ‘Does Europe Needs a Constitution?’ op. cit., 1995. For a more nuanced view see Neil
MacCormick, ‘The Maastricht-Urteil: Sovereignty Now,’ European Law Journal, vol. 1, No.
3, 1995. For criticism about the Lisbon decision in a similar tone to Weiler, see Alfred
Grosser, ‘The Federal Constitutional Court’s Lisbon Case: Germany’s “Sonderweg” – An
Outsider’s Perspective,’ German Law Journal, vol. 10, No. 8, 2009, pp. 1263–266; similarly,
Christoph Schonberger, ‘Lisbon in Karlsruhe: Maastricht’s Epigones at Sea,’ German Law
Journal, vol. 10, No. 8, 2009, pp. 1201–218. Against which, see Frank Schorkopf, ‘The EU,
as an Association’, 2009, op. cit., pp. 1219–240, and also, Philipp Kiiver, ‘German
Participation in EU Decision‐Making’, 2009, op. cit., pp. 1287–296.
133 Ibid, Lisbon decision of the FCC, Para. 229. The German Court rejected the Bodinian idea
of unlimited sovereignty and the notion that the ‘State is the actuality of the ethical idea’,
found in Friedrich Hegel (trans. T. M. Knox), Outlines of the Philosophy of Right, Oxford:
Oxford University Press (first published in 1821), 2008, p. 228. On this ‘reification’ of the
State in legal theory derived from Hegel and its influence, see Shlomo Avineri, Hegel’s
Theory of the Modern State, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972, pp. 176–84.
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because the European integration process is not based on the unification of states into
a ‘super-state’. It follows therefore that the EU is not a federation, because member
states still remain unitary actors under International Law, although they are bound by
the commitments of a federal political system in which sovereignty is jointly shared.
States accept the principle of supremacy of European Law although their participation
in the European constitutional project is multi-layered and remains based on their
participation as units in the common institutions of the EU.
This does not mean that sovereignty has been abolished. It means simply that it has
been reframed within new terms, using a new vocabulary, based on a federal
partnership between states and the EU. In the American federal experiences this
meant the notion of ‘dual sovereignty’, but in the EU, it would imply an
understanding of sovereignty in the context of a plural governance system based on
different legal orders; a notion of shared sovereignty within the Althusian tradition.
And this is why the institutional dialogue between the ECJ and national Courts is so
relevant – to ascertain the limits of the boundary between the two legal orders –
national and European.
The Tobacco Decision134 illustrates some of these issues. It is perhaps the only
example of an ECJ Decision to enforce the principle of conferral, where a Directive to
ban Tobacco135 advertising was deemed to be illegal because of the violation of the
principle of conferral. It was adopted under Article 95 of the EC Treaty, which only
provided competence for measures for the ‘establishment and functioning of the
common market’, and not for the general legislative competence for market
regulation.136 However, the findings of the Court were reversed partially by the
Swedish Match case, which involved a challenge to Community prohibition of
134 ECJ, Case C-376/98, CLMR, 3. 1998.
135 Directive 98/43/EC.
136 This also relates to the question of ultra vires, see Jukka Snell, ‘European Constitutional
Settlement, an ever Closer Union, and the Treaty of Lisbon,’ European Law Review, vol. 33,
2008, p. 627. The ECJ did not annul the Directive because it violated the principle of
conferral or subsidiarity, but because it was not adopted with the appropriate legal basis.
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tobacco for oral use.137 The importance of those two cases for the institutional
dialogue, and the question of ultra vires, is related to capacity, particularly the will of
the ECJ to police the boundaries of European Law considering the limited ends of the
EU, and one of the oldest questions in political theory: ‘Quis custodet ipsos
custodes?’138
5. The Language of Constitutionalism
For some authors, such as Kirchoff, the EU does not have a Constitution because only
states can have Constitutions139 however, as discussed above, the ECJ did treat the
137 ECJ Case C-210/03, 2004, Snell, op. cit., pp. 628–29.
138 ‘Who guards the guardians?’The phrase appears to be attributed originally to the Roman
poet Juvenal (AD 55–AD 127), in the Satires 6:346–8, see Juvenal, The Satires, London:
Penguin Books, 2004. ‘The essential question in any constitutional system must be: “Quis
custodet ipsos custodes?” The dangers to constitutionalism of a final but lawless
constitutional court are multiple’. Richard S. Kay, ‘American Constitutionalism,’ in Larry
Alexander (ed.), Constitutionalism: Philosophical Foundations, Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1998, p. 153. On the debate about the nature of authority of the ECJ, the
question is posed in other terms by Miguel Maduro, ‘Europe and the Constitution: What if
this Is As Good As It Gets?’ in Joseph. H. H. Weiler and Marlene Wind, European
Constitutionalism Beyond the State, op. cit., p. 95.
139 He notes: ‘In addition, the EU would be incorrectly characterised by the legal concept of a
“constitution”. The union is a union of states (Staatenverbund) in which constitutional states
have so obligated themselves, that the intensity of this commitment clearly exceeds a
confederation (Staatenbund), nonetheless does not reach the statehood of a federal state
(Bundestaat)’. The author of this quotation was one of the judges of the German Federal
Constitutional Court in the Maastricht decision, Paul Kirchof, ‘The Legal Structure of the EU
as a Union of States,’ in Armin Bogdandy and Jurgen Bast, Principles of European
Constitutional Law, Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2006, p. 773. On the same position, affirming
that only states can have constitutions see Alain Pellet, ‘Epilogue, Europe and the Dream of
Reason,’ in Joseph H. Weiler and Marlene Wind, European Constitutionalism Beyond the
State, op. cit., p. 215; against this position, see Pavlos Eleftheriadis, ‘The Idea of a European
Constitution,’ Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, vol. 27, No. 1, 2007.
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Treaties as a Constitution140 which interpretation, meant that the European Treaties
were akin to national constitutions.
Perhaps the question is, therefore, necessarily: why a European Constitution?141 Will
the ‘European constitution’ be recognised with the presence of a Grundnorm142 or a
‘rule of recognition’143 for the constitutions and legal systems of member states? The
answer will be indicative of the nature of the European legal system and its peculiar
variety of constitutionalism.
This discussion has inevitably led to one about the definition of a Constitution. This is
particularly relevant because a Constitution is not a simple law, but a ‘fundamental
law’144 bestowed on a given community. This is because it enjoys a higher normative
status than a simple law. By treating the European treaties as higher law, therefore, the
ECJ was, in effect, giving them a special status. Considering the nature of the
European legal order, this meant that all national laws would be rendered inapplicable
or non-effective if in conflict with EU Law and that this, therefore, could be directly
140 Parti écologiste ‘Les Verts' v European Parliament, Case 294/83, ECJ.
141 This is the starting point for Michael O’Neill, The Struggle for the European Constitution:
A Past and Future History, Abingdon: Routledge, 2009.
142 To use Kelsen’s view that the all legal systems have a ‘fundamental norm’ (Grundnorm)
from where their authority derives, see Hans Kelsen, The Pure Theory of Law, Los Angeles:
University of California Press, 1970.
143 To make use of Hart’s understanding of the rule of recognition as an organising rule that
determines the hierarchy of rules found in a given legal system, see Herbert Hart, The
Concept of Law, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997.
144 On the definition of a Constitution see Joseph Raz, ‘On the Authority and Interpretation of
Constitutions: Some Preliminaries,’ in Larry Alexander (ed.), Constitutionalism,
Philosophical Foundations, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998, p. 153. On the
problems of applying the framework of a Constitution to the context of the EU, see Stefan
Griller, ‘Is this a Constitution? Remarks on a Contested Concept,’ in Stephan Griller and
Jacques Ziller (eds), The Lisbon Treaty: EU Constitutionalism without a Constitutional
Treaty, Vienna: Springer Wien New York, 2008. See also Michelle Everson and Julia Eisner,
The Making of a European Constitution: Judges and Law Beyond Constitutive Power,
Abingdon: Routledge-Cavendish, 2007.
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applicable to the national legal orders via direct effect. Moreover, the ECJ failed to
make a distinction between primary and secondary European Law in interpreting the
principle of supremacy, but the assumption was that the Treaties as adopted by
member states were the ‘constitutional charter’ of the community. Therefore, the
implications of treating the Treaties as ‘constitutional law’ because of the ‘European
constitution’, for the national legal systems – including their own constitutions – were
of great significance to the Court’s autonomy and claims of supremacy.
When referring to a constitution, the reference may be to the fundamental laws or
norms of a particular society. In this sense, all societies have constitutions: from a
sports association to a local authority.145 This is what is referred to as a constitution in
the ‘material sense’.146
A constitution in the ‘formal sense’ is more specific, referring not only to a Law that
contains the fundamental provisions of a community, but also one that enjoys higher
normativity in a legal system; it is a Law that has followed a formal legal process of
adoption by the constituent power of the people or demos.147 It is in this latter sense
that the debate about a European constitution becomes problematic in the legal and
political debate, because no ‘inferior’ law – in this case national legislation, including
national constitutions – could override European Law. As Kelsen emphasised, ‘If
there is a constitutional form, then constitutional laws must be distinguished from
ordinary laws’.148 Nevertheless, if this statement is valid regarding member states, is it
also valid for the European polity? As Grim argues on the complexities of a European
Constitution:
To the extent that constitutions are concerned with legalising political
rule, the Treaties leave nothing to be desired. Fundamental requirements
of modern constitutionalism are thus met in the Communities. This
145 In this sense all social organisations have constitutions.
146 Hans Kelsen, General Theory of Law and the State, New Brunswick: Transaction
Publishing, 2006, pp. 124–5.
147 This definition is used more often in Constitutional Law.
148 Hans Kelsen, op. cit., 2006, p. 124.
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gives the justification for the position that European legal science has
taken on the constitutional question. The Treaties are not however a
constitution in the full sense of the term. The difference lies in reference
back to the will of Member States rather than to the people of the Union.
Many European lawyers gloss over this. The European Public Power is
not one that derives from the people, but one mediated through States.149
The introduction of the language of constitutionalism for studying European
integration, therefore, poses a problem of translation.150 This is because
constitutionalism was devised as a tool to analyse the legal and political framework of
the modern territorial state. The possibility of a European constitutionalism must go
beyond the state, which notion derives from the idiosyncrasy of the European
integration process, the nature of the EU, and its role as a political and legal
community.
In analysing the specific claims of European constitutionalism, the first question is:
what is the source of the constituent power in European integration? Considering that
the source of the constituent power in state constitutionalism is the presence of a
people (demos), European constitutionalism will not have one, because there is not a
demos ‘of Europe’.151 This should not mean, however, that a European
149 Dieter Grimm, ‘Does Europe need a Constitution?’ European Law Journal, vol. 1, No. 3,
1995, p. 291.
150 Neil Walker, ‘Postnational Constitutionalism and the Problem of Translation,’ in Joseph H.
Weiler and Marlene Wind, European Constitutionalism Beyond the State, op. cit; Matej
Avbelj, ‘Questioning EU Constitutionalisms,’ German Law Journal, vol. 9, No. 1, 2008, pp.
126; Mattias Kumm, ‘The Jurisprudence of Constitutional Conflict: Constitutional Supremacy
in Europe before and after the Constitutional Treaty,’ European Law Journal, vol. 11, No. 3,
2005, pp. 262–307. For the possibilities of global constitutionalism and the implications for
sovereignty under the UN Charter, an overview, see Bardo Fassbender, ‘Sovereignty and
Constitutionalism in International Law,’ in Neil Walker (ed.), Sovereignty in Transition,
Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2003, pp. 115–143.
151 This thesis is known as the no demos thesis, see Grimm, 1995, op. cit. for a critique, and
see Michiel Brand, ‘Formalising European Constitutionalism: Potential Added Value or
“Death by Constitution”’, in Kirstyn Inglis and Andrea Ott, The Constitution for Europe and
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constitutionalism is impossible, but it does pose a challenge to the notion that a
European constitutionalism should follow the model of a state constitutionalism.
In addition, European constitutionalism should not follow a model where the multiple
European demoi are unrepresented through different member states in the European
integration process. This means, therefore, that the constituent power in Europe, by
nature, should pass necessarily through member states and not just by way of direct
representation of citizens to European bodies such as the European Parliament. This is
because the nature of representation in federal arrangements passes, necessarily,
through the mediation of member states’ political institutions as units, whether by the
executive branch, or through their national Parliaments.
In federal political systems representation is dual, as was discussed in Chapter 3; it
passes primarily through the member states that created the EU, but also through the
common bodies, which in the case of Europe, is through the European Parliament.
Hence, a constituent power that claims authority to create a new legal order cannot do
so without reference to the different peoples of the states within the confederation.
This is why the new decision of the FCC sheds new light onto the debate about
sovereignty, because instead of defending an ‘old’ statist view of sovereignty, the
opportunity should be seen as one that points out the limits and claims to authority of
a European integration process, that necessarily, should be sought through the
member states, as Walker states:
We lack an ideal understanding of the supranational conception of
constituent power. That is, if against the sceptic, it can be demonstrated
that European constituent power is not merely derivative of national
constituent power, we nevertheless still acknowledge the national legacy
of its foundations and, alongside the newer supranational authority, the
resilience of the original constituent powers. The ‘people’ of second-
order supranational understanding can never be just like the otherwise
politically, unencumbered and unmediated ‘people’ of our first order
an Enlarging Union: Unity and Diversity? Amsterdam: Europa Law Publishing, 2005, pp. 5–
10.
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imaginary; the second-order people necessarily describes a compound
structure.152
For all of these reasons, a European constitutionalism does not abolish or eliminate
state constitutionalism, but complements it, and it may even redefine it into a new
matrix structure that replaces the hierarchical nature of the current system.153
The Treaty of Lisbon touched the limits of European constitutionalism, but in so
doing, also illuminated the nature of the EU as a polity. This outcome was contrary to
the predictions of some who claimed that there was a need for further integration:
European integration, although resilient and deeper than many had anticipated, had
not superseded the expectations of member states; the most important and constituent
actors in the process of European integration. This is fully consistent with the
understanding of federalism presented by this thesis, because the outcome showed
that European constitutionalism still followed the logic of representation of federal
political systems, that is, one based on the partnership of different states in a process
of deep integration.
A European constitutionalism is, first and foremost, based in the federal political
process, the nature of the dynamic of which is defined primarily by member-states,
albeit also by the different European actors154 involved in the various processes,
152 Neil Walker, ‘Post-Constituent Constitutionalism? The Case of the EU,’ in Martin
Loughlin and Neil Walker, The Paradox of Constitutionalism, Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2007, p. 264. Some authors also point out that, at the European level, there are
problems in relation to constituent power where there is a lack of a truly European ‘public
sphere’; an arena where Europeans can be part of a common political integration ideal. This
relates to the notion of the ‘democratic deficit’ and the need for the EU to be substantively
democratic and not just procedurally democratic. See Simon Hix, What’s Wrong with
European Union and How to Fix it, Cambridge: Polity Press, 2008. On the Public Sphere as
an arena for democratic politics, see Jurgen Habermas, Between Facts and Norms,
Cambridge: Polity Press, 1997, pp. 360–366.
153 Miguel Poiares Maduro, ‘Europe and the Constitution’, 2003, op. cit., p. 101.
154 Citizens, transnational corporations, NGOs, political parties and so on, this is what is
meant when referring to the importance of actors in the transnational European process.
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political or judicial. It is in this context that the concept of sovereignty must be
analysed, along with the different claims to authority of the European legal order, and
member states. In this regard, the articulation of the different legal orders should be
based on the notion of constitutional pluralism,155 which means that the question of
who has the ultimate authority should remain open.156 The fact that member states
ultimately have the ‘right’ to veto either integration into Europe or exit157 from it,
defines the EU is a confederation, meaning that sovereign statehood of its members is
not eliminated, and that, therefore, a European constitutionalism is still led by its
member-states. European constitutionalism is not atypical, therefore, because its
Constitution is what might be termed as ‘mixed’.158
The role of national Parliaments in the European political process, recognised by the
Article 12 of the Treaty of the EU, was significantly increased by the ‘Early Warning
Mechanism’159 of the Treaty of Lisbon. This has increased the ‘voice’ of member
states and strengthened the federal element of the EU, because representation should
be primarily through member states’ national institutions, of which parliaments are
155 See Neil MacCormick, Questioning Sovereignty, 1999, op. cit., p. 97. Also Chalmers, et.
al., 2010, op. cit., pp. 198–203.
156 This point is emphasised by Maduro, ‘Europe and the Constitution,’ op. cit, pp. 97,
however, if Carl Schmitt’s view is adopted, that the ‘sovereign is he who decides on the
exception’, then the conclusion will be that sovereignty resides completely with member
states, because they have a veto over the European integration process, and can, ultimately,
withdraw, see Carl Schmitt, Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of
Sovereignty, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005, p. 5.
157 On ‘Exit’ and ‘Voice’, as political mechanisms – exit as the right of withdrawal and voices
as participation – see Albert O. Hirschman, Exit, Voice and Loyalty, Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press, 1970.
158 On the notion of a mixed constitution which is applied to the EU because of its multiple
dimensions, see Neil MacCormick, Questioning Sovereignty, 1999, op. cit., pp. 137–156; on
the historical origins of the notion of a mixed constitution within ancient political philosophy,
see Marcus Tullius Cicero (trans. Niall Rudd), The Republic, Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1998, p. 32.
159 See infra, section on subsidiarity.
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usually the most representative from the democratic point of view. This innovation is
particularly relevant towards the possibility of a European constitutionalism.
5.1. Sharing Power: The Principle of Subsidiarity and the Problem of
Sovereignty
The argument so far leads us to consider the principle of subsidiarity, which while
being perhaps one of the most interesting additions to the political and legal
scholarship, is also one of the most problematic. There are many definitions of
subsidiarity, so for the purposes of this thesis, one definition of the Treaty of Rome
has been selected:
In areas which do not fall within its exclusive competences, the
Community shall take action, in accordance with the principle of
subsidiarity, only and in so far as the objectives of the proposed action
cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States and can therefore,
by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better
achieved by the Community.160
The concept of subsidiarity has been hailed as a potential replacement for the concept
of sovereignty161 but, as will be argued below, this understanding tends to obscure the
historical background of the concept, while also ignoring the problems to do with its
potential application to the EU.
160 Article 5, Treaty of Rome as amended in Maastricht and subject to an additional Protocol
(No. 30) by the Treaty of Amsterdam. See Koen Lenaerts and Piet Van Nufell, Constitutional
Law of the European Union, London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2004. p. 100.
161 Mattias Kumm, ‘The Legitimacy of International Law: A Constitutionalist Framework of
Analysis,’ European Journal of International Law, vol. 15, No. 5, 1999, pp. 907–31.
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Subsidiarity and its insertion into the Treaty of Maastricht provoked expressions of
dissatisfaction from member states because of a perceived increase in the powers of
the EU.162
The concept of subsidiarity, which originated in Catholic political thought before it
was secularised,163 has an underlying ontology based on a hierarchical concept that
describes the relationship between the centre and periphery. The understanding of
federalism, according to the present thesis, is one based on the matrix model where
there is no hierarchy, but that said, subsidiarity, it is argued, can have the effects of
both protecting states’ sovereignty and, in the case of the EU, further centralisation.
Subsidiarity has two tests, which against Union actions, are judged: a ‘decentralisation
criterion’ and an ‘efficiency criterion’.164 The former refers to actions by the Union
that can act only if the proposed objectives cannot be sufficiently achieved by member
states; the latter refers to actions which can be ‘better’ achieved by the Union. In
addition, the concept of subsidiarity only applies to areas of shared competence with
member states. This means that in areas where the Union has exclusive competences,
such as in Common Commercial Policy, subsidiarity does not apply.165
The concept does not establish clear boundaries between states and the Union, but
merely acts as a general principle with consequentialist logic rather than
162 Lenaerts and Nufell, op. cit., p. 101; and note that it would apply only to areas where the
Union did not have exclusive competences.
163 On the historical origins of the concept as applicable to the relations between centre and
periphery in the teachings of the social doctrine of the Catholic Church beginning in the Papal
encyclical Rerum Novarum of 1891, but explicitly in the Encyclical Quadragesimo Anno of
1931, see Antonio Estella, The EU Principle of Subsidiarity and its Critique, Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2002, pp. 79–80; and also Douglas-Scott, 2002, op. cit., pp. 174–75. On its
introduction to the EU (EC) in the Single European Act (SEA) with environmental policy,
and then the Maastricht Treaty (Article 5), see David Lazer and Viktor Mayer-Schöenberger,
‘Blueprints for Change: Devolution and Subsidiarity in the United States and the EU,’ in
Kalypso Nicolaidis and Robert Howse, The Federal Vision: Legitimacy, Levels of
Governance in the United States and the EU, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001, p. 133.
164 Lenaerts and Nufell, op. cit., supra note 144, p. 103,
165 For a criticism of this particular restriction, see Douglas-Scott, 2002, op. cit., pp.177–78.
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deontological.166 This means that subsidiarity is a concept that is concerned with the
state of affairs, of ‘finding out the appropriate level of action for a given result’, and
does not impose constraints ex ante, by stating which areas are to be prohibited or
allowed for either EU or state action. As discussed above, this is clearly not what the
concept of sovereignty is all about, because contrary to subsidiarity, the concept of
sovereignty imposes strong restrictions on the sphere of states’ actions either by
international or supranational polities, whereas subsidiarity, is concerned with finding
out the appropriate or adequate level in which an action is possible; sovereignty is
concerned with the complete exclusion of interference on states unless they consent.
In contrast, the ontology of the concept of subsidiarity does not warrant an
interpretation that necessarily would protect member states’ interests and preserve
their sovereignty, for all the reasons discussed above.167 This does not mean, however,
that the concept is completely useless in asserting a delimitation of powers between
the Union and member states, although this would be difficult because of its
hierarchical nature, as Elazar points out:
At the same time, the principle of power sharing adopted by the EU as a
whole-subsidiarity – has its own problematic elements. Subsidiarity is a
concept developed in Catholic Europe, the Europe organised along
hierarchical lines, and it was designed to soften hierarchy by vesting and
protecting the powers of the lower levels.168
Another problem, which is less theoretical but relates to the practical application of
subsidiarity, is how can the different institutional processes deal with eventual or
potential violations of principle? The ECJ has discussed the principle in some
166 On consequentialism and deontology in Philosophy and Law, see Bernard Williams,
‘Consequentialisn and Integrity,’ in Samuel Scheffler, Consequentialism and its Critics,
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988.
167 In a similar tone see Anthony Cary, ‘Subsidiarity―Essence or Antidote to European
Union?’ in Andrew Duff, Subsidiarity within the European Community, London: Federal
Trust Report, 1993.
168 Daniel Elazar, ‘The United States and the EU:’ in The Federal Vision, 2001, op, cit, p. 104.
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cases,169 but is it safe to assume that the Court will challenge an act of the Council
based on violations of the principle of subsidiarity?170 The question is not without
merit, particularly if the problems of the legitimacy of the ECJ are considered.171 This
is not an inconsequential criticism, because the ECJ has not yet judged an action or
act of the Union to be incompatible with the principle of subsidiarity.
The BAT case172 was prominent in this regard, whereby the ECJ discussed the
principle of subsidiarity in the context of the legality of the Directive under Article 95
of the EC Treaty that harmonised measures regarding tobacco. The Court found no
violation of the principle,173 and in considering other cases174 where the principle had
been discussed, concluded: ‘the overall consequence is that the word that saved
Maastricht has lost much of its practical utility’.175 In the view of the author of this
thesis, the problems associated with the principle of subsidiarity reside in ontology –
not only in the practical application of it – but because the concept imposes a
consequentialist logic that is, in essence, backed by a ‘purpositivist’ interpretation.176
This mandates an analysis based on the actual outcomes, where it does not matter at
169 For example ECJ, Case C-233/94, Germany vs. European Parliament and Council,
(1997), ECR, ECJ, Case C-377/98 Netherlands v. European Parliament and Council (2001).
Nonetheless, as Chalmers states: ‘Although the principle of subsidiarity has regularly been
invoked before the Court of Justice, the Court has yet to annul a measure for breach of the
principle’. See Chalmers, et. al., 2010, op. cit. p. 364.
170 Particularly considering that Union acts are political, usually involving different actors and
a complex decision-making judgment and procedure. See Koen Lenaerts and Piet Van Nufell,
2004, op. cit. p. 106.
171 For example the ‘counter-majoritarian’ difficulty pointed out by Antonia Estella, 2002, op.
cit, p. 138. This relates to the question of the judicial, in contrast to the political nature, of
ECJ authority within the European legal order.
172 Case, C-491-01, 2003, CMLR, 14, ECJ.
173 For a critical analysis of the case, see Jukka Snell, 2008, op. cit., p. 629.
174 For example, Germany vs. Parliament and Council (second case), ECJ, case C-380/03,
2006, 2007, 2 CMLR, Working Time Directive, ECJ, Case C-84/94, 1996, 3 CMLR, 1996.
175 Jukka Snell, 2008, op. cit., p. 630.
176 On Purposivism in legal interpretation see John F. Manning, ‘What Divides Textualists
from Purposivists?’ Columbia Law Review, vol. 106, No. 1, 2006, pp. 70–111.
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which level the decision is taken, but what matters, is the end result, which is to
achieve the best result.
Some proponents of the concept of subsidiarity make normative statements on its use
in International Law and claim that ‘subsidiarity is in process of replacing the
unhelpful concept of “sovereignty” as the core idea that serves to demarcate the
respective spheres of the national and international’.177
This argument is based on the notion that if problems of ‘collective action’ are related
to externalities, there might then be a strong reason for International Law to act in the
domestic arena, the initial assessment for which is based on an ‘efficiency test’ or a
‘cost-benefit analysis’.178 However, the application of the principle of subsidiarity at
either the European or international level is based on incorrect assumptions,
particularly for those who see it as a replacement for the concept of sovereignty.
This is because, first, the assumption disregards the historical origins of the concept of
subsidiarity within the EU, when member states insisted on adding the concept of
subsidiarity because they were dissatisfied with the excessive centralisation of
competences within the EU, particularly its centralist bias, and the problems
associated with the conceptualisation of subsidiarity where nobody appeared to agree
on the terms.179
Second, it assumes an inherent legitimacy180 of the upper levels (whether European or
International) to intervene in matters of municipal or domestic law and risks
177 Mattias Kumm, The Legitimacy of International Law, 1999, op. cit.
178 Idem.
179 Just like sovereignty, subsidiarity risks becoming an essentially contested concept. See
Samantha Besson, The Morality of Conflict: Reasonable Disagreement and the Law, Oregon:
Hart Publishing, 2005, pp. 69–89.
180 On the problem of legitimacy in International Law see Allen Buchanan, Justice,
legitimacy, and Self-Determination: Moral Foundations for International Law, Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2004, pp. 233–327.
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completely disregarding the possibility of an ‘illegitimate act’181 or even illegal acts at
the upper levels.
Third, by adopting an efficiency-criteria test, it bases the justification for action on
consequentialist logic, as discussed above. The problem with consequentialist analysis
is that the desired result (in this case, to achieve the best results) depends on the
preferences of the agents. In this case, it will depend on how one constructs the
meaning of ‘achieving the best results’, which might be done against the domestic
level if it is proven it is more efficient and if it will produce a better result, as Lenaerts
argues:
The limitation placed on Community action by the principle of
subsidiarity is not large if it is principally considered whether such
action affords ‘clear benefits’ or is ‘better’ than action at the national
level.182
The concept of subsidiarity was borne out of practical necessity but it cannot be seen
as a plausible replacement for sovereignty, because it does not protect the autonomy
of states, which argument can now be set aside by a functionalist angle. Another
criticism of the theory of sovereignty advanced by the proponents of subsidiarity is
that it is a concept that is biased in favour of the state which has the freedom to not
accept obligations of the international community.183 This view184 is however
consistent only within a Bodinian understanding of sovereignty – one that proclaims
181 For example within the UN system, Sarooshi presents the hypothesis of legally valid acts
of the UN Security Council, which are deemed illegitimate by the international community.
See Dan Sarooshi, The United Nations and the Development of Collective Security, Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2000, p. 6.
182 Lenaerts, op. cit., p. 104.
183 An extended criticism of sovereignty in defense of subsidiarity is offered by Mattias
Kumm, ‘The Cosmopolitan Turn in Constitutionalism: On the Relationship between
Constitutionalism in and beyond the State,’ in Jeffrey Dunoff and Joel Trachtman, Ruling the
World? Constitutionalism, International Law, and Global Governance, Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2009, pp. 291–5.
184As discussed in Chapter 1 on the history and evolution of the concept of sovereignty.
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the absolute, perpetual and indivisible character of sovereignty. An analysis of the
concept of sovereignty also implies a discussion as to the nature and pervasiveness of
the state – the most important polity in the international system. To assume a ‘waning
of the state’ in favour of an international legal system that subsumes the domestic
legal system, is problematic to say the least, if not, somehow, simply an idealist
argument. Furthermore, an understanding of sovereignty does not imply, necessarily,
the adoption of the concept of absolute and unlimited sovereignty, as Constant argued:
‘It is clear that the absolute character which Hobbes attributes to the sovereignty of
the people is the basis of his entire system. The word absolute distorts the whole
question, and leads us to a series of fresh implications’.185 It is, however, possible to
reframe sovereignty as a ‘bound’ concept; one tied-in by the limits imposed on it by
International Law and the ‘deterritorialization’ of authority beyond states. This is
because of the inherent limits imposed on member states by the constitutive or
‘constitutional’ rules of the international system. These rules include those of
membership, conduct and meta-rules.
The process of fragmentation of the Law through the creation of regional legal
systems – which include both the European and functional legal regimes – and which
impose limits on states’ sovereignty will be addressed in the Chapter 5. But those who
argue that sovereignty is irrelevant, who advocate its abandonment as a concept,
claiming that ‘the idea of sovereignty adds nothing’186 are teetering on the borders of
an idealist argument upheld by a naïve faith in the international legal process as a
whole, or, as Koskenniemi puts it:
Indeed it does not seem possible to believe that international law is
automatically or necessarily an instrument of progress. It provides
resources for defending good and bad causes, enlightened and regressive
policies. Some have found this suggestion insupportable. They have
185 Constant vehemently rejects the notion that sovereignty is unlimited or absolute. See
Benjamin Constant, ‘Principles of Politics Applicable to All Representative Governments,’ in
Benjamin Constant: Political Writings (edited and translated by Bincamaria Fontana),
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988, pp.179–81.
186 Mattias Kumm, ‘The Cosmopolitan Turn in Constitutionalism,’ op. cit. p. 292.
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wished to see international law as already containing their ideal of the
good society so that it would suffice, outside political choice, to commit
oneself to international law so as to ensure oneself of the rightness one
does.187
5.2. Subsidiarity and Lisbon
The Treaty of the European Union, Article 5, also laid down the principle of
subsidiarity, however, interestingly enough, it was the solution proposed in the Treaty
of Lisbon that enhanced dramatically the role of national Parliaments in the European
legal process by increasing the democratic element via Protocol Number 2 on the
Application of the Principles of Subsidiarity and Proportionality. The German
Constitutional Court briefly mentioned in its decision regarding the Lisbon Treaty188
the so-called ‘Early Warning System’,189 in which the draft legislative acts of the EU
should be sent to national Parliaments at the same time as to the Council of Ministers
(Article 4 of the Protocol), and which impose an obligation for the Union legislator
that legislative drafts must comply with the principle of subsidiarity (Article 5 of the
Protocol). According to the Protocol, National Parliaments may within eight weeks
from the date of the transmission of a legislative draft send a ‘reasoned opinion’ to the
Presidents of the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission stating why
it may consider a draft incompatible with the principle of Subsidiarity (Article 6).190
187 Martti Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia: The Structure of the International Legal
Argument, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004, p. 613.
188 FCC , supra note 101 , Para. 37.
189 For a critical overview see Philipp Kiiver, ‘The Treaty of Lisbon, the National Parliaments
and the Principle of Subsidiarity,’ Maastricht Law Journal, vol. 15, No. 1, 2008. Bilancia
argues that this ‘kind of ex ante control will eventually create a sort of multilateral mechanism
at the EU level, exerted by national Parliaments: the European parliament at this point is due
to play the role of counterpart in the evaluation process of subsidiarity’. Paola Bilancia, ‘The
Role and Power of the European and the National Parliaments in the Dynamics of
Integration,’ Perspectives on Federalism, vol. 1, 2009, p. 7.
190 For some, this new power may only amount to a veto power by national Parliaments on EU
legislative acts, and may ‘disrupt the multi-tier constitutional balance’, see Andrea
Manzanella, op. cit., p. 265. In the view of the author of this thesis, this is not the case:
considering that the Protocol tries to address the problem of legitimacy of the EU legislative
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This additional instrument increases the role of the political process and addresses
part of the problem of the aforementioned democratic deficit. This is because
representation in federal arrangements is primarily by member states as individual
units, but particularly through the direct intervention of the directly elected national
Parliaments and European bodies involved in the legislative process, who should take
into account those opinions (Article 7, N. 1).
More importantly, the ECJ will have jurisdiction on actions brought by national
Parliaments191 or a Chamber, on grounds of infringement of the principle of
subsidiarity by legislative acts (Article 8). The Protocol clearly strengthens member
states’ participation in the European legal process, especially the role of national
Parliaments in the European legal system. Moreover, it is fully consistent with the
federal principle in which representation in common institutions is ensured directly by
the different polities as units. Considering the judicial review enforced by the ECJ
which the Protocol provides, it may augur an interpretation of the principle of
subsidiarity more consistent with the original intent of the member states, and while
so doing, also address states’ dissatisfaction about the increased powers of the EU.
6. Conclusion
This chapter has examined the nature of sovereignty in the context of the EU, taken as
the most salient case of a regional integration mechanism, where the Westaphalian
conception of sovereignty has been challenged and redefined.
acts, notes the ‘democratic deficit’ and insufficient participation of member states in the EU
decision-making process, and introduces a mechanism in line with the logic of representation
of federal political systems, i.e. participation of member states in the EU legislation as
independent units. Moreover national Parliaments enjoy greater democratic legitimacy than
the national governments represented in the Council and the European Parliament and other
EU institutions. Centre for European Policy Studies, Egmont: European Policy Centre, op.
cit., pp. 107–19.
191 Robert Schutze, ‘Subsidiarity After Lisbon: Reinforcing the Safeguards of Federalism?’
Cambridge Law Journal, vol. 68, No. 3, 2009.
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Furthermore, the chapter has analysed the institutional architecture of the EU and
considered the innovations brought about by the Treaty of Lisbon.
The chapter has also discussed the limitations of the concept of supranationalism as an
adequate concept to express the complexities of European integration, and presented
federalism as an alternative framework to apply, in order to understand the workings
of the European Union. This, in turn, has led to an exploration of the implications for
the concept of sovereignty, following in the federalist tradition.
Moreover, the chapter has examined the recent decision of the FCC, taking as the
archetype some of the issues raised by different national Supreme and Constitutional
courts in various member states, concerning European integration.
The chapter has also analysed the concept of sovereignty as it applies to member
states in the context of the possibilities of a constitutionalism beyond the state. The
chapter then concluded with an analysis of the concept of subsidiarity, comparing it
with the concept of sovereignty, and considering the changes introduced by the Treaty
of Lisbon. In the context of sovereignty, if the EU is taken as a paradigmatic case, we
will learn that:
Rather than grope for the seat of sovereignty, we should adjust our
intellectual framework to a multi-layered reality consisting of a variety
of authoritative structures.192
192 Christoph Schreuer, ‘The Waning of the Sovereign State,’ European Journal of
International Law, Vol. 4, No. 1, 1993, p. 453.
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Chapter 5
Sovereignty in a Post-Westphalian World
1. Introduction
The chapter explores the changes to the concept of sovereignty in the post-
Westphalian world considering the different processes of institutionalisation in
international affairs that have challenged the exclusive authority of the modern
territorial state.
The chapter examines the limits imposed on sovereignty by the structure of the
international system, considering the rise of regional and functional legal orders that
have challenged the Bodinian understanding of sovereignty.
Furthermore, the chapter examines the relationship between the concept of
sovereignty and the international norms that protect the individual, exploring the
limitations of the Bodinian tradition of sovereignty, and the potential of the Althusian
tradition of sovereignty, in a world of overlapping and competing legal orders.
Moreover, the chapter analyses the phenomenon of global legal pluralism, considering
the multiplicity of institutional arrangements beyond the state, all with their own legal
systems and mechanisms of dispute resolution, which are fragmenting the unity of
International Law.
Of particular importance is the analysis relating to the phenomenon of
‘deterritorialization’ of authority, exploring the rise of different international regimes
at the regional and functional level. The chapter examines the concept of sovereignty
in the post-national world, and considers the insights offered by the federalist tradition
inaugurated by Johannes Althusius.
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Finally, the chapter concludes with a re-statement of the key points found throughout
the thesis.
4.1. International Law and the Concept of Sovereignty
The dominant ‘Bodinian’ tradition in International Law proclaimed sovereignty as
an absolute concept. This view is now being challenged by the rise of regional and
functional legal orders and by a ‘counter-tradition’ in the history of political thought
– referred to as ‘Althusian’ – which sees sovereignty as a flexible concept with non-
absolute connotations.
This means that in order to understand the changes to the framework of the concept
of sovereignty, it is necessary to understand the mechanisms of the changes. These
mechanisms of change include the fragmentation of International Law and the rise
or the creation of adjudicative bodies (such as International Courts and Tribunals
and Panels) with authority, which challenge the national authority of the sovereign
state.
International Law is in the process of fragmenting into a multiplicity of self-
contained regimes, which is due to the rise of regional and functional institutional
arrangements.1 These institutional arrangements with their own legal systems,2 pose
1 For Klabbers, the self-containment of these different areas of International Law is a form of
‘quasi-independence’ which goes hand-in-hand with the dispersion of authority, arguing that
‘where it was undisputed in yesterday’s world order, that legitimate authority rested with
states and states alone, authority now springs from a variety of sources and institutions’. Jan
Klabbers, ‘Setting the Scene in,’ Jan Klabbers, Anne Peters and Geir Ulfstein, The
Constitutionalization of International Law, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011, pp. 11–
12.
See also Chapter 1 on Fragmentation of International Law.
2 Martti Kosksenniemi refers to them as ‘functional regimes’, and identifies three forms of
fragmentation in International Law: first, new institutions or regimes that interpret the law in
an unorthodox way; second, the functional differentiation has institutionalised, firm
exceptions to that of general Public International Law; third, the potential for conflicts
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a challenge, not only to the legal order of the state, but also to the unity of
International Law. The nature of these challenges rests in the fact that these legal
systems (regional and functional) are self-referential.3
These legal regimes do not necessarily recognise the ultimate authority (summa
potestas) of the modern territorial state, with the result that conflict between these
different legal systems presents a challenge to monism or dualism, the traditional
approaches of international legal scholarship in the relationship between national
and international law.
Considering all of the above, it is important to emphasise that International Law in a
Post-Westphalian world should recognise sovereignty as the cornerstone of the
international system because of the pervasiveness of the state as the most important
actor in international affairs.
Notwithstanding, a new conceptualisation of sovereignty should incorporate the role
of institutionalised processes in dealing with transnational issues, considering that
the state is not able to deal with transnational issues without international
institutions, as Hobe explains:
As a bottom line, the new transnational law will recognise state
sovereignty as one core pillar of the international legal order. But
between these different regimes, see Martti Koskenniemi, The Politics of International Law,
Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2011, pp. 228–229. See Chapter 1 of this thesis on the theme of
fragmentation of International Law.
3 The notion of self-reference is inherent to the legal system as a whole, moreover, we could
argue like Luhmann that the legal system is ‘autopoietic’ in the sense that the legal system
‘produces by itself all the distinctions and concepts it uses and that the unity of law is nothing
but the fact of this self-production’, see Niklas Luhmann, Law as a Social System, Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2004, p. 70. In his criticism of this view, Habermas sees the
interconnectedness of Law with other domains, namely with Politics, Jurgen Habermas,
Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy,
Cambridge: Polity Press, 1997, p. 51. This relationship between Law and Politics is a key
theme in legal theory, particularly at the international level.
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this state sovereignty will again be subject to important changes
and, if you will, important restrictions. Because in view of the
global problems, for example of environmental degradation, and in
view of the state’s incapability exclusively to shape regulations for
the use of the internet or for international financial transactions of
transnational corporations, the new approach to sovereignty should
be designated as ‘enlightened sovereignty.4
Furthermore, the concept of sovereignty requires an understanding of the ‘self-
limitation’ of sovereignty; the concept of sovereignty as both a right and a duty, and
the idea of ‘ultimate authority’ should be seen in the context of the immanent limits of
sovereignty, which are to be found in the foundational norms and rules (the structure)
of the international system:
Sovereignty can, then, be understood as a dual structure in which a
supreme authority that is ‘independent of any other earthly
authority’ is coupled with the self-restrictive mentality that dignity
requires.5
Thus, a theory of sovereignty requires a thorough understanding of the different
institutional processes by which authority is shared. This implies comprehension
and appreciation of how different international institutions shape international
affairs. Hence, it is important to point out that the modern territorial state
becomes one of the many actors in the international system sharing authority, as
Hirst argues:
The new national sovereignty is above all the power to confer
legitimacy and governmental competence to other agencies,
international and local, but then to continue to support and sustain
4 Stephan Hobe, ‘Globalisation: A Challenge to the Nation State and to International Law,’ in
Michael Likosky (ed.), Transnational Legal Processes, Globalisation and Power Disparities,
Butterworths, 2002, p. 388.
5 Panu Minkkinen, Sovereignty, Knowledge, Law, Abingdon: Routledge, 2009, p. 72.
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those agencies as a co-operative partner in a new scheme of
authority. The nation state does not thereby become functionless,
rather it becomes the key node (the main source of legitimacy that
ties the whole together) in a complex web of governing powers. 6
In addition, the concept of sovereignty needs to be seen in light of the
reconfiguration of power7 in international affairs, considering that power and
authority are no longer solely exercised by states, but also by the different
mechanisms of global governance, as Maduro recalls:
Traditionally, the form of power has been the Constitution of the
Nation State. The States were the holders of the ultimate authority
and of monopoly over power (encapsulated in the traditional
conception of sovereignty); others could exercise such power but
either in the form of a delegation or authorisation from the State
(regulated, in turn, by its Constitution). Constitution and power
coincided in the same locus: the State. The idea of global
governance reflects a perception of change in the locus and forms
of power.8
6 Paul Hirst, From Statism to Pluralism, London: Routledge, 2003, pp. 230-31.
7 Authority is not the same as power. Power can be exercised by different actors or institutions
without regard to legitimacy, the same applies to sovereignty, which is an absolute category
that involves the right to rule legitimately, see Kalevi J., Holsti, Taming the Sovereigns,
Institutional Change in International Politics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004,
pp. 138–39.
8 Miguel Poiares Maduro, ‘From Constitutions to Constitutionalism: A Constitutional
Approach to Global Governance,’ in Douglas Lewis (ed.), Global Governance and the Quest
for Justice, vol. 1, International and Regional Organisations, Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2006,
p. 229. For a sceptical view of the mechanisms of global governance, particularly when using
the language of Constitutionalism proposed by some scholars, see David Kennedy, ‘The
Mystery of Global Governance,’ Ohio Northern University Law Review, vol. 34, 2008, pp.
854–57.
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In summary, International Law should recognise the role of all the different legal
systems (regional and functional) in the international legal process, and appreciate
how they challenge the authority of the state, defined as ‘summa potestas’, and
reconfigure the concept of sovereignty. Thus, sovereignty should be seen as a
concept that is determined by the structure of each international system, which
defines the rules of behaviour, rules of conduct and secondary rules.
International Law should also incorporate fully the contribution of federalism to the
concept of sovereignty. This means, in addition, that sovereignty should be seen as a
flexible concept with a non-absolute character, which can be shared by different
polities such as states and international organisations. The importance of the
‘Althusian’ tradition for International Law rests on the fact that in the view of the
author of this thesis, it offers a better understanding of the concept of sovereignty,
considering the rise of international legal orders (regional and functional) in
international affairs.
4.2. Sovereignty and the Individual
The concept of sovereignty can also be seen as a barrier to international governance,
and to the full development of human values, if one adopts the Bodinian
understanding of sovereignty.9 Notwithstanding, sovereignty should be seen as an
attribute of statehood that incorporates the protection of the individual in international
affairs. The old notion that proclaimed the power of the state as absolute does not any
longer hold in an international environment that imposes strong rules of behaviour on
the modern territorial state. In this conception, the normative status of sovereignty
derives from ‘humanity, understood as the legal principle in that human rights,
interests, and security must be respected and promoted, and that this humanistic
9 Louis Henkin, ‘Human Rights and State Sovereignty,’ Georgia Journal of International
Law, vol. 25, 1995, p. 31. Similarly, Koffi A. Annan, ‘Two Concepts of Sovereignty,’ The
Economist, 18 September, 1999. From this perspective, the protection of human rights is
directly linked to sovereignty as an attribute of statehood. See also W. Michael Reisman,
‘Sovereignty and Human Rights in Contemporary International Law,’ American Journal of
International Law, vol. 84, No. 4, 1990, p. 876.
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principle is also the telos of the international legal system’.10 As a corollary,
sovereignty is seen as encompassing the ‘responsibility to protect’,11 particularly
considering that:
In signing the Charter of the United Nations, States not only benefit
from the privileges of sovereignty but also accept its
responsibilities. Whatever perceptions may have prevailed when
the Westphalian system first gave rise to the notion of State
sovereignty, today it clearly carries with it the obligation of a State
to protect the welfare of its own peoples and meet its obligations to
the wider international community.12
The recent developments in International Criminal Law13 particularly with the
creation of the International Criminal Court (ICC), significantly challenges the
10 Anne Peters, ‘Humanity as the Α and Ώ of Sovereignty,’ European Journal of International
Law, vol. 20, No. 3, 2009, p. 514. Similarly, Ronald A. Brand, ‘Sovereignty: The State, The
Individual and the International Legal System in the Twenty-First Century,’ Hastings
International & Comparative Law Review, vol. 25, 2002.
11 International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), Report on The
Responsibility to Protect, 2001, http://www.iciss.ca/pdf/Commission-Report.pdf, [Accessed
21.12 2010]. Similarly, Philip Bobbitt, Terror and Consent, the Wars for the Twenty-First
Century, London: Penguin Books, 2008, p. 470. Against this view and arguing that
sovereignty has never been immune from intervention, therefore sovereignty is not really
changing see China Mieville, Between Equal Rights, A Marxist Theory of International Law,
London: Pluto Press, 2005, pp. 308–314.
12 Report of the High Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change, A More Secure World, Our
Shared Responsibility, 2004, Para. 29, p. 17, UN Doc A/59/565 2004 at:
http://www.un.org/secureworld/report2.pdf [Accessed 21.12.2010].
13 Particularly with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and
the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), both of which were created by
resolutions of the Security Council, and pose significant challenges to state sovereignty. See
Robert Cryer, ‘International Criminal Law vs. State Sovereignty: Another Round?’ The
European Journal of International Law, vol. 16, No. 5, 2006, p. 985; Antonio Cassese, ‘On
the Current Trends Towards Criminal Prosecution and Punishment of Breaches of
International Humanitarian Law,’ European Journal of International Law, vol. 9, 1998; M.
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traditional conception of sovereignty, defined as the supreme authority within the
national territorial borders,14 as Simpson puts it: ‘The apparent conflict between
sovereignty and international criminal law could not be so easily wished away,
however. This conflict is inevitably acute in the case of a treaty whose consequences
might be the prosecution of State nationals in international courts’.15 The traditional
notion of state sovereignty is challenged by the normative claims of international
institutions, particularly by International Courts in International Humanitarian Law,
by imposing international obligations to states, erga omnes16 and claiming a sphere of
authority that challenges state sovereign authority.
Cheriff Bassiouni, ‘From Versailles to Rwanda in Seventy-Five Years: The Need to Establish
a Permanent International Criminal Court,’ Harvard Human Rights Journal, vol. 10, 1997.
14 The ICC is based on states’ consent (Article 12) and the principle of complementarity
(Article 17, Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court). It challenges and sets aside
traditional notions of sovereignty, considering the potential for ‘judicial review’ and the direct
authority (jurisdiction) which the ICC has over individuals. See David A. Nill, ‘National
Sovereignty: Must it be Sacrificed to the International Criminal Court?’ Brigham Young
University Journal of Public Law, vol. 14, 1999, p. 134. In favour of the ICC considering that
sovereignty ‘can function in more than one manner’, see Alex Ward, ‘Breaking the
Sovereignty Barrier: The United States and the International Criminal Court,’ Santa Clara
Law Review, vol. 41, 2001 p. 1144. The notion of sovereign immunity in International Law is
also considered irrelevant for the purposes of criminal responsibility under the terms of the
Statute (Article 27 of the Rome Statute). This is in contrast to a recent ICJ decision, Arrest
Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Belgium), ICJ, 14 February
2002, where it appeared the ICJ upheld the doctrine of sovereign immunity for state officials.
15 Gerry Simpson, ‘Politics, Sovereignty, Remembrance.’ in Dominic McGoldrick, Peter
Rowe and Eric Donnelly (eds), The Permanent International Criminal Court, Oxford: Hart
Publishing, 2004, p. 55.
16 Obligations Erga omnes or peremptory norms apply even against state consent, they
include International Humanitarian Law and also the prohibition of the use of force by states,
except in the cases permitted under the UN Charter. See Alexander Orakhelashvili,
Peremptory Norms in International Law, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007, pp. 50–66.
The prohibition of Genocide and Slavery in International Law are seen as jus cogens norms,
Maurizio Ragazzi, The Concept of International Obligations Erga Omnes, Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1997, pp. 90–117, Alina Kaczorowska, Public International Law, fourth
edition, London: Routledge, 2010, p. 50. Peremptory Norms are recognised by the Vienna
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This was recognised by the ICJ, in its Advisory Opinion concerning the Genocide
Convention which stated that: ‘It has nevertheless been argued that any State entitled
to become a party to the Genocide Convention may do so while making any
reservation it chooses by virtue of its sovereignty. The Court cannot share this view. It
is obvious that so extreme an application of State sovereignty could lead to a complete
disregard of the object and purpose of the Convention’.17 In this case, the ICJ
recognised that the nature of the obligations in the Genocide Convention implied that
the traditional notion of sovereignty could not accept the possibility of reservations by
states in the Convention, particularly if the nature of those reservations threatened the
purposes and finality of the Convention.
Obligations erga omnes are part of the structure of the international system, in the
sense that they proscribe and prescribe certain behaviours by states in international
law (rules of behaviour). The nature of these obligations significantly changes the
general principle of International Law, in that rules are only valid if states have
accepted them (the principle of consent)18.
Some of these norms are not new, such as the Kellog-Briand Pact,19 which prohibited
aggressive war in International Law. The growing elements of hierarchy in the
Convention on the Law of Treaties (Article 53), the ICJ also recognised these obligations in
the Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited (Belgium v. Spain),(New
Application: 1962), ICJ. The nature of jus cogens obligations is problematic, and its
peremptory character is disputed by Peter Malanczuk, Akehurst’s Modern Introduction to
International Law, London: Routledge, 1997, p. 58, similarly Dinah Shelton, ‘International
Law and ‘Relative Normativity’ in Malcolm Evans (ed.), International Law, Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2006, pp. 164–73.
17 Advisory Opinion Concerning Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, International Court of Justice (ICJ), 28 May 1951., pa.
24, available at: http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/12/4283.pdf [Accessed 21.12.2010].
18 Juan Antonio Carrillo Salcedo, ‘Reflections on the Existence of a Hierarchy of Norms in
International Law,’ European Journal of International Law, vol. 8, No. 4, 1997, p. 586.
19 Its formal name is ‘General Treaty for the Renunciation of War’, 1928. The Treaty is still in
force, although most of its norms are now incorporated into the UN Charter, which forbids the
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international legal system are determined by the rise of functional legal regimes such
as the ICTR, the ICTY and the ICC. These new regimes contribute to the
fragmentation of International Law, and are part of the increasing ‘institutionalisation’
in international affairs. This means that in order to understand the concept of
sovereignty in the present international system, it is necessary to look at the impact of
these legal regimes on the idea of ‘ultimate authority’. That impact rests in the
positive rules that define what is and what is not acceptable behaviour. However,
more important, is the growing role of the adjudicative bodies that interpret those
rules, which is also redefining the way the concept of sovereignty, as an essential
attribute of state, is seen.
Consequently, a new understanding of sovereignty that incorporates the protection of
individuals in International Law is necessary, and also, one that recognises the
contribution of the different adjudicative bodies to the reformulation of the concept of
sovereignty, as Worth argues:
This reformulation would replace the misguided structural balance
between the empowering and limiting aspects of sovereignty,
which posited international cooperation as a tolerable concession,
with a functional understanding of sovereignty strengthened by
cooperation. Truly transnational concerns would no longer simply
be tolerated derogations of sovereignty; rather, ‘they [would
become] emanations of that sovereignty.’ Perhaps most
importantly, under this reformulation, sovereignty would no longer
exist in diametrical opposition to global denationalization.20
right to wage war (jus ad bellum), Antonio Cassese, International Law, Oxford: Oxford
University Press, pp. 33–34.
20 John R. Worth, ‘Globalization and the Myth of Absolute National Sovereignty:
Reconsidering the “Un-signing” of the Rome Statute and the Legacy of Senator Bricker,’
Indiana Law Journal, vol. 79, 2004, p. 262. Similarly, David Held, ‘The Changing Structure
of International Law: Sovereignty Transformed?’ in David Held and Anthony McGrew (eds),
The Global Transformations Reader, Cambridge: Polity Press, 2000, p. 172.
207
4.3. Global Legal Pluralism
International Law cannot be seen as the sole product of the modern territorial state,
but rather should be viewed as the result of an exchange of the different actors in the
international legal process, including states, international organisations and
international institutions. This means that the international legal process should be
decentralised, in the sense that it derives from multiple sources.
This is why it is important to consider the diversity in the transnational legal and
political process in the creation of law, as Santos argues: ‘the concept of law put
forward by liberal political theory – the equation between nation, state and law – and
elaborated upon in nineteenth-century and twentieth-century legal positivism is too
narrow for our purposes, since it recognizes only one of the time-spaces: the national
one’.21
Thus, International Law should be seen not as a project of a unified and complete
legal system,22 but as a set of competing and overlapping legal orders, expressed in
the different regional and functional institutional arrangements at the international
level.23 Hence, legal pluralism ‘involves renouncing the binary opposition between
hierarchical relationships (by subordination of one order to another) and non-
hierarchical relationships (by coordination) and considering the process of interaction
in a more nuanced fashion, a bit like the reflection of diverse pluralisms’.24
21 Boaventura de Sousa Santos, Towards a New Legal Common Sense: Law, Globalization
and Emancipation, Butterworths, 2002, p. 86.
22 The goal of the positivist understanding of International Law as a complete and rational
unified legal system, see Martti Koskenniemi, The Gentle Civilizer of Nations: the Rise and
Fall of International Law 1870-1960, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001, p. 57.
23 This pluralism of International Law can be described as a ‘jurisgenerative’ process, in
which the creation of law by different transnational communities is seen through their own
narratives and precepts, see Paul Schiff Berman, ‘A Pluralist approach to International Law,’
Yale Journal of International Law, vol. 32, 2007, p. 322.
24 Mireille Delmas-Marty, Ordering Pluralism: A Conceptual Framework for Understanding
the Transnational Legal World, Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2009, p. 15. For Delmas-Marty,
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The presence of the different plural legal orders in international affairs, each
representing its own epistemic community, results from the decentralised law-making
process of international legal processes, this means that international systems cannot
be thought of as supreme over the national systems of states (monism), and cannot be
seen as completely separated from the national legal system (dualism).25
International Law, viewed from the perspective of legal pluralism, can be seen as an
alternative to both monism and dualism. Legal pluralism offers a superior theory of
coordination between different legal orders to monism or dualism, in the sense that it
assumes that the different legal systems26 are in a ‘heterarchical’27 rather than a
hierarchical relationship, each with a claim to a sphere of authority, while ensuring
that no one system can claim supreme authority.
Furthermore, legal pluralism assumes that each system is supreme, and as such, it
offers a theory of coordination rather than a theory of supremacy of a particular legal
system. Legal pluralism at the international level recognises the autonomy and
uniqueness of each legal system.
legal pluralism or ordered pluralism involves three processes: coordination, harmonisation
and unification, Delmas-Marty, op. cit., p. 18.
25 Peter Malanczuk, op. cit., p. 63. This is also related to the fragmentation of International
Law, Paul Schiff Berman, ‘Federalism and International Law through the Lens of Legal
Pluralism,’ Missouri Law Review, vol. 73, No. 4, 2006, p. 1183.
26 The interaction of the different legal systems includes the national legal system and the
international legal system, which is becoming increasingly fragmented into regional and
functional legal systems.
27 The term is coined by Neil Walker, and as he makes clear: ‘legal pluralism assumes that the
state is “no longer the sole locus of constitutional authority”’, see Neil Walker (ed.),
Sovereignty in Transition, Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2003, p. 4. The notion of ‘Contrapunctual
Law’ offered by Maduro is another attempt to demonstrate at the European level the
possibilities of legal pluralism in the political process, where sovereignty is fiercely contested,
which is the case with the EU, see Miguel Poiares Maduro, ‘Contrapunctual Law: Europe’s
Constitutional Pluralism in Action,’ in Neil Walker (ed), Sovereignty in Transition, op. cit.
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A theory of sovereignty should recognise that authority is multi-layered, and that the
modern territorial state constitutes only one level in which authority can be
legitimately be exercised. This means that in understanding the articulation between
different legal systems, it is crucial to consider the possibilities of legal pluralism in
contrast to both monism and dualism.
As a result, sovereignty cannot be seen in light of either the Bodinian or Hobbesian
traditions, considering that these traditions identify states as the sole repository of
authority in international affairs, and assume the inherent supremacy of state or
national law.
Instead, the concept of sovereignty should be seen from the Althusian tradition, in the
sense that sovereignty is not a unitary concept, but a pluralistic one that is based on
the multiplicity of levels within the state and the diversity of polities and their legal
systems beyond the state. This will demand recognition of the multiple sources of law
beyond the state, each claiming authority.
5. Deterritorialization of Authority
‘Deterritorialization’ means the process of disaggregation of authority, by which
territoriality as a variable of authority, loses its relevance in a world of multiple,
overlapping centres of authority. The result of this is that the umbilical link between
supreme authority and territory is severed,28 whereby the state, as the supreme
28 This does not mean that territoriality is rendered obsolete, but that sovereignty defined as
supreme authority, cannot be seen as absolute and only exercised by the modern territorial
state. Deterritorialization ‘is the name given to the problematic of the territory losing its
significance and power in everyday life’, Gearóid Ó Tuathail, ‘Borderless Worlds:
Problematizing Discourses of Deterritorialization in Global Finance and Digital Culture,’ in
Geopolitics at the End of the Twentieth Century: The Changing World Political Map, Nurit
Kliot and David Newman (eds), London: Frank Cass, 2000, p. 40. Deterritorialization
presupposes reconfiguration of territoriality and its re-scaling, see Neil Brenner, ‘Beyond
State-Centrism? Space, Territoriality, and Geographical Scale,’ in Globalization Studies,
Theory and Society, vol. 28, No. 1, 1999, p. 50.
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embodiment of sovereignty, now grapples with other mechanisms and processes that
restructure territoriality; ‘deterritorialization implies ‘reterritorialization’.29 Therefore,
sovereignty should also be seen as deterritorialized, as Simpson points out:
‘sovereignty has somehow been deterritorialized in the process of
decomposition/recomposition’.30
The phenomenon of deterritorialization of authority should be considered within the
context of the emergence of mechanisms of global governance, which includes
regional and functional institutional arrangements, such as the EU, the ICC and the
WTO. The creation of new ‘legal spaces’ beyond the modern state is part of the
process of deterritorialization of authority. These new legal spaces are not based on
territoriality, however, which means that the notion of sovereignty or ultimate
authority within a national circumscribed territory, will not explain these new
mechanisms of international governance.
In this ‘new medievalism’, states are no longer the sole depositaries of exclusive
authority. The international system is now composed of a multiple centres of
authority, as Brolman explains:
How has the principle of territoriality in international law come
under pressure? At least two phenomena, international and
transnational, are instrumental. We see a decline in the role of the
territorial parameter brought about by both traditional structures,
which have emanated from states, and by new, transboundary
29 Globalisation can be seen as reterritorialization of socio-economic and political institutional
spaces, see Neil Brenner, ‘Globalisation as Reterritorialization: The Re-scaling of Urban
Governance in the European Union,’ Urban Studies, vol. 36, No. 3, 1999, p. 432; Gearóid Ó
Tuathail, and Timothy O Luke, ‘Present at (Dis)Integration: Deterritorialization and
Reterritorialization in the New Wor(l)d Order,’ Annals of the Association of American
Geographers, vol. 84, No. 3, 1994.
30 Gerry Simpson, ‘The Guises of Sovereignty,’ in Trudy Jacobsen, Charles Sampford and
Ramesh Thakur, Re-Envisioning Sovereignty: The End of Westphalia? Aldershot: Ashgate,
2008, p. 68.
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private structures.31
2.1. Sovereignty after Westphalia
Just like the rise of the modern territorial state reconfigured supreme authority into
the notion of exclusive territorial sovereignty, the rise of mechanisms of global
governance is also reconfiguring authority and detaching it from the notion of the
exclusive territorial jurisdiction of the state,32 as Elden argues: ‘In this understanding,
territory does not cease to be important, rather it is no longer bound within a single
state’.33 This does not mean that territoriality as the hallmark of sovereign statehood
ceases to be relevant it suggests that territoriality is being transformed by new
authoritative institutional arrangements beyond the state.
A theory of sovereignty should incorporate and recognise the dynamic institutional
processes at every level, for it is at all levels that the reconfiguration of supreme
authority and territoriality beyond ‘sovereigntist territorialism and universalism’ is
taking place.34 This implies a new understanding of the role of overlapping multiple
institutional arrangements and its legal systems, which claim authority beyond the
state, and redefine the link between authority and territory in a way that challenges
the summa potestas of the state. For modern territorial states, this poses a paradox, as
Behr argues: ‘In order to react towards deterritorialized politics and to reassert their
31 Catherine Brölmann, ‘Deterritorialization in International Law: Moving Away from the
Divide between National and International Law,’ in Janne Nijman and André Nollkaemper
(eds), New Perspectives on the Divide between National and International Law, Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2007, p. 91.
32 This is the case with the EU, see James A. Caporaso and Joseph Jupille, ‘Sovereignty and
Territoriality in the European Union: Transforming the UK Institutional Order,’ in:
Christopher K. Ansell and Giuseppe Di Palma (eds), Restructuring Territoriality: Europe and
the United States Compared, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004, pp. 72–73.
33 Stuart Elden, ‘Missing the Point: Deterritorialization and the Space of the World,’
Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers, vol. 30, No. 1, 2005, p. 16.
34 Paul Schiff Berman, ‘Global Legal Pluralism,’ Southern California Law Review, vol. 80,
2007, p. 1192.
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power in global politics, states must overcome their traditional principles of territorial
politics and further develop deterritorializing politics’.35 The paradox lies in the fact
that politics is still national while the impact of transnational politics requires states
and different actors at the international level to transcend the territoriality of politics
at the national level.36
This implies an understanding of sovereignty that takes into account the mechanisms
of global governance, particularly one that recognises the shift of authority from states
towards international ‘authoritative institutions’, which institutions are changing the
structure of the international system and, thus, transforming sovereignty itself, as
Cooper et. al. argue: ‘Once authoritative institutions arise, we expect they will feed
back into changes in the international system that will facilitate the future creation of
more such institutions and will increase levels of authority for existing institutions. In
the process the international system may be transformed’.37This means that the
structure of the international system, although anarchical, should be seen as multi-
layered and composed of hierarchical elements.38 Furthermore, the changes in the
35 Hartmut Behr, ‘Deterritorialization and the Transformation of Statehood: The Paradox of
Globalisation,’ Geopolitics, vol. 13, No. 2, 2008, p. 376.
36 For instance, the role of dispute resolution in International Investment Law, particularly
Arbitration between private actors and national states as the result of Bilateral Investment
Treaties (BIT) and at the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID),
which created a new forum that transcends national dispute resolution mechanisms, such as
national courts, which significantly restrict states’ sovereignty, as Cheng argues:
‘International Investment Law diminishes the authority and power of the state by restraining
its internal decision-makers’, see Thai Heng Cheng, ‘Power, Authority and International
Investment Law,’ American University International Law Review, vol. 20, 2005, p. 482.
Similarly, Rudolph Dolzer and Christoph Schreuer, Principles of International Investment
Law, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008, p. 9.
37 Scott Cooper, Darren Hawkins, Wade Jacoby and Daniel Nielson, ‘Yielding Sovereignty to
International Institutions: Bringing System Structure Back In,’ International Studies Review,
vol. 10, 2008, p. 504.
38 Hierarchy should also be included within the understanding of the traditional notion of
sovereignty, David A. Lake, ‘The New Sovereignty in International Relations,’ International
Studies Review, vol. 5, 2005, pp. 316–21.
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Westphalian system of states does not mean that states cease to be relevant, or that
they suddenly become insignificant in international affairs, but that attributes of
statehood, particularly sovereignty, should be seen in the context of the increasing
institutionalisation of international affairs.39
Consequently, a theory of sovereignty should address the issue of authority by
international institutions and international organisations. This requires an analysis that
goes beyond the positivist understanding of the Wimbledon Decision, which is
somehow prevalent in International Law.40 International obligations and authoritative
structures that challenge state sovereignty do not always reflect states’ preferences
and interests, and it is this fact that puts states at odds with international institutions
and organisations, and it is in this context that it is necessary to understand the
concept of sovereignty.
Furthermore, International Law and international institutions reflect the asymmetries
of power in international affairs, as seen in the case of the Security Council,41 with the
39 This means that a new theory of the state is required; one that acknowledges the plurality of
actors and institutions in international affairs which are challenging states’ sovereignty.
40 States voluntarily accept participation in international institutions, nonetheless, these
institutions, created by states (or accessed through membership) will restrict state sovereignty,
Wang refers to this dilemma in the context of the WTO when he notes that ‘The WTO
Agreements and other international agreements have, through the operation of the principle of
national treatment and other basic requirements, imposed substantive restrictions on
sovereignty, including the power to legislate and to tax’. See Guiguo Wang, ‘The Impact of
Globalization on State Sovereignty,’ Chinese Journal of International Law, vol. 3, 2004, p.
477.
41 The Security Council is the organ responsible for the maintenance of international peace
and security and, as such, is the most influential within the UN system. The Security Council
Resolutions can impose obligations on states in International Law, as the ICJ stated: ‘Within
the legal framework of the United Nations Charter, notably on the basis of Articles 24, 25 and
chapter VII thereof, the Security Council may adopt resolutions imposing obligations under
international law.’, Advisory Opinion in Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral
Declaration of Independence In Respect of Kosovo, (ICJ), 22 July 2010., Paragraph 85. This
is why White argues that ‘in practice, the hierarchy provisions of the UN Charter are being
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result that ‘the relationship between the distribution of power (in particular
unipolarity) and sovereignty demands attention’.42 The analysis of the concept of
sovereignty should consider that the concept of sovereignty needs to be seen from the
constitutional rules of the United Nations system, which emphasises the prohibition of
certain behaviours such as aggressive war43 and genocide among other issues of
international concern.
This also means that the concept of sovereignty is in the process of being challenged
by the rise of different mechanisms of international governance, particularly regional
and functional.
Furthermore, it is important to emphasise that the federalist tradition offers an
alternative view of sovereignty that challenges the traditional understanding of
sovereignty.
moulded by the Security Council’, see Nigel White, ‘Hierarchy in International
Organisations: Regional Bodies and the United Nations,’ in Nicholas Tsagourias,
Transnational Constitutionalism: International and European Perspectives, Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2007, p. 142.
Nonetheless, the fact remains that the Security Council is still an arrangement of the Great
Powers (defined in 1945), although is institutionalised in the UN Charter (legalised
hegemony), and as Krisch argues: ‘international institutions and great powers often coexist in
an ambivalent relationship.’, Nico Krisch, ‘The Security Council and the Great Powers,’ in
Vaughan Lowe, Adam Roberts, Jennifer Welsh and Dominik Zaum (eds), The United Nations
Security Council and War, 2008, p. 133.
42 Melea Lewis, Charles Sampford and Ramesh Thakur, ‘Introduction,’ in Trudy Jacobsen,
Charles Sampford and Ramesh Thakur, Re-Envisioning Sovereignty, op. cit., p. 4.
43 For instance, the ICJ discussed the principle of non-intervention and the notion of
aggression in the Nicaragua case against the background of the Article 2(4) of the UN
Charter, Christine Gray, International Law and the Use of Force, Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2008, pp. 75–78.
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6. Conceptual Theory: The History of Sovereignty
The concept of sovereignty should not be seen as absolute, indivisible or inalienable,
but as a flexible concept that encompasses the notion of shared or partial sovereignty,
as Krasner emphasises: ‘A second problem with simply treating final authority within
a defined territory as unproblematic is that there are territories and spheres of human
activity in which only partial sovereignty – that is control over only some issues – is
claimed’.44 Sovereignty was never an absolute concept in the first place, at least not in
the international practice of states,45 although the Bodinian and Hobbesian tradition
argued for an absolute and exclusive conception of sovereignty to be attributed to the
sovereign state.
In the history of the concept of sovereignty, it is necessary to appreciate that the
Bodinian tradition appeared as a challenge to the medieval worldview of the
Respublica Christiana, which was composed of multiple polities other than the state.
The gradual rise of the modern territorial state was then followed by an adherence to
the tradition that ascribed states the ultimate authority within a national territory as
Schmitt argues:
Thus arose the territorial order of the ‘state’ – spatially self-
contained, impermeable, unburdened with the problem of estate,
ecclesiastical, and creedal civil wars. It became the representative
of a new order in international law, whose spatial structure was
determined by and referred to the state.46
44 Stephen Krasner, ‘Sovereignty: An Institutional Perspective,’ Comparative Political
Studies, vol. 21 No. 1, 1988, p. 87. Considering that there are many institutional arrangements
where sovereignty is shared, the EU as a confederation is an example that was examined in
Chapter 4 of this thesis.
45 This is why Stephen Krasner sees sovereignty as ‘organised hypocrisy’, considering the
violations of sovereignty since the Peace of Westphalia, Stephen Krasner, Sovereignty:
Organized Hypocrisy, op. cit., 1999.
46 Carl Schmitt, The Nomos of the Earth in the International Law of the Jus Publicum
Europaeum (first published in 1950), New York: Telos Press Publishing, 2003, pp. 129
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It is necessary to understand that the concept of sovereignty – even within the
Bodinian tradition – was never unlimited in the sense that it allowed states to have
absolute power within their jurisdictions and territory. Furthermore, the concept of
sovereignty had many facets, each determined by the ‘constitutional or foundational’
precepts of the different international systems since the Peace of Westphalia in
1648.47
Notwithstanding, in the present international system, the concept of sovereignty as an
attribute of statehood should be seen detached from the idea of complete exclusive
territorial authority, which means that states can share sovereignty with other polities,
and that ultimate authority is never absolute, as Judge Alvarez said:
We can no longer regard sovereignty as an absolute and individual
right of every State, as used to be done under the old law bound by
the rules which they accept. Today owing to social interdependence
and to the predominance of the general interest, the States are
bound by many rules which have not been ordered by their will.
The sovereignty of States has now become an institution, an
international social function of a psychological character, which has
to be exercised in accordance with the new international law.48
47 The systems identified in the Thesis are the Peace of Westphalia (1648), The Congress of
Vienna (1815), The Peace of Versailles (1918) and the United Nations (1945). Sovereignty
assumes different characteristics in each system determined by the structure of each
international system. This means that each system has its own constitutional rules (rules of
membership, behaviour and secondary rules) and that these change the definition of
sovereignty. For instance, sovereignty in the system inaugurated by the Congress of Vienna
assumes characteristics different from the international system inaugurated by the Peace of
Versailles concerning the Prohibition of aggressive war, which only occurred with the Kellog-
Briand Pact of 1928. Moreover, these foundational rules are not static, but they evolved
considerably, and that is the case with the contemporary international system.
48 Individual Opinion of Judge Alvarez in Corfu Channel Case (United Kingdom v. Albania);
Merits, International Court of Justice (ICJ), 9 April 1949, p. 43. Available at: http://www.icj-
cij.org/docket/files/1/1649.pdf [Accessed 21.12.2010].
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Hence, a new conception of sovereignty is warranted, one that considers the changes
in the present international system, and ‘whatever names this new form of sovereignty
professes – be it global governance, cosmopolitan democracy, transnational
citizenship, universal community, contingent sovereignty, empire or whatever – it is
said to be characterized by its gradual withdrawal from the boundaries established for
politics by the modern state’.49
3.1. Conceptual Theory: Federalism and the European Union
The revival of the federalist tradition inaugurated by Althusius provides a good
starting point for an analysis of the concept of sovereignty. This is because federalism
as a political theory attempts to combine different polities into a larger political
system by the principle of partnership. For federal polities, the very notion of the
absolute and unlimited character of sovereignty is meaningless, because federalism is
based on the notion of a covenant between polities, which share sovereignty.
As discussed in Chapter 3, federalism was rediscovered by the American federal
polity as a mechanism of governance for the original thirteen colonies, which had at
least three federal regimes since the approval of their first constitution, seen in The
Articles of the Confederation. That said, it is important to emphasise that the concept
of sovereignty in the American tradition always emphasised the concept of ‘dual
sovereignty’ between states and the Union, although as was argued above, only the
American federation had international legal sovereignty.
The European tradition of federalism also offers significant insights into the concept
of sovereignty because there was a diversity of federal polities sharing sovereignty at
the international level. This meant that in Europe, sovereignty was never seen as an
obstacle for unions of states in the federal sense, a good example of which is the
German Federation of 1815; a creation of the Congress of Vienna. The concept of
49 Juri Lipping, ‘Sovereignty Beyond the State,’ in Hent Kalmo and Quentin Skinner (eds),
Sovereignty in Fragments: The Past, Present and Future of a Contested Concept, Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2010, p. 187.
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sovereignty in the European tradition was always seen as flexible and non-absolute
sovereignty, which could be divided and shared between sovereign states. It is notable
that the Bodinian tradition rejects this understanding, which is why it is necessary to
appreciate the importance of the Althusian tradition in the history of political thought.
More recently with the process of EU integration, sovereignty has broken away from
the Bodinian understanding and its absolute connotations. This is why Rabkin claims
that ‘Sovereignty was first developed as a political doctrine by Europeans, but in
today’s Europe, most states are no longer fully sovereign’.50 European integration did
not eliminate the sovereignty of the modern territorial state,51 but it did significantly
reconfigure sovereignty in the context of a pluralistic governance system, just like
Althusius proposed in his work.
Sovereignty, in the context of European integration, becomes a legal concept shared
and divided by the member states and the EU, although the sovereign powers
exercised by the European Union are not a simple case of a delegation of powers. It is
necessary therefore to keep in mind that European integration is not state unification;
member states still have the ultimate power of withdrawal, now recognised by the
Treaty of Lisbon. This follows Schmitt’s assertion that ‘sovereign is he who decides
on the exception’,52 and this is why Koskenniemi asks the question of whether ‘a
sovereign really [can] be able to alienate its sovereignty in a permanent way?’53
50 Jeremy Rabkin, ‘Recalling the Case for Sovereignty,’ Chicago Journal of International
Law, vol. 5, No. 2, 2005, p. 452. Similarly, Robert O. Keohane, ‘Ironies of Sovereignty: The
European Union and the United States,’ Journal of Common Market Studies, vol. 40, No. 4,
2002, p. 748.
51 Andras Jakab, ‘Neutralizing the Sovereignty Question: Compromise Strategies in
Constitutional Argumentations about the Concept of Sovereignty for the European
Integration,’ European Constitutional Law Review, vol. 2, 2006.
52 Carl Schmitt, Political Theology, Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty, Chicago:
Chicago University Press, 2005, p. 5.
53 Martti Koskenniemi, ‘Conclusion: Vocabularies of Sovereignty-Powers of a Paradox,’ in
Hent Kalmo and Quentin Skinner (eds), Sovereignty in Fragments, op. cit., p. 227.
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The conception of sovereignty put forward in this thesis, therefore, is one based on
the counter-tradition in political thought inaugurated by Althusius, as Hueglin argues:
‘by contrast, what is claimed here as a counter-tradition in Western political thought
is a Weltanschauung (World-view) based on multidirectional pluralism and diversity.
According to this view and tradition states are important agents of political authority
and power, but not the exclusive ones’.54
This presupposes a change of paradigm; an altered world-view that accepts an
alternative to the traditional understanding of sovereignty, particularly considering the
endless debates about its usefulness or relevance, and as Kuhn argues, it is one where
the willing see what was there already in a different way: ‘Led by a new paradigm
scientists adopt new instruments and look in new places. Even more important during
revolutions scientists see new and different things when looking with familiar
instruments in places they have looked before’.55
This new model recognises the limitations of previous scholarship in the analysis of
the concept of sovereignty,56 and maps out new avenues towards an understanding of
sovereignty in a world of overlapping and competing ‘authoritative’ international
institutions that challenge state sovereignty.
In order to comprehend the new paradigm, it is important to acknowledge the three
main streams of the literature on the subject of the concept of sovereignty: the end of
54 Thomas O. Hueglin, Early Modern Concepts for a Late Modern World: Althusius on
Community and Federalism, Ontario: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 1999, pp. 201-2.
55 Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Chicago: Chicago University
Press, 1996, p. 111.
56Hudson is critical of the limitations of the literature in seeing sovereignty as an a-historical
concept, together with the fact that many authors reduce their analysis to the historical
examples of France and England, see Wayne Hudson, ‘Fables of Sovereignty,’ in Trudy
Jacobsen, Charles Sampford and Ramesh Thakur (eds), Re-Envisioning Sovereignty, op. cit.,
p. 23.
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sovereignty, the centrality of sovereignty and the qualification of sovereignty.57 The
literature concerned with the end of sovereignty proclaims sovereignty as an obsolete
concept that does not reflect the political and legal realities in international affairs;58
the literature about the centrality of sovereignty recognises that sovereignty is not an
absolute concept or a-historical, seeing it, nonetheless, as a concept bound within
certain limits to ensure constitutional government,59 but still as the most important
concept in International Law; the literature concerned with the qualification of
sovereignty seeks to reframe the concept of sovereignty in light of the changes in the
international system, and acknowledges the traditional limitations of the concept.60
The analysis of the concept of sovereignty proposed by this thesis belongs within this
last stream of literature: two primary goals were sought in the research; first has been
to retrace the concept of sovereignty in its historical origins, and offer an alternative
insight into the notion of sovereignty following the Althusian tradition and federal
theory. Second, has been to consider the limitations of states in dealing with
transnational issues in a globalised world, offering an account of the mechanisms of
global governance, and bearing in mind the role of ‘authoritative’ international
institutions in challenging state sovereignty and in considering the increasing
institutionalisation of international affairs.
57 Joseph Camilleri, ‘Sovereignty Discourse and Practice―Past and Future,’ in Trudy
Jacobsen, Charles Sampford and Ramesh Thakur (eds), Re-Envisioning Sovereignty, op. cit.,
pp. 37–38.
58 There are normative and descriptive arguments in the literature, including those who
propose the extirpation of sovereignty of the legal and political lexicon, and argue for the
replacement of sovereignty with other concepts such as subsidiarity, see Mattias Kumm, ‘The
Legitimacy of International Law: A Constitutionalist Framework of Analysis,’ European
Journal of International Law, vol. 15, No. 5, 1999.
59 This argument is made by Rabkin, who claims that sovereignty as an attribute of statehood
can be seen in the context of a constitutional culture that protects rights and depends on
popular sovereignty, which he says is the case in the US, considering its Constitutional
history, see Jeremy A. Rabkin, Law Without Nations? Why Constitutional Government
Requires Sovereign States, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005, pp. 18–44.
60 Jens Bartleson, A Genealogy of Sovereignty, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1995, pp. 12–52.
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In the international system, the concept of sovereignty cannot be seen as obsolete or
as an obstacle to the fulfilment of international cooperation between states or the
attainment of goals, such as the protection of the individual. Sovereignty is and will
continue to be a key ordering principle of International Law in the relations between
states. 61
Notwithstanding, sovereign statehood should be seen within the context of the
demands of international cooperation and the development of ‘authoritative
international institutions’, which challenge the absolute and exclusive ‘reserved
domain’ of the state.62
As a consequence, the structure of the international system poses ‘immanent limits’ to
the concept of sovereignty, particularly if the constitutional rules of the international
system are considered .
The fact that sovereignty is an essentially contestable concept,63 full of emotional
connotations,64 does not mean that its obsolescence or eradication should be
61 Juliane Kokott, ‘States’ Sovereign Equality,’ Max Planck Encyclopaedia of Public
International Law, 2007, paras 79–82, at: http://www.mpepil.com/ViewPdf /epil/entries/law-
9780199231690e1113.pdf?stylesheet=EPIL-display-full.xsl [Accessed 21.12.2010].
62 Margot E. Salomon, Global Responsibility for Human Rights: World Poverty and the
Development of International Law, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007, pp. 26–7;
similarly, Federico Lenzerini, ‘Sovereignty Revisited: International Law and Parallel
Sovereignty of Indigenous Peoples,’ Texas Journal of International Law, vol. 42, 2006, p.
159.
63 Samantha Besson, ‘Sovereignty in Conflict,’ European Integration Online Papers (EIoP)
at: http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2004-015a.htm [Accessed 21.12.2010]. As Pavlich and Barbour
argue: ‘Worse, the term denotes many things, from the “untrammelled power of rulers” to the
“highest possible authority”, to specific powers of agents (sovereigns) such as monarchs,
states, dictators, parliaments and the people’. See George Pavlich and Charles Barbour,
‘Introduction,’ in Charles Barbour and George Pavlich (eds), After Sovereignty: On the
Question of Political Beginnings, Abingdon: Routledge, 2010, p. 2.
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advocated, as Crawford warns, ‘But the term is ineradicable, and anyway its
eradication might only make matters worse’.65 This is because states are still the most
important actors in the international system and that sovereignty presupposes the
existence of states.
Furthermore, even if sovereignty is seen as a social construct,66 it is important to
emphasise that states remain the natural realm for the political participation of
individuals (politics is mostly national), which means that states are seen as the
natural depositories for the aspirations of groups that desire recognition under
International Law.67
This is an important point when it is considered that the rise of the modern territorial
state has been associated with particular national groups, and that it is for this reason
that most of the literature still refers to the modern territorial state as a ‘Nation-
State’.68 This also suggests that different national groups hold deep attachment for the
modern territorial state,69 despite that in federal and international arrangements, such
as the EU, it is possible to discern the emergence of transnational identities that
complement national identities, as Allot notes:
One way or another, therefore, a state-society is able to generate
powerful emotions in its citizens in conducting its struggle to
identify itself by asserting its rights over territory and to defend its
64 Jenik Radon, ‘Sovereignty: A Political Emotion, not a Concept,’ Stanford Journal of
International Law, vol. 40, 2004.
65 James Crawford, The Creation of States in International Law, Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2006, p. 32.
66 Thomas J. Biersteker and Cytnthia Weber, ‘The Social Construction of State Sovereignty,’
in Thomas J. Biersteker and Cynthia Weber (eds), State Sovereignty as Social Construct,
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.
67 This is why the principle of self-determination applies to states and not to other polities,
because states are seen as the ‘natural polities’ in the international system.
68 The ‘Nation-State’ is in fact a social construct, as discussed in Chapter 1 of this thesis.
69 Attachment to states is not a universal phenomenon otherwise secessionist movements
would not exist in several states, including those where the modern states first emerged.
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identity by defending those rights. Loyalty to the state-society and
its government has been connected with love of country, with love
of the most personal possessions. And since the state-society has
identified itself by so-called sovereignty, an original and natural
and unlimited authority, it has seemed only natural that sovereignty
over territory should be conceived as being an aspect of
sovereignty and hence of the very identity of the state society.70
Nonetheless, in the post-Westphalian international system the concept of sovereignty
should be seen in the context of the plurality of polities and institutional arrangements
that have claimed a sphere of authority, which has challenged the sovereignty of the
state. Thus, a Bodinian understanding of sovereignty is untenable when it is
considered that the Althusian tradition offers a ‘better’ explanation as to the relevance
and pervasiveness of sovereignty in the current international system, because
sovereignty is seen as:
1. An institution that derives from the structure of the international system (its
constitutional rules);
2. A part of the multi-layered and pluralistic governance system composed of
states, regional and functional legal orders, and other institutional processes;
3. A concept in which supreme authority is shared71 between different
institutional arrangements, including the state, and which is contingent (non-
absolute).
3.2. Reconceptualising Sovereignty: The Argument Re-stated
There are two distinct historical traditions in political theory about the concept of
sovereignty: the Bodinian tradition and the Althusian tradition.
70 Philip Allott, Eunomia: New Order for a New World, Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1990, p. 323.
71 Stephen Krasner, ‘The Hole in the Whole: Sovereignty, Shared Sovereignty, and
International Law,’ Michigan Journal of International Law, vol. 25, 2004, p. 17.
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The Bodinian tradition sees sovereignty as an absolute and unlimited power of the
territorial state; as Bodin argued it is the ‘absolute and perpetual power of the
commonwealth’.72 This tradition considers that the loci of authority should be
concentrated in the modern territorial state by exclusion of other polities and
institutional arrangements. That said, it is important to emphasise, as Krasner does,
that: ‘organized hypocrisy has always characterized the sovereign state system’,73
considering that the Great Powers never fully respected the principle of non-
intervention contained in the principle of sovereignty.
Conversely, the Althusian tradition considers sovereignty as neither absolute nor
unlimited, and proposes that it should not be an exclusive attribute of the modern
territorial state. Althusius argued, ‘for this right of sovereignty is not the supreme
power; neither is it perpetual or above law … Indeed, an absolute and supreme power
standing above all laws is called tyrannical’.74
Analysis of federalism and its contribution to the study of sovereignty is of paramount
importance towards an understanding of the concept of sovereignty, which perceived
within the Althusian framework, has a flexible and non-absolute character. This, in
the view of the author of this thesis, better represents the concept of sovereignty in the
present international system.
The EU as a ‘confederal’ polity, where sovereignty is effectively shared between the
member states and the Union75 is a paradigmatic case, in part because of its
idiosyncrasy, and also because of the interactions between the national constitutional
courts and the ECJ in jointly interpreting the concept of sovereignty in a multi-level
governance system, as the decision on the Lisbon Treaty by the FCC demonstrates.76
72 Jean Bodin, Six Books of the Commonwealth, op. cit., p. 1.
73 Stephen Krasner, The Durability of Organized Hypocrisy, in Hent Kalmo and Quentin
Skinner (eds), Sovereignty in Fragments, op. cit., p. 112.
74 Johannes Althusius, Politica, op. cit., p. 18.
75 The FCC called the EU an ‘association of sovereign states’ (staatenverbund) as discussed
in Chapter 4.
76 For Allot, ‘As in international society so also in the society of the European Union, the
reality has overtaken the fantasy. The sharing of sovereign powers between states is now a
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The concept of sovereignty should also be seen in the context of ‘deterritorialization
of authority’, as the element of authority that is detached from the territory of the
state. This process of ‘disaggregation of authority’ away from the national territorial
jurisdictions further undermines the Bodinian conception of sovereignty, as Watts
emphasises: ‘two of the perceived underpinnings of the old international community
are disappearing before our eyes (if only we open them wide enough) – namely,
sovereignty and territory. The modern world is no longer a place in which either of
these two notions can prosper’.77 This means that the Grundnorm78 in International
Law recognises both the supreme authority of the state and the authority of the
different international legal regimes.
The argument throughout this thesis reaffirms that the concept of international legal
sovereignty – or sovereign equality – is determined by the ‘constitutional rules’ of the
international system, and that these rules are rule of membership, rules of conduct and
secondary rules.79 In the present international system, these rules began with the UN
major structural feature of international society. It is the major structural feature of the
European Union, where the member states have shared almost all their basic sovereign rights
with the Union’, Philip Allot, The Health of Nations: Society and Law beyond the State,
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002, p. 177; similarly, Gidon Gottlieb, Nation
Against State: A New Approach to Ethnic Conflicts and the Decline of Sovereignty, New
York: Council of Foreign Relations Press, 1993, p. 38.
77 Arthur Watts, ‘The Importance of International Law,’ in Michael Byers (ed), The Role of
Law in International Politics: Essays in International Relations and International Law,
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000, p. 10.
78 Fundamental Rule (Hart calls it ‘rule of recognition’), is found in Hans Kelsen, Pure
Theory of Law, Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1970.
79 That said, it is important to point out that the claim of supreme authority of the sovereign
state was never fully reconciled with the idea of an international society because of the
consensual nature of International Law, see Andrew Hurrell, On Global Order, Power,
Values, and the Constitution of the International Society, Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2007, p. 49. The ‘Lotus principle’ (as a result of the Lotus decision of the ICJ) states that
‘Restrictions upon the independence of States cannot therefore be presumed’. This principle
should be understood in the context of the foundational rules of the international system,
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Charter, which established the foundational rules of the present system, but these
rules now encompass a plethora of legal regimes that go beyond the UN system. This
is why it is important to understand that the international society established after
1945 by the United Nations system is becoming increasing pluralistic.
The emergence of regional legal systems, such as the EU and functional regimes
such as the WTO and the ICC, have created new challenges to the absolute
conception of sovereignty when it is considered that these organisations claim a
sphere of authority that is not bound by the national jurisdiction of the sovereign
state. These legal systems challenge the monopoly of the modern territorial state in
wielding supreme authority over its territory, with the result that the jurisdiction of
the state – traditionally defined as jurisdiction to prescribe, jurisdiction to enforce
and jurisdiction to adjudicate – is now being exercised by these institutional
arrangements.80
In the view of the author of this thesis, legal pluralism offers a theory that explains
well the articulation of the different legal systems (the national, the international,
regional and functional legal orders), each of which claim supreme authority.81 Legal
pluralism emphasises the diversity of legal systems in a world where International
Law is becoming increasingly fragmented by the emergence of self-contained
regimes, as Krisch argues:
Pluralism eschews the hope of building one common, overarching
legal framework that would integrate postnational governance,
distribute powers, and provide for means of solving disputes
between the various layers of law and politics. It is based instead on
Lotus case, Para. 44, at: http://www.worldcourts.com/pcij/eng/decisions/1927.
09.07_lotus.htm; see also, Martti Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia, op. cit., pp. 255–58.
80 On the manifestations of jurisdiction of the states: jurisdiction to prescribe, jurisdiction to
enforce and jurisdiction to adjudicate, see Antonio Cassese, International Law, Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2005, second edition, p. 49.
81 For a sceptical view of legal pluralism at the international level, see Martti Koskenniemi,
The Politics of International Law, op. cit., pp. 350–54.
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the heterarchical interplay of these layers according to rules
ultimately set by each layer itself. In pluralism, there is no common
legal point of reference to appeal to for resolving disagreement;
conflicts are solved through convergence, mutual accommodation –
or not at all. It is a vision that takes societal fragmentation to the
institutional level.82
Some authors argue that International Law is in the process of
‘constitutionalization’83 but that implies that there is an increasing group of norms
and rules that enjoy higher status in International Law. In the view of the author of
this thesis, this might be the case only if ‘constitution’ is defined as a set of
foundational rules that establish the international society of states.84 The
82 Nico Krisch, Beyond Constitutionalism: The Pluralist Structure of Post-National Law,
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010, p. 69.
83 Fassbender sees the UN Charter as a ‘constitutional’ charter for the international
community, see Bardo Fassbender, ‘Sovereignty and Constitutionalism in International Law,’
op. cit., p. 130; also Bardo Fassbender, ‘We the Peoples of the United Nations: Constituent
Power and Constitutional Form in International Law,’ in Martin Loughlin and Neil Walker,
The Paradox of Constitutionalism, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007, p. 281.
84 The idea of a Constitution in International Law makes sense only if Constitution is defined
in the material sense (not in the formal sense): defined as a set of foundational principles of
the international society of states, see Hans Kelsen, General Theory of Law and the State, op.
cit., pp. 124–5. The problems of translation of a Constitutionalism beyond the state occur also
in International Law because the language of constitutionalism is inherently national, as
argued in Chapter 4 of this thesis when discussing the possibilities of a European
constitutionalism.
For a skeptical view of the ‘constitutionalization’ of International Law and arguing that the
existence of a constitutionalised political order is vastly overstated, see Jean L. Cohen,
‘Whose Sovereignty? Empire versus International Law,’ Ethics and International Affairs, vol.
18, No. 3, 2004, p. 11. For a more positive view of the constituionalization of International
Law, arguing that individuals and not states should be the cornerstone of International Law,
see Anne Peters, ‘Membership in the Global Constitutional Community,’ in Jan Klabbers,
Anne Peters, and Geir Ulfstein, The Constitutionalization of International Law, op. cit., p.
157, p. 178. For Anne Peters, the concept of sovereignty ‘exists only within the confines of
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constitutionalization of International Law does not imply an endorsement of a ‘world
state’, but contrarily, it can be seen as an answer to the fragmentation of International
order.85
Hence, it is important to adopt a pluralist conception of sovereignty within the
framework of the Althusian tradition as opposed to an absolutist conception found in
the Bodinian tradition.86 The Althusian tradition is more consistent with the realities
of the present international system, whereby states share sovereignty with different
international institutions. This meaning of sovereignty ‘posits any sovereign as fully
dependent upon the historical concept from which it emerges’.87 Moreover,
International Law should incorporate the contribution of federalism as an apolitical
theory, particularly in analysing the union of states, and should not relegate the study
of federalism to Constitutional Law.
The notion of an international society of states is a very important one to International
Law, but the dichotomy between sovereignty and international community is false,
when it is acknowledged that: ‘neither sovereignty nor world community has any
fixed meaning, and that the choice between the two cannot be made as a principled
commitment, only as a hegemonic strategy’.88 This means that the international
society created in 1945 with the UN, accepted the principle of sovereign equality as
international constitutional law’, see Anne Peters, ‘Membership in the Global Constitutional
Community’, ibid., p. 185.
85 Bardo Fassbender, ‘The Meaning of International Constitutional Law,’ in Nicholas
Tsagourias, Transnational Constitutionalism, op. cit., p. 311.
86 Changes to the concept of sovereignty should be considered in the Althusian tradition with
its history and its own ‘tradition of discourse’, see Terence Ball, ‘Conceptual History and the
History of Political Thought,’ in Iain Hampsher-Monk, Karin Tilmans and Frank Vree (eds),
History of Concepts: Comparative Perspectives, Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press,
1998, p. 81.
87 Charles Barbour and George Pavlich, ‘Introduction,’ in Charles Barbour and George
Pavlich (eds), After Sovereignty, op. cit., 2010, p. 5.
88 Martti Koskenniemi, The Politics of International Law, op. cit., p. 225.
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an ordering principle, while acknowledging a ‘world community’ with some universal
norms.89
Thus, International Law should recognise the inherent malleability of the concept of
sovereignty, and appreciate that the pull towards centralisation and unity in
International Law is not possible in a world of increasingly fragmented legal orders.
Thus, International Law should reflect the ‘idea of an emerging law of a transnational
society’.90
Sovereignty cannot, therefore, be seen just as an emanation of the transfer of powers
by states to international institutions (regional and functional).91 On the contrary,
sovereignty is an attribute of statehood that is exercised increasingly by different
polities and institutional arrangements, without reference to the primacy of the state.
4. Conclusion
The chapter has examined the changes to the concept of sovereignty in the
international system, considering different mechanisms of global governance. The
institutionalisation of these mechanisms, it has been argued, need to be seen in the
89 Ian Clark, Legitimacy in International Society, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005, pp.
144–51. The contemporary international society was established by the UN and represented
the political consensus of its age, although the practice of the UN during the Cold War was
never compatible with its ideals.
90 Andrew Hurrell, ‘Conclusion: International Law and the Changing Constitution of the
International Society, in Michael Byers (ed), The Role of Law in International Politics:
Essays in International Relations and International Law, Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2000, p. 357.
91 Joyce emphasises this point by arguing that in this approach, the state is the ‘unmoved
mover’ and sovereignty can only be exercised by the state, see Richard Joyce, ‘Sovereignty
after Sovereignty,’ in Charles Barbour and George Pavlich (eds), After Sovereignty, op. cit., p.
37. International institutions exercise authority not just trough the delegated authority of the
state but also through the authority of own self-referential legal system, this is what Raz calls
the ‘authoritative nature of law’, Joseph Raz, Between Authority and Interpretation, On the
Theory of Law and Interpretation, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009, pp. 109.
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context of international cooperation, when action by two or more states is required in
order to deal with transnational issues, for example, negative externalities.
However, as a corollary, these mechanisms of global governance challenge state
authority when authoritative structures are developed within their own legal systems
and dispute-resolution mechanisms by claiming a sphere of authority that overlaps
with the authority of the modern territorial state.
The chapter has analysed the contribution the federalist tradition – inaugurated by
Althusius – has made to the concept of sovereignty, considering its emphasis on the
non-absolute and pluralistic character of sovereignty.
In the international system, a plurality of institutional arrangements regulate a certain
area (functional arrangements) or region (regional arrangements), which are
challenging the Westphalian system of sovereign states. Moreover, the challenges
posed by the changes in the constitutional rules of the international system are
opening up new possibilities for different polities and institutional arrangements.
The chapter has also examined the increasing international arrangements and
enforcement mechanisms in place to protect the individual, particularly in the field of
International Criminal Law.
The rise of these different international regimes – regional or functional – have
contributed to the increasing fragmentation of the international legal system, and
bearing this in mind, the chapter has addressed global legal pluralism as an alternative
both to either monism or dualism. Global legal pluralism is seen as a theory capable
of articulating the different legal orders in a world where each legal system claims
exclusive authority.
The chapter concluded with a re-statement of the argument concerning the nature and
evolution of the concept of sovereignty in International Law.
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